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THE

MISCELLANEOUS

WORKS

Of the Right Honourable

HENRY St. JOHN,

Lord Viscount BOLINGBROKE.

VOLUME IV.

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THE

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HENRY ST. JOHN,

LORD VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE.

VOLUME IV.

CONTAINING

I. A Letter to SIR WILLIAM WINDHAM.

II. REFLECTIONS on the Present state of the Nation.

III. Letters on the SPIRIT of PATRIOTISM.

IV. On the IDEA of a PATRIOT KING.

V. On the STATE of PARTIES at the Accession of KING GEORGE the FIRST.

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CONTENTS of Vol. IV.

	Page
A Letter to Sir William Windham, ——	1
Reflections on the present State of the Nation, principally with regard to her taxes and her debts; and on the causes and consequences of them. —— ——	123
On the Spirit of Patriotism, ——	176
The Idea of a Patriot King, ——	211
On the State of Parties at the Accession of King George I.	305

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A

LETTER

TO

Sir WILLIAM WINDHAM.

Written in the Year MDCCXVII.

By the Right Honourable

HENRY St. JOHN,

Lord Viscount BOLINGBROKE.

A

LETTER

TO

SIR WILLIAM WINDHAM.

I WAS well enough acquainted with the general character of mankind, and in particular, with that of my own countrymen, to expect to be as much out of the minds of the Tories during my exile, as if we had never lived and acted together. I depended on being forgot by them; and was far from imagining it poſſible that I ſhould be remembered, only to be condemned loudly by one half of them, and to be tacitly cenſured by the greateſt part of the other half. As ſoon as I was ſeparated from the pretender and his intereſt, I declared myſelf to be ſo; and I gave directions for writing into England what I judged ſufficient to put my friends on their guard againſt any ſurpriſe concerning an event, which it was their intereſt, as well as mine, that they ſhould be very rightly informed about.

As ſoon as the pretender's adherents began to clamour againſt me in this country, and to diſperſe

their ſcandal by circular letters every where elſe, I gave directions for writing into England again. Their groundleſs articles of accuſation were refuted, and enough was ſaid to give my friends a general idea of what had happened to me, and at leaſt to make them ſuſpend the fixing any opinion till ſuch time as I ſhould be able to write more fully and plainly to them myſelf. To condemn no perſon unheard, is a rule of natural equity, which we ſee rarely violated in Turky, or in the country where I am writing: that it would not be ſo with me in Great Britain, I confeſs that I flattered myſelf. I dwelt ſecurely in this confidence, and gave very little attention to any of thoſe ſcurrilous methods, which were taken about this time to blaſt my reputation. The event of things has ſhewn, that I truſted too much to my own innocence, and to the juſtice of my old friends.

It was obvious that the Chevalier and the Earl of Mar hoped to load me with the imputation of treachery, incapacity, or neglect: it was indifferent to them of which. If they could aſcribe to one of thoſe their not being ſupported from France, they imagined that they ſhould juſtify their precipitate flight from Scotland, which many of their faſteſt friends exclaimed againſt; and that they ſhould varniſh over that original capital fault, the drawing the Highlanders together in arms at the time and in the manner in which it was done.

The Scots, who fell at once from all the ſanguine expectations with which they had been ſoothed, and who found themſelves reduced to deſpair, were eaſy to be incenſed; they had received no ſupport whatever, and it was natural for them rather

to

to believe that they failed of this support by my fault, than to imagine their general had prevailed on them to rise in the very point of time when it was impossible that they should be supported from France, or from any other part of the world. The Duke of Ormond, who had been the bubble of his own popularity, was enough out of humour with the general turn of affairs to be easily set against any particular man. The emissaries of this court, whose commission was to amuse, had imposed upon him all along; and there were other busy people who thought to find their account in having him to themselves. I had never been in his secret whilst we were in England together; and from his first coming into France, he was either prevailed upon by others, or, which I rather believe, he concurred with others to keep me out of it. The perfect indifference I shewed whether I was in it or no, might carry him from acting separately, to act against me.

The whole tribe of Irish and other Papists were ready to seize the first opportunity of venting their spleen against a man, who had constantly avoided all intimacy with them; who acted in the same cause, but on a different principle, and who meant no one thing in the world less, than railing them to the advantages, which they expected.

That those several persons, for the reasons I have mentioned, should join in a cry against me, is not very marvellous: the contrary would be so to a man who knows them as well as I do. But that the English Tories should serve as echos to them, nay more, that my character should continue doubtful at best amongst you, when those who first propa-

gated the ſlander, are become aſhamed of railing without proof, and have dropped the clamour, this I own that I never expected: and I may be allowed to ſay, that as it is an extreme ſurpriſe, ſo it ſhall be a leſſon to me.

The Whigs impeached and attainted me. They went farther—at leaſt, in my way of thinking, that ſtep was more cruel than all the others—by a partial repreſentation of facts, and pieces of facts, put together as it beſt ſuited their purpoſe, and publiſhed to the whole world, they did all that in them lay to expoſe me for a fool, and to brand me for a knave. But then I had deſerved this abundantly at their hands, according to the notions of party juſtice. The Tories have not indeed impeached nor attainted me; but they have done, and are ſtill doing ſomething very like to that which I took worſe of the Whigs, than the impeachment and attainder: and this, after I have ſhewn an inviolable attachment to the ſervice, and almoſt an implicit obedience to the will of the party; when I am actually an out-law, deprived of my honours, ſtripped of my fortune, and cut off from my family and my country, for their ſakes.

Some of the perſons who have ſeen me here, and with whom I have had the pleaſure to talk of you, may, perhaps, have told you, that, far from being oppreſſed by that ſtorm of misfortunes in which I have been toſſed of late, I bear up againſt it with firmneſs enough, and even with alacrity. It is true, I do ſo: but it is true likewiſe, that the laſt burſt of the cloud has gone near to overwhelm me. From our enemies we expect evil treatment of every ſort, we are prepared for it, we are animated by it, and

we

we ſometimes triumph in it : but when our friends abandon us, when they wound us, and when they take, to do this, an occaſion where we ſtand the moſt in need of their ſupport, and have the beſt title to it, the firmeſt mind finds it hard to reſiſt.

Nothing kept up my ſpirits when I was firſt reduced to the very circumſtances I now deſcribe, ſo much as the conſideration of the deluſions under which I knew that the Tories lay, and the hopes I entertained of being able ſoon to open their eyes, and to juſtify my conduct. I expected that friendſhip, or, if that principle failed, curioſity at leaſt, would move the party to ſend over ſome perſon, from whoſe report they might have both ſides of the queſtion laid before them. Though this expectation be founded in reaſon, and you want to be informed, at leaſt as much as I do to be juſtified ; yet I have hitherto flattered myſelf with it in vain. To repair this misfortune, therefore, as far as lies in my power, I reſolve to put into writing the ſum of what I ſhould have ſaid in that caſe. Theſe papers ſhall ly by me till time and accidents produce ſome occaſion of communicating them to you. The true occaſion of doing it, with advantage to the party, will probably be loſt ; but they will remain a monument of my juſtification to poſterity. At worſt, if even this fails me, I am ſure of one ſatisfaction in writing them ; the ſatisfaction of unburdening my mind to a friend, and of ſtating before an equitable judge the account, as I apprehend it to ſtand, between the Tories and myſelf. *Quantum humano conſilio efficere potui, circumſpectis rebus meis omnibus, rationibuſque ſubductis, ſummam feci cogitationum mearum omnium, quam tibi, ſi potero, breviter exponam.*

It is neceſſary to my deſign that I call to your mind the ſtate of affairs in Britain, from the latter part of the year 1710, to the beginning of the year 1715, about which time we parted. I go no farther back, becauſe the part which I acted before that time, in the firſt eſſays I made in public affairs, was the party of a Tory, and ſo far of a piece with that which I acted afterwards. Beſides, things which preceded this ſpace of time had no immediate influence on thoſe which happened ſince that time; whereas the ſtrange events, which we have ſeen fall out in the king's reign, were owing in a great meaſure to what was done, or neglected to be done, in the laſt four years of the queen's. The memory of theſe events being freſh, I ſhall dwell as little as poſſible upon them. It will be ſufficient that I make a rough ſketch of the face of the court, and of the conduct of the ſeveral parties during that time. Your memory will ſoon furniſh the colours which I ſhall omit to lay, and finiſh up the picture.

From the time at which I left Britain I had not the advantage of acting under the eyes of the party which I ſerved, nor of being able from time to time, to appeal to their judgment. The groſs of what happened has appeared; but the particular ſteps, which led to thoſe events, have been either concealed or miſrepreſented: concealed from the nature of them, or miſrepreſented by thoſe with whom I never agreed perfectly, except in thinking they and I were extremely unfit to continue embarked in the ſame bottom together. It will, therefore, be proper to deſcend, under this head, to a more particular relation.

In

In the ſummer of the year 1710 the queen was prevailed upon to change her parliament and her miniſtry. The intrigue of the Earl of Oxford might facilitate the means, the violent proſecution of Sacheverel, and other unpopular meaſures, might create the occaſion, and encourage her in the reſolution: but the true original cauſe was the perſonal ill uſage which ſhe received in her private life, and in ſome trifling inſtances of the exerciſe of her power; for indulgence in which ſhe would certainly have left the reins of government in thoſe hands which had held them ever ſince her acceſſion to the throne.

I am afraid that we came to court in the ſame diſpoſitions as all parties have done; that the principal ſpring of our actions was to have the government of the ſtate in our hands; that our principal views were the conſervation of this power, great employments to ourſelves, and great opportunities of rewarding thoſe who had helped to raiſe us, and of hurting thoſe who ſtood in oppoſition to us. It is however true, that with theſe conſiderations of private and party intereſt there were others intermingled, which had for their object the public good of the nation, at leaſt what we took to be ſuch.

We looked on the political principles, which had generally prevailed in our government from the revolution in 1688, to be deſtructrive of our true intereſt, to have mingled us too much in the affairs of the continent, to tend to the impoveriſhing our people, and to the looſening the bands of our conſtitution in church and ſtate. We ſuppoſed the Tory party to be the bulk of the landed intereſt, and to have no contrary influence blended

blended into its compoſition. We ſuppoſed the Whigs to be the remains of a party formed againſt the ill deſigns of the court under King Charles the ſecond, nurſed up into ſtrength, and applied to contrary uſes by King William the third, and yet ſo weak as to lean for ſupport on the Preſbyterians and the other ſectaries, on the bank and the other corporations, on the Dutch and the other allies. From hence we judged it to follow, that they had been forced, and muſt continue ſo, to render the national intereſt ſubſervient to the intereſt of thoſe who lent them an additional ſtrength, without which they could never be the prevalent party. The view, therefore, of thoſe amongſt us, who thought in this manner, was to improve the queen's favour to break the body of the Whigs, to render their ſupports uſeleſs to them, and to fill the employments of the kingdom, down to the meaneſt, with Tories. We imagined that ſuch meaſures, joined to the advantages of our numbers and our property, would ſecure us againſt all attempts during her reign; and that we ſhould ſoon become too conſiderable, not to make our terms in all events which might happen afterwards; concerning which, to ſpeak truly, I believe few or none of us had any very ſettled reſolution.

In order to bring theſe purpoſes about, I verily think, that the perſecution of diſſenters entered into no man's head. By the bills for preventing occaſional conformity and the growth of ſchiſm, it was hoped that their ſting would be taken away. Theſe bills were thought neceſſary for our party intereſt, and beſides were deemed neither unreaſonable

able nor unjuſt. The good of ſociety may require, that no perſon ſhould be deprived of the protection of the government on account of his opinions in religious matters; but it does not follow from hence, that men ought to be truſted in any degree with the preſervation of the eſtabliſhment, who muſt, to be conſiſtent with their principles, endeavour the ſubverſion of what is eſtabliſhed. An indulgence to conſciences, which the prejudice of education and long habits have rendered ſcrupulous, may be agreeable to the rules of good policy and of humanity: yet will it hardly follow from hence that a government is under any obligation to indulge a tenderneſs of conſcience to come; or connive at the propagating of theſe prejudices, and at the forming of theſe habits. The evil effect is without remedy, and may therefore deſerve indulgence; but the evil cauſe is to be prevented, and can, therefore, be intitled to none. Beſides this, the bills I am ſpeaking of, rather than to enact any thing new, ſeemed only to enforce the obſervation of ancient laws; which had been judged neceſſary for the ſecurity of the church and ſtate at a time, when the memory of the ruin of both, and of the hands by which that ruin had been wrought, was freſh in the minds of men.

The bank, the Eaſt-India company, and in general the moneyed intereſt, had certainly nothing to apprehend like what they feared, or affected to fear from the Tories, an entire ſubverſion of their property. Multitudes of our own party would have been wounded by ſuch a blow. The intention of thoſe, who were the warmeſt, ſeemed to me to go no farther than reſtraining their influence on the

the legiſlature, and on matters of ſtate; and finding at a proper ſeaſon means to make them contribute to the ſupport and eaſe of a government, under which they enjoyed advantages ſo much greater than the reſt of their fellow ſubjects. The miſchievous conſequence which had been foreſeen, and foretold too, at the eſtabliſhment of thoſe corporations, appeared viſibly. The country gentlemen were vexed, put to great expences and even baffled by them in their elections: and among the members of every parliament numbers were immediately or indirectly under their influence. The bank had been extravagant enough to pull off the maſk; and, when the queen ſeemed to intend a change in her miniſtry, they had deputed ſome of their members to repreſent againſt it. But that which touched ſenſibly even thoſe who were but little affected by other conſiderations, was the prodigious inequality between the condition of the moneyed men and of the reſt of the nation. The proprietor of the land, and the merchant who brought riches home by the returns of foreign trade, had during two wars bore the whole immenſe load of the national expences; whilſt the lender of money, who added nothing to the common ſtock, throve by the public calamity, and contributed not a mite to the public charge.

As to the allies, I ſaw no difference of opinion among all thoſe who came to the head of affairs at this time. Such of the Tories as were in the ſyſtem abovementioned, ſuch of them as deſerted ſoon after from us, and ſuch of the Whigs as had upon this occaſion deſerted to us, ſeemed equally convinced of the unreaſonableneſs, and even of the impoſſibility, of continuing the war on the ſame diſproportionate

tionate foot. Their univerſal ſenſe was, that we had taken, except the part of the States General, the whole burden of the war upon us, and even a proportion of this; while the entire advantage was to accrue to others: That this had appeared very groſsly in 1709, and 1710, when preliminaries were inſiſted upon, which contained all that the allies, giving the greateſt looſe to their wiſhes, could deſire, and little or nothing on the behalf of Great Britain: That the war which had been begun for the ſecurity of the allies, was continued for their grandeur; that the ends propoſed, when we engaged in it, might have been anſwered long before, and therefore that the firſt favourable occaſion ought to be ſeized of making peace; which we thought to be the intereſt of our country, and which appeared to all mankind, as well as to us, to be that of our party.

Theſe were in general the views of the Tories; and for the part I acted in the proſecution of them, as well as of all the meaſures acceſſory to them, I may appeal to mankind. To thoſe who had the opportunity of looking behind the curtain, I may likewiſe appeal for the difficulties which lay in my way, and for the particular diſcouragements which I met with. A principal load of parliamentary and foreign affairs, in their ordinary courſe, lay upon me: The whole negotiation of the peace, and of the troubleſome invidious ſteps preliminary to it, as far as they could be tranſacted at home, were thrown upon me. I continued in the houſe of commons during that important ſeſſion which preceded the peace; and which, by the ſpirit ſhewn through the whole courſe of it, and by the reſolu-

tions,

tions taken in it, rendered the concluſion of the treaties practicable. After this I was dragged into the houſe of lords; in ſuch a manner as to make my promotion a puniſhment, not a reward; and was there left to defend the treaties almoſt alone.

It would not have been hard, to have forced the Earl of Oxford to uſe me better. His good intentions began to be very much doubted of: The truth is, no opinion of his ſincerity had ever taken root in the party; and, which was worſe perhaps for a man in his ſtation, the opinion of his capacity began to fall apace. He was ſo hard puſhed in the houſe of lords, in the beginning of 1712, that he had been forced, in the middle of the ſeſſion, to perſuade the Queen to make a promotion of twelve peers at once; which was an unprecedented and invidious meaſure, to be excuſed by nothing but the neceſſity, and hardly by that. In the houſe of commons his credit was low, and my reputation very high. You know the nature of that aſſembly; they grow, like hounds, fond of the man who ſhews them game, and by whoſe halloo they are uſed to be encouraged. The thread of the negotiations, which could not ſtand ſtill a moment without going back, was in my hands; and before another man could have made himſelf maſter of the buſineſs, much time would have been loſt, and great inconveniencies would have followed. Some, who oppoſed the court ſoon after, began to waver then; and if I had not wanted the inclination, I ſhould have wanted no help to do miſchief. I knew the way of quitting my employments, and of retiring from court when the ſervice of my party required it: but I could not bring myſelf up to that reſolu-

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tion, when the conſequence of it muſt have been the breaking my party, and the diſtreſs of the public affairs. I thought my miſtreſs treated me ill: but the ſenſe of that duty which I owed her, came in aid of other conſiderations, and prevailed over my reſentment. Theſe ſentiments, indeed, are ſo much out of faſhion, that a man who avows them is in danger of paſſing for a bubble in the world: yet they were, in the conjuncture I ſpeak of, the true motives of my conduct; and you ſaw me go on as cheerfully in the troubleſome and dangerous work aſſigned me, as if I had been under the utmoſt ſatisfaction. I began, indeed, in my heart, to renounce the friendſhip, which, till that time, I had preſerved inviolable for Oxford. I was not aware of all his treachery, nor of the baſe and little means which he employed then, and continued to employ afterwards, to ruin me in the opinion of the Queen, and every where elſe. I ſaw, however, that he had no friendſhip for any body, and that with reſpect to me, inſtead of having the ability to render that merit, which I endeavoured to acquire, an addition of ſtrength to himſelf, it became the object of his jealouſy, and a reaſon for undermining me. In this temper of mind I went on, till the great work of the peace was conſummated, and the treaty ſigned at Utrecht: after which a new and more melancholy ſcene for the party, as well as for me, opened itſelf.

I am far from thinking the treaties, or the negotiations which led to them, exempt from faults. Many were made no doubt in both, by thoſe who were concerned in them; by myſelf, in the firſt place; and many were owing purely to the oppoſi-

tion they met with in every ſtep of their progreſs. I never look back on this great event, paſſed as it is, without a ſecret emotion of mind; when I compare the vaſtneſs of the undertaking, and the importance of its ſucceſs, with the means employed to bring it about, and with thoſe which were employed to traverſe it. To adjuſt the pretenſions, and to ſettle the intereſt of ſo many princes and ſtates, as were engaged in the late war, would appear, when conſidered ſimply and without any adventitious difficulty, a work of prodigious extent. But this was not all. Each of our allies thought himſelf entitled to raiſe his demands to the moſt extravagant height. They had been encouraged to this, firſt, by the engagements which we had entered into with ſeveral of them, with ſome to draw them into the war, with others to prevail on them to continue in it; and, ſecondly, by the manner in which we had treated with France in 1709-10. Thoſe who intended to tie the knot of the war as hard, and to render the coming at a peace as impracticable as they could, had found no method ſo effectual as that of leaving every one at liberty to inſiſt on all he could think of, and leaving themſelves at liberty, even if theſe conceſſions ſhould be made, to break the treaty by ulterior demands. That this was the ſecret, I can make no doubt after the confeſſion of one of the * plenipotentiaries who tranſacted theſe matters, and who communicated to me and to two others of the Queen's miniſters an inſtance of the Duke of Marlborough's management at a critical moment, when the French miniſters at Gertrudenburg ſeem-

* Buys Penſionary of Amſterdam.

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ed inclinable to come into an expedient for explaining the thirty-ſeventh article of the preliminaries, which could not have been refuſed. Certain it is, that the king of France was at that time in earneſt to execute the article of Philip's abdication; and therefore the expedients for adjuſting what related to this article would eaſily enough have been found, if on our part there had been a real intention of concluding. But there was no ſuch intention; and the plan of thoſe who meant to prolong the war was eſtabliſhed among the allies, as the plan which ought to be followed whenever a peace came to be treated. The allies imagined that they had a right to obtain, at leaſt, every thing which had been demanded for them reſpectively: and it was viſible that nothing leſs would content them. Theſe conſiderations ſet the vaſtneſs of the undertaking in a ſufficient light.

The importance of ſucceeding, in the work of the peace, was equally great to Europe, to our country, to our party, to our perſons, to the preſent age, and to future generations. But I need not take pains to prove what no man will deny. The means employed to bring it about were in no degree proportionable. A few men, ſome of whom had never been concerned in buſineſs of this kind before, and moſt of whom put their hands for a long time to it faintly and timorouſly, were the inſtruments of it. The miniſter who was at their head ſhewed himſelf every day incapable of that attention, that method, that comprehenſion of different matters, which the firſt poſt in ſuch a government as ours requires in quiet times. He was the firſt ſpring of all our motion by his credit with the

Queen, and his concurrence was neceſſary to every thing we did by his rank in the ſtate; and yet this man ſeemed to be ſometimes aſleep, and ſometimes at play. He neglected the thread of buſineſs; which was carried on, for this reaſon, with leſs diſpatch and leſs advantage in the proper channels; and he kept none in his own hands. He negotiated, indeed, by fits and ſtarts, by little tools, and indirect ways; and thus his activity became as hurtful as his indolence; of which I could produce ſome remarkable inſtances. No good effect could flow from ſuch a conduct. In a word, when this great affair was once engaged, the zeal of particular men in their ſeveral provinces drove it forward, though they were not backed by the concurrent force of the whole adminiſtration, nor had the common helps of advice till it was too late, till the very end of the negotiations; even in matters ſuch as that of commerce, which they could not be ſuppoſed to underſtand. That this is a true account of the means uſed to arrive at the peace, and a true character of that adminiſtration in general, I believe the whole cabinet-council of that time will bear me witneſs. Sure I am, that moſt of them have joined with me in lamenting this ſtate of things whilſt it ſubſiſted, and all thoſe who were employed as miniſters in the ſeveral parts of the treaty, felt ſufficiently the difficulties which this ſtrange management often reduced them to. I am confident they have not forgot them.

If the means employed to bring the peace about were feeble, and in one reſpect contemptible, thoſe employed to break the negotiation were ſtrong and formidable. As ſoon as the firſt ſuſpicion of a treaty's

treaty's being on foot crept abroad into the world, the whole alliance united with a powerful party in the nation to obſtruct it. From that hour to the moment the congreſs of utrecht finiſhed, no one meaſure poſſible to be taken was ommitted, to traverſe every advance that was made in this work, to intimidate, to allure, to embarraſs every perſon concerned in it. This was done without any regard either to decency or good policy; and from hence it ſoon followed, that paſſion and humour mingled themſelves on each ſide. A great part of what we did for the peace, and of what others did againſt it, can be accounted for on no other principle. The allies were broke among themſelves before they began to treat with the common enemy. The matter did not mend in the courſe of the treaty; and France and Spain, but eſpecially the former, profited of this diſunion.

Whoever makes the compariſon which I have touched upon, will ſee the true reaſons which rendered the peace leſs anſwerable to the ſucceſs of the war than it might, and than it ought to have been. Judgment has been paſſed in this caſe, as the different paſſions or intereſts of men have inſpired them. But the real cauſe lay in the conſtitution of our miniſtry, and much more in the obſtinate oppoſition which we met with from the Whigs and from the allies. However, ſure it is, that the defects of the peace did not occaſion the deſertions from the Tory party which happened about this time, nor thoſe diſorders in the court which immediately followed.

Long before the purport of the treaties could be known, thoſe Whigs who had ſet out with us in 1710, began

began to relapſe back to their party. They had among us ſhared the harveſt of a new miniſtry, and like prudent perſons they took meaſures in time to have their ſhare in that of a new government.

The whimſical or the Hanover Tories continued zealous in appearance with us, till the peace was ſigned. I ſaw no people ſo eager for the concluſion of it. Some of them * were in ſuch haſte, that they thought any peace preferable to the leaſt delay, and omitted no inſtances to quicken their friends who were actors in it. As ſoon as the treaties were perfected, and laid before the parliament, the ſcheme of theſe gentlemen began to diſcloſe itſelf entirely. Their love of the peace, like their paſſions, cooled by enjoyment. They grew nice about the conſtruction of the articles, could come up to no direct approbation, and, being let into the ſecret of what was to happen, would not preclude themſelves from the glorious advantage of riſing on the ruins of their friends, and of their party.

The danger of the ſucceſſion, and the badneſs of the peace, were the two principles on which we were attacked. On the firſt, the whimſical Tories joined the Whigs, and declared directly againſt their party. Although nothing is more certain than this truth, that there was at that time no formed deſign in the party, whatever views ſome particular men might have againſt his Majeſty's acceſſion to the throne. On the latter, and moſt other points, they affected a moſt glorious neutrality.

Inſtead of gathering ſtrength, either as a miniſtry or as a party, we grew weaker every day. The peace had been judged with reaſon to be the only ſolid foundation whereupon we could erect a Tory

* Hanmer's etter.

ſyſtem:

ſyſtem: and yet when it was made we found ourſelves at a full ſtand. Nay the very work, which ought to have been the baſis of our ſtrength, was in part demoliſhed before our eyes, and we were ſtoned with the ruins of it. Whilſt this was doing, Oxford looked on, as if he had not been a party to all which had paſſed; broke now and then a jeſt, which ſavoured of the inns of court, and the bad company in which he had been bred; and on thoſe occaſions, where his ſtation obliged him to ſpeak of buſineſs, was abſolutely unintelligible.

Whether this man ever had any determined view, beſides that of raiſing his family, is, I believe, a problematical queſtion in the world. My opinion is, that he never had any other. The conduct of a miniſter, who propoſes to himſelf a great and noble object, and who purſues it ſteadily, may ſeem for a while a riddle to the world; eſpecially in a government like ours, where numbers of men, different in their characters, and different in their intereſts, are at all times to be managed; where public affairs are expoſed to more accidents and greater hazards than in the other countries; and where, by conſequence, he who is at the head of buſineſs will find himſelf often diſtracted by meaſures which have no relation to his purpoſe, and obliged to bend himſelf to things which are in ſome degree contrary to his main deſign. The ocean which environs us is an emblem of our government: and the pilot and the miniſter are in ſimilar circumſtances. It ſeldom happens that either of them can ſteer a direct courſe, and they both arrive at their port by means which frequently ſeem to carry them from it. But as the work advances, the conduct of him who leads it on with

with real abilities clears up, the appearing inconſiſtencies are reconciled, and when it is once conſummated, the whole ſhews itſelf ſo uniform, ſo plain, and ſo natural, that every dabbler in politics will be apt to think he could have done the ſame. But, on the other hand, a man who propoſes no ſuch object, who ſubſtitutes artifice in the place of ability, who, inſtead of leading parties, and governing accidents, is eternally agitated backwards and forwards by both, who begins every day ſomething new, and carries nothing on to perfection, may impoſe a while on the world: but a little ſooner or a little later, the myſtery will be revealed, and nothing will be found to be couched under it but a thread of pitiful expedients, the ultimate end of which never extended farther than living from day to day. Which of theſe pictures reſembles Oxford moſt, you will determine. I am ſorry to be obliged to name him ſo often; but how is it poſſible to do otherwiſe while I am ſpeaking of times wherein the whole turn of affairs depended on his motions and character?

I have heard, and I believe truly, that when he returned to Windſor, in the autumn of 1713, after the marriage of his ſon, he preſſed extremely to have him created Duke of Newcaſtle or Earl of Clare; and the Queen preſuming to heſitate on ſo extraordinary a propoſal, he reſented this heſitation in a manner which little became a man who had been ſo lately raiſed by the profuſion of her favours upon him. Certain it is, that he began then to ſhew a ſtill greater remiſſneſs in all parts of his miniſtry, and to affect to ſay, that from ſuch a time, the very

time

time I am ſpeaking of, he took no ſhare in the direction of affairs, or words to that effect.

He pretended to have diſcovered intrigues which were ſet on foot againſt him, and particularly he complained of the advantage which was taken of his abſence, during the journey he made at his ſon's marriage, to undermine him with the Queen. He is naturally inclined to believe the worſt; which I take to be a certain mark of a mean ſpirit and a wicked ſoul: at leaſt I am ſure that the contrary quality, when it is not due to weakneſs of underſtanding, is the fruit of a generous temper, and an honeſt heart. Prone to judge ill of all mankind, he will rarely be ſeduced by his credulity; but I never knew a man ſo capable of being the bubble of his diſtruſt and jealouſy. He was ſo in this caſe, although the Queen, who could not be ignorant of the truth, ſaid enough to undeceive him. But to be undeceived, and to own himſelf ſo, was not his play. He hoped by cunning to varniſh over his want of faith and of ability. He was deſirous to make the world impute the extraordinary part, or, to ſpeak more properly, the no part which he acted with the ſtaff of treaſurer in his hand, to the Queen's withdrawing her favour from him, and to his friends abandoning him: pretences utterly groundleſs when he firſt made them, and which he brought to be real at laſt. Even the winter before the Queen's death, when his credit began to wain apace, he might have regained it; he might have reconciled himſelf perfectly with all his ancient friends, and have acquired the confidence of the whole party. I ſay, he might have done all this; becauſe I am perſuaded that none of thoſe I have named were ſo convinced of his

his perfidy, ſo jaded with his yoke, or ſo much piqued perſonally againſt him, as I was: and yet if he would have exerted himſelf in concert with us, to improve the few advantages which were left us, and to ward off the viſible danger which threatened our perſons and our party, I would have ſtifled my private animoſity, and would have acted under him with as much zeal as ever. But he was incapable of taking ſuch a turn. The ſum of all his policy had been to amuſe the Whigs, the Tories, and the Jacobites, as long as he could, and to keep his power as long as he amuſed them. When it became impoſſible to amuſe mankind any longer, he appeared plainly at the end of his line.

By ſecret correſpondence with the late Earl of Halifax, and by the intrigues of his brother, and other fanatical relations, he had endeavoured to keep ſome hold on the Whigs.

The Tories were attached to him at firſt by the heat of a revolution in the miniſtry, by their hatred of the people who were diſcarded, and by the fond hopes which it is eaſy to give at the ſetting out of a new adminiſtration. Afterwards he held out the peace in proſpect to them, and to the Jacobites, ſeparately, as an event which muſt be brought about before he could effectually ſerve either. You cannot have forgot how things which we preſſed were put off, upon every occaſion, till the peace? the peace was to be the date of a new adminiſtration, and the period at which the millenary year of Toryiſm ſhould begin. Thus were the Tories at that time amuſed: and ſince my exile I have had the opportunity of knowing certainly and circumſtantially that the Jacobites were treated in the ſame manner,

manner, and that the pretender was made through the French miniſter, to expect that meaſures ſhould be taken for his reſtoration, as ſoon as the peace had rendered them practicable. He was to attempt nothing, his partiſans were to lie ſtill, Oxford undertook for all.

After many delays, fatal to the general intereſt of Europe, this peace was ſigned; and the only conſiderable thing which he brought about afterwards was the marriage I have mentioned above; and by it an acceſſion of riches and honour to a family, whoſe eſtate was very mean, and whoſe illuſtration before this time I never met with any where, but in the vain diſcourſes which he uſed to hold over claret. If he kept his word with any of the parties abovementioned, it muſt be ſuppoſed that he did ſo with the Whigs; for as to us we ſaw nothing after the peace but increaſe of mortification and nearer approaches to ruin. Not a ſtep was made towards compleating the ſettlement of Europe, which the treaties of Utrecht and Radſtat left imperfect; towards fortifying and eſtabliſhing the Tory party; towards ſecuring thoſe, who had been the principal actors in this adminiſtration, againſt future events. We had proceeded in a confidence that theſe things ſhould immediately follow the concluſion of the peace: he had never, I dare ſwear, entertained a thought concerning them. As ſoon as the laſt hand was given to the fortune of his family, he abandoned his miſtreſs, his friends, and his party, who had bore him ſo many years on their ſhoulders: and I was preſent when this want of faith was reproached him in the plaineſt and ſtrongeſt

ſtrongeſt terms by one of the honeſteſt * men in Britain, and before ſome of the moſt † conſiderable Tories. Even his impudence failed him on this occaſion: he did not ſo much as attempt an excuſe.

He could not keep his word which he had given the pretender and his adherents, becauſe he had formed no party to ſupport him in ſuch a deſign. He was ſure of having the Whigs againſt him if he made the attempt, and he was not ſure of having the Tories for him.

In this ſtate of confuſion and diſtreſs, to which he had reduced himſelf and us, you remember the part he acted. He was the ſpy of the Whigs, and voted with us in the morning againſt thoſe very queſtions which he had penned the night before with Walpole, and others.—He kept his poſt on terms which no man but he would have held it on, neither ſubmitting to the Queen, nor complying with his friends. He would not, or he could not act with us; and he reſolved that we ſhould not act without him, as long as he could hinder it. The Queen's health was very precarious, and at her death he hoped by theſe means to deliver us up, bound as it were hand and foot, to our adverſaries. On the foundation of this merit he flattered himſelf that he had gained ſome of the Whigs, and ſoftened at leaſt the reſt of the party to him. By his ſecret negotiations at Hanover, he took it for granted, that he was not only reconciled to that court, but that he ſhould, under his preſent Majeſty's reign,

* Lord Trever.

† Duke of Ormond, Lord Angleſey, Lord Harcourt, and myſelf, in Oxford's lodgings in St. James's houſe.

have

have as much credit as he had enjoyed under that of the Queen. He was weak enough to boaſt of this, and to promiſe his good offices voluntarily to ſeveral: for no man was weak enough to think them worth being ſolicited. In a word you muſt have heard that he anſwered to Lord Dartmouth and to Mr. Bromley, that one ſhould keep the privy ſeal, and the other the ſeals of ſecretary; and that Lord Couper makes no ſcruple of telling how he came to offer him the ſeals of Chancellor. When the King arrived, he went to Greenwich with an affectation of pomp and of favour. Againſt his ſuſpicious character, he was once in his life the bubble of his credulity; and this deluſion betrayed him into a puniſhment, more ſevere in my ſenſe than all which has happened to him ſince, or than perpetual exile; he was affronted in the manner in which he was preſented to the king. The meaneſt ſubject would have been received with goodneſs, the moſt obnoxious with an air of indifference; but he was received with the moſt diſtinguiſhing contempt. This treatment he had in the face of the nation. The King began his reign, in this inſtance, with puniſhing the ingratitude, the perfidy, the inſolence, which had been ſhewn to his predeceſſors. Oxford fled from court covered with ſhame, the object of the deriſion of the Whigs and of the indignation of the Tories.

The Queen might, if ſhe had pleaſed, have ſaved herſelf from all thoſe mortifications ſhe met with during the laſt months of her reign, and her ſervants and the Tory party from thoſe misfortunes which they endured during the ſame time, perhaps from thoſe which they have fallen into ſince her death.

When ſhe found that the peace, from the concluſion of which ſhe expected eaſe and quiet, brought ſtill greater trouble upon her; when ſhe ſaw the weakneſs of her government, and the confuſion of her affairs increaſe every day; when ſhe ſaw her firſt miniſter bewildered and unable to extricate himſelf or her; in fine, when the negligence of his public conduct, and the faucineſs of his private behaviour had rendered him inſupportable to her, and ſhe took the reſolution of laying him aſide, there was a ſtrength ſtill remaining ſufficient to have ſupported her government, to have fulfilled in great part the expectations of the Tories, and to have conſtituted both them and the miniſters in ſuch a ſituation as would have left them little to apprehend. Some deſigns were indeed on foot which might have produced very great diſorders: Oxford's conduct had given much occaſion to them, and with the terror of them he endeavoured to intimidate the Queen. But expedients were not hard to be found, by which thoſe deſigns might have been nipped in the bud, or elſe by which the perſons who promoted them might have been induced to lay them aſide. But that fatal irreſolution inherent to the Stuart race hung upon her. She felt too much inward reſentment to be able to conceal this diſgrace from him; yet after he had made this diſcovery, ſhe continued to truſt all her power in his hands.

No people ever were in ſuch a condition as ours continued to be from the autumn of 1713, to the ſummer following. The Queen's health ſunk every day. The attack which ſhe had in the winter at Windſor ſerved as a warning both to thoſe who wiſhed, and to thoſe who feared her death, to expect it. The party which oppoſed the court had

been

been continually gaining ſtrength by the weakneſs of our adminiſtration: and at this time their numbers were vaſtly encreaſed, and their ſpirit was raiſed by the near proſpect of the ſucceſſion taking place. We were not at liberty to exert the ſtrength we had. We ſaw our danger, and many of us ſaw the true means of avoiding it; but whilſt the magic wand was in the ſame hands, this knowledge ſerved only to increaſe our uneaſineſs; and, whether we would or no, we were forced with our eyes open to walk on towards the precipice. Every moment we became leſs able, if the Queen lived, to ſupport her government; if ſhe died, to ſecure ourſelves. One ſide was united in a common view, and acted upon an uniform plan; the other had really none at all. We knew that we were out of favour at the court of Hanover, that we were repreſented there as Jacobites, and that the Elector, his preſent Majeſty, had been rendered publicly a party to that oppoſition, in ſpite of which we made the peace: and yet we neither had taken, nor could take in our preſent circumſtances, any meaſures to be better or worſe there. Thus we languiſhed till the twenty-ſeventh of July 1714, when the Queen diſmiſſed the treaſurer. On the Friday following ſhe fell into an apoplexy, and died on Sunday the firſt of Auguſt.

You do me, I dare ſay, the juſtice to believe, that whilſt this ſtate of things laſted I ſaw very well, how little mention ſoever I might make of it at the time, that no man in the miniſtry, or in the party, was ſo much expoſed as myſelf. I could expect no quarter from the Whigs, for I had deſerved none. There were perſons amongſt them for

whom I had great eſteem and friendſhip; yet neither with theſe, nor with any others, had I preſerved a ſecret correſpondence, which might be of uſe to me in the day of diſtreſs: and beſides the general character of my party, I knew that particular prejudices were entertained againſt me at Hanover. The Whigs wanted nothing but an opportunity of attacking the peace, and it could hardly be imagined that they would ſtop there. In which caſe, I knew that they could have hold on no man ſo much as myſelf: the inſtructions, the orders, the memorials had been drawn by me, the correſpondence relating to it in France, and every where elſe, had been carried on by me; in a word my hand appeared to almoſt every paper that had been writ in the whole courſe of the negotiation. To all theſe conſiderations I added that of the weight of perſonal reſentment, which I had created againſt myſelf at home and abroad: in part unavoidably by the ſhare I was obliged to take in theſe affairs; and in part, if you will, unneceſſarily by the warmth of my temper, and by ſome unguarded expreſſions, for which I have no excuſe to make but that which Tacitus makes for his father-in law Julius Agricola, *honeſtius putabam offendere, quam odiſſe.*

Having this proſpect of being diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of my party, in the common calamity by ſeverer treatment, I might have juſtified myſelf by reaſon and by great authorities too, if I had made early proviſion, at leaſt to be ſafe, when I ſhould be no longer uſeful. How I could have ſecured this point I do not think fit to explain; but certain it is that I made no one ſtep towards it. I reſolved not

to

to abandon my party by turning Whig, or, which is worſe a great deal, whimſical; nor to treat ſeparately from it. I reſolved to keep myſelf at liberty to act on a Tory bottom. If the Queen diſgraced Oxford and continued to live afterwards, I knew we ſhould have time and means to provide for our future ſafety: if the Queen died and left us in the ſame unfortunate circumſtances, I expected to ſuffer for and with the Tories; and I was prepared for it.

The thunder had long grumbled in the air; and yet when the bolt fell, moſt of our party appeared as much ſurpriſed as if they had had no reaſon to expect it. There was a perfect calm and univerſal ſubmiſſion through the whole kingdom. The chevalier indeed ſet out as if his deſign had been to gain the coaſt and to embark for Great Britain; and the court of France made a merit to themſelves of ſtopping him and obliging him to return. But this, to my certain knowledge, was a farce acted by concert, to keep up an opinion of his character, when all opinion of his cauſe ſeemed to be at an end. He owned this concert to me at Bar, on the occaſion of my telling him that he would have found no party ready to receive him, and that the enterpriſe would have been to the laſt degree extravagant. He was at this time far from having any encouragement: no party, numerous enough to make the leaſt diſturbance, was formed in his favour. On the king's arrival the ſtorm aroſe. The menaces of the Whigs, backed by ſome very raſh declarations, by little circumſtances of humour which frequently offend more than real injuries, and by the entire

change of all the perſons in employment blew up the coals.

At firſt many of the Tories had been made to entertain ſome faint hopes that they would be permitted to live in quiet. I have been aſſured that the King left Hanover in that reſolution. Happy had it been for him and for us if he had continued in it; if the moderation of his temper had not been overborne by the violence of party, and his and the national intereſt ſacrificed to the paſſions of a few. Others there were among the Tories who had flattered themſelves with much greater expectations than theſe, and who had depended, not on ſuch imaginary favour and dangerous advancement as was offered them afterwards, but on real credit and ſubſtantial power under the new government. Such impreſſions on the minds of men had rendered the two houſes of parliament, which were then ſitting, as good courtiers to King George, as ever they had been to Queen Anne. But all theſe hopes being at once and with violence extinguiſhed, deſpair ſucceeded in their room.

Our party began ſoon to act like men delivered over to their paſſions, and unguided by any other principle; not like men fired by a juſt reſentment and a reaſonable ambition to a bold undertaking. They treated the government like men who were reſolved not to live under it; and yet they took no one meaſure to ſupport themſelves againſt it. They expreſſed, without reſerve or circumſpection, an eagerneſs to join in any attempt againſt the eſtabliſhment which they had received and confirmed, and which many of them had courted but a few weeks before: and yet in the midſt of all this bravery, when

when the election of the new parliament came on, ſome of thoſe very men acted with the coolneſs of thoſe who are much better diſpoſed to compound than to take arms.

The body of the Tories being in this temper, it is not to be wondered at, if they heated one another, and began apace to turn their eyes towards the pretender; and if thoſe few, who had already engaged with him, applied themſelves to improve the conjuncture, and endeavoured to liſt a party for him.

I went, about a month after the Queen's death, as ſoon as the ſeals were taken from me, into the country; and whilſt I continued there, I felt the general diſpoſition to Jacobitiſm increaſe daily among people of all ranks; among ſeveral who had been conſtantly diſtinguiſhed by their averſion to that cauſe. But at my return to London in the month of February or March 1715, a few weeks before I left England, I began for the firſt time in my whole life to perceive theſe general diſpoſitions ripen into reſolutions, and to obſerve ſome regular workings among many of our principal friends, which denoted a ſcheme of this kind. Theſe workings, indeed, were very faint; for the perſons concerned in carrying them on did not think it ſafe to ſpeak too plainly to men, who were, in truth, ill diſpoſed to the government, becauſe they neither found their account at preſent under it, nor had been managed with art enough to leave them hopes of finding it hereafter; but who at the ſame time had not the leaſt affection for the pretender's perſon, nor any principle favourable to his intereſt.

This was the ſtate of things when the new parliament,

ment, which his Majesty had called, assembled. A great majority of the elections had gone in favour of the Whigs; to which the want of concert among the Tories had contributed as much, as the vigour of that party, and the influence of the new government. The Whigs came to the opening of this parliament full of as much violence as could possess men who expected to make their court, to confirm themselves in power, and to gratify their resentments by the same measures. I have heard that it was a dispute among the ministers, how far this spirit should be indulged; and that the king was determined, or confirmed in a determination, to consent to the prosecutions, and to give the reins to the party, by the representations that were made to him, that great difficulties would arise in the conduct of the session if the court should appear inclined to check this spirit, and by Mr. W—'s undertaking to carry all the business successfully through the house of commons if they were at liberty. Such has often been the unhappy fate of our princes: a real necessity sometimes, and sometimes a seeming one, has forced them to compound with a part of the nation at the expence of the whole; and the success of their business for one year, has been purchased at the price of public disorder for many.

The conjuncture I am speaking of affords a memorable instance of this truth. If milder measures had been pursued, certain it is, that the Tories had never universally embraced Jacobitism. The violence of the Whigs forced them into the arms of the pretender. The court and the party seemed to vie with one another which should go the greatest lengths in severity: and the ministers, whose true interest

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it muſt at all times be to calm the minds of men, and who ought never to ſet the examples of extraordinary inquiries, or extraordinary accuſations, were upon this occaſion the tribunes of the people.

The council of regency, which began to ſit as ſoon as the Queen died, acted like a council of the holy office. Whoever looked on the face of the nation ſaw every thing quiet; not one of theſe ſymptoms appearing which muſt have ſhewn themſelves more or leſs at that moment, if, in reality, there had been any meaſures taken during the former reign to defeat the Proteſtant ſucceſſion. His majeſty aſcended the throne with as little contradiction and as little trouble, as ever a ſon ſucceeded a father in the poſſeſſion of a private patrimony. But he, who had the opportunity, which I had till my diſmiſſion, of ſeeing a great part of what paſſed in that council, would have thought that there had been an oppoſition actually formed, that the new eſtabliſhment was attacked openly from without, and betrayed from within.

The ſame diſpoſition continued after the King's arrival. This political inquiſition went on with all the eagerneſs imaginable in ſeiſing of papers, in ranſacking the Queen's cloſet, and examining even her private letters. The Whigs had clamoured loudly, and affirmed in the face of the world, that the nation had been ſold to France, to Spain, to the pretender; and whilſt they endeavoured in vain, by very ſingular methods, to find ſome colour to juſtify what they had advanced without proof, they put themſelves under an abſolute neceſſity of grounding the moſt ſolemn proſecution on things, whereof they might indeed have proof, but which would never

ver pass for crimes before any judges, but such as were parties at the same time.

In the King's first speech from the throne, all the inflaming hints were given, and all the methods of violence were chalked out to the two houses. The first steps in both were perfectly answerable: and, to the shame of the peerage be it spoken, I saw at that time several lords concur to condemn, in one general vote, all that they had approved of in a former parliament, by many particular resolutions. Among several bloody resolutions, proposed and agitated at this time, the resolution of impeaching me of high treason was taken: and I took that of leaving England, not in a panic terror, improved by the artifices of the Duke of Marlborough, whom I knew, even at that time, too well to act by his advice or information in any case, but on such grounds as the proceedings which soon followed sufficiently justified, and as I have never repented building upon. Those who blamed it in the first heat, were soon after obliged to change their language: for what other resolution could I take? The method of prosecution designed against me would have put me immediately out of condition to act for myself, or to serve those who were less exposed than me, but who were, however, in danger. On the other hand, how few were there on whose assistance I could depend, or to whom I would, even in those circumstances, be obliged? The ferment in the nation was wrought up to a considerable height; but there was, at that time, no reason to expect that it could influence the proceedings in parliament in favour of those who should be accused. Left to its own movement, it was much more pro-

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per to quicken than ſlacken the proſecutions: and who was there to guide its motions? The Tories, who had been true to one another to the laſt, were an handful, and no great vigour could be expected from them. The whimſicals, diſappointed of the figure which they hoped to make, began indeed to join their old friends. One * of the principal amongſt them, was ſo very good as to confeſs to me, that if the court had called the ſervants of the late Queen to account, and had ſtopped there, he muſt have conſidered himſelf as a judge, and have acted according to his conſcience, on what ſhould have appeared to him: but that war had been declared to the whole Tory party, and that now the ſtate of things was altered. This diſcourſe needed no commentary, and proved to me, that I had never erred in the judgment I made of this ſet of men. Could I then reſolve to be obliged to them, or to ſuffer with Oxford? As much as I ſtill was heated by the diſputes, in which I had been all my life engaged againſt the Whigs, I would ſooner have choſe to owe my ſecurity to their indulgence, than to the aſſiſtance of the whimſicals: but I thought baniſhment, with all her train of evils, preferable to either. I abhorred Oxford to that degree, that I could not bear to be joined with him in any caſe. Nothing perhaps contributed ſo much to determine me as this ſentiment. A ſenſe of honour would not have permitted me to diſtinguiſh between his caſe and mine own: and it was worſe than death to lie under the neceſſity of making them the ſame, and of taking meaſures in concert with him.

* Earl of Angleſey. I told the fact to the biſhop of Rocheſter, that night or the next day.

I am now come to the time at which I left England, and have finiſhed the firſt part of that deduction of facts which I propoſed to lay before you. I am hopeful that you will not think it altogether tedious or unneceſſary: for although very little of what I have ſaid can be new to you, yet this ſummary account will enable you with greater eaſe to recal to your memory the paſſages of thoſe four years wherewith all that I am going to relate to you has an immediate and neceſſary connection.

In what has been ſaid I am far from making my own panegyric. I had not in thoſe days ſo much merit as was aſcribed to me: nor, ſince that time have I had ſo little as the ſame perſons allowed me. I committed without diſpute many faults; and a greater man than I can pretend to be, conſtituted in the ſame circumſtances, would not have kept clear of all; but, with reſpect to the Tories, I committed none. I carried the point of party honour to the height, and ſacrificed every thing to my attachment to them during this period of time. Let us now examine whether I have done ſo during the reſt.

When I arrived in France, about the end of March 1715, the affairs of England were repreſented to me in another light than I had ſeen them in, when I looked upon them with my own eyes very few weeks before. I found the perſons who were detached to ſpeak with me, prepared to think that I came over to negotiate for the Pretender: and when they perceived that I was more ignorant than they imagined, I was aſſured by them, that there would be ſuddenly an univerſal riſing in England and Scotland. The leaders were named to me, their

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engagements ſpecified, and many gentlemen, yourſelf among others, were reckoned upon for particular ſervices, though I was certain you had never been treated with. From whence I concluded, and the event has juſtified my opinion, that theſe aſſurances had been given on the general characters of men, by ſuch of our friends as had embarked ſooner, and gone farther than the reſt.

This management ſurpriſed me extremely. In the anſwers I made, I endeavoured to ſet the miſtake right; to ſhew that things were far from the point of maturity imagined; that the Chevalier had yet no party for him, and that nothing could form one but the extreme violence which the Whigs threatened to exerciſe. Great endeavours were uſed to engage me in this affair, and to prevail on me to anſwer the letter of invitation ſent me from Bar I alledged, as it was true, that I had no commiſſion from any perſon in England, and that the friends I left behind me were the only perſons who could determine we, if any could, to take ſuch a ſtep. As to the laſt propoſition, I abſolutely refuſed it.

In the uncertainty of what would happen, whether the proſecutions would be puſhed, which was moſt probable, in the manner intended againſt me, and againſt others, for all of whom, except the Earl of Oxford, I had as much concern as for myſelf; or whether the Whigs would relent, drop ſome, and ſoften the fate of others; I reſolved to conduct myſelf ſo, as to create no appearance which might be ſtrained into a pretence for hard uſage, and which might be retorted on my friends when they debated for me, or when they defended themſelves. I ſaw the Earl of Stair, I promiſed him that

I would enter into no Jacobite engagements, and I kept my word with him. I writ a letter to Mr. Secretary Stanhope, which might take off any imputation of neglect of the government; and I retired into Dauphine, to remove the objections of reſidence near the court of France.

This retreat from Paris was cenſured in England, and ſtiled a deſertion of my friends, and of their cauſe; with what foundation let any reaſonable man determine. Had I engaged with the Pretender before the party acted for him, or required of me that I ſhould do ſo, I had taken the air of being his man; whereas I looked on myſelf as theirs: I had gone about to bring them into his meaſures; whereas I never intended, even ſince that time, to do any thing more than to make him, as far as poſſible, act conformably to their views.

During the ſhort time I continued on the banks of the Rhone, the proſecutions were carried on at Weſtminſter with the utmoſt violence, and the ferment among the people was riſen to ſuch a degree, that it could end in nothing better, it might have ended in ſomething worſe, than it did. The meaſures which I obſerved at Paris had turned to no account; on the contrary, the letter which I writ to Mr. Secretary Stanhope, was quoted as a baſe and fawning ſubmiſſion: and what I intended as a mark of reſpect to the government, and a ſervice to my friends, was perverted to ruin me in the opinion of the latter. The act of attainder, in conſequence of my impeachment, had paſſed againſt me for crimes of the blackeſt dye; and, among other inducements to paſs it, my having been engaged in the pretender's intereſt was one. How well

well founded this article was, has already appeared: I was juſt as guilty of the reſt. The correſpondence with me was, you know, neither frequent nor ſafe. I heard ſeldom and darkly from you; and though I ſaw well enough which way the current ran, yet I was entirely ignorant of the meaſures you took, and of the uſe you intended to make of me. I contented myſelf, therefore, with letting you all know, that you had but to command me, and that I was ready to venture in your ſervice the little which remained, as frankly as I had expoſed all which was gone. At laſt your commands came, and I ſhall ſhew you in what manner I executed them.

The perſon who was ſent to me arrived in the beginning of July 1715, at the place where I was. He ſpoke in the name of all the friends whoſe authority could influence me, and he brought me word, that Scotland was not only ready to take arms, but under ſome ſort of diſſatisfaction to be withheld from beginning; that in England the people were exaſperated againſt the government to ſuch a degree, that far from wanting to be encouraged, they could not be reſtrained from inſulting it on every occaſion; that the whole Tory party was become avowedly Jacobite; that many officers of the army, and the majority of the ſoldiers were very well affected to the cauſe; that the city of London was ready to riſe, and that the enterpriſes for ſeizing of ſeveral places were ripe for execution: in a word, that moſt of the principal Tories were in a concert with the Duke of Ormond, for I had preſſed particularly to be informed, whether his Grace acted alone, or, if not, who were his council; and

that the others were so disposed, that there remained no doubt of their joining as soon as the first blow should be struck. He added, that my friends were a little surprised to observe, that I lay neuter in such a conjuncture. He represented to me the danger I ran of being prevented by people of all sides, from having the merit of engaging early in this enterprise; and how unaccountable it would be for a man impeached and attainted under the present government, to take no share in bringing about a revolution so near at hand, and so certain. He entreated that I would defer no longer to join the Chevalier; to advise and assist in carrying on his affairs, and to solicit and negotiate at the court of France, where my friends imagined that I should not fail to meet with a favourable reception, and from whence they made no doubt of receiving assistance in a situation of affairs so critical, so unexpected, and so promising. He concluded by giving me a letter from the Pretender, whom he had seen in his way to me, in which I was prefſed to repair, without loss of time, to Commercy: and this instance was grounded on the message which the bearer of the letter had brought me from my friends in England. Since he was sent to me, it had been more proper to have come directly where I was: but he was in haste to make his own court, and to deliver the assurances which were entrusted to him. Perhaps too he imagined that he should tie the knot faster on me, by acquainting me, that my friends had actually engaged for themselves and me, than by barely telling me that they desired I would engage for myself and them.

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In the progress of the conversation he related a multitude of facts, which satisfied me as to the general disposition of the people; but he gave me little satisfaction as to the measures taken for improving this disposition, for driving the business on with vigour, if it tended to a revolution, or for supporting it with advantage, if it spun into a war. When I questioned him concerning several persons, whose disinclination to the government admitted of no doubt, and whose names, quality, and experience, were very essential to the success of the undertaking, he owned to me, that they kept a great reserve, and did at most but encourage others to act by general and dark expressions.

I received this account, and this summons, ill in my bed; yet, important as the matter was, a few minutes served to determine me. The circumstances wanting to form a reasonable inducement to engage, did not escape me. But the smart of a bill of attainder tingled in every vein; and I look on my party to be under oppression, and to call for my assistance. Besides which, I considered first that I should certainly be informed, when I conferred with the Chevalier, of many particulars unknown to this gentleman; for I did not imagine that you could be so near to take arms as he represented you to be, on no other foundation than that which he exposed: and, secondly, that I was obliged in honour to declare, without waiting for a more particular information of what might be expected from England; since my friends had taken their resolution to declare, without any previous assurance of what might be expected from France. This second motive weighed extremely with me at that time;

there is however more ſound than ſenſe in it, and it contains the original error to which all your ſubſequent errors, and the thread of misfortunes which followed, are to be aſcribed.

My reſolution thus taken, I loſt no time in repairing to Commercy. The very firſt converſation with the Chevalier, anſwered in no degree my expectations: and I aſſure you, with great truth, that I began even then, if not to repent of my own raſhneſs, yet to be fully convinced both of yours and mine.

He talked to me like a man who expected every moment to ſet out for England or Scotland, but who did not very well know for which: and when he entered into the particulars of his affairs, I found that, concerning the former, he had nothing more circumſtantial nor poſitive to go upon, than what I had already heard. The advices which were ſent from thence, contained ſuch aſſurances of ſucceſs, as it was hard to think that men, who did not go upon the ſureſt grounds, would preſume to give. But then theſe aſſurances were general, and the authority ſeldom ſatisfactory. Thoſe which came from the beſt hands were verbal, and often conveyed by very doubtful meſſengers; others came from men whoſe fortunes were as deſperate as their counſels; and others came from perſons whoſe ſituation in the world gave little reaſon to attend to their judgement in matters of this kind.

The Duke of Ormond had been for ſome time, I cannot ſay how long, engaged with the Chevalier. He had taken the direction of this whole affair, as far as it related to England, upon himſelf, and had received a commiſſion for this purpoſe, which contained

tained the moſt ample powers that could be given. After this, one would be apt to imagine, that the principles on which the pretender ſhould proceed, and the Tories engage in this ſervice, had been laid down; that a regular and certain method of correſpondence had been eſtabliſhed; that the neceſſary aſſiſtances had been ſpecified, and that poſitive aſſurances had been given of them. Nothing leſs. In a matter as ſerious as this, all was looſe and abandoned to the diſpoſition of fortune. The firſt point had never been touched upon: by what I have ſaid above, you ſee how little care was taken of the ſecond: and, as to the third, the Duke had aſked a ſmall body of regular forces, a ſum of money, and a quantity of arms and ammunition. He had been told in anſwer, by the court of France, that he muſt abſolutely deſpair of any number of troops whatever; but he had been made in general, to hope for ſome money, ſome arms, and ſome ammunition: a little ſum, had, I think, been advanced to him. In a caſe ſo plain as this, it is hard to conceive how any man could err. The aſſiſtances demanded from France at this time, and even greater than theſe, will appear, in the ſequel of this relation, by the ſenſe of the whole party, to have been deemed eſſentially neceſſary to ſucceſs. In ſuch an uncertainty, therefore, whether even theſe could be obtained, or rather with ſo much reaſon to apprehend that they could not, it was evident that the Tories ought to have lain ſtill. They might have helped the ferment againſt the government, but ſhould have avoided, with the utmoſt care, giving any alarm, or even ſuſpicion of their true deſign, and have reſumed, or not reſumed it, as the Chevalier

lier was able, or not able, to provide the troops, the arms, the money, &c. Inſtead of which, thoſe who were at the head of the undertaking, and therefore anſwerable for the meaſures which were purſued, ſuffered the buſineſs to jog merrily on. They knew in general, how little dependence was to be placed on foreign ſuccour, but acted as if they had been ſure of it: while the party were rendered ſanguine by their paſſions, and made no doubt of ſubverting a government they were angry with: both one and the other made as much buſtle, and gave as great alarm, as would have been imprudent even at the eve of a general inſurrection. This appeared to me to be the ſtate of things with reſpect to England, when I arrived at Commercy.

The Scots had long preſſed the Chevalier to come amongſt them, and had of late ſent frequent meſſages to quicken his departure, ſome of which were delivered in terms much more zealous than reſpectful. The truth is, they ſeemed in as much haſte to begin, as if they had thought themſelves able to do the work alone; as if they had been apprehenſive of no danger but that of ſeeing it taken out of their hands, and of having the honour of it ſhared by others. However, that which was wanting on the part of England, was not wanting in Scotland: the Scots talked aloud, but they were in a condition to riſe. They took little care to keep their intentions ſecret, but they were diſpoſed to put thoſe intentions into immediate execution, and thereby to render the ſecret no longer neceſſary. They knew upon whom to depend for every part of the work, and they had concerted with the Chevalier, even to the place of his landing.

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There was need of no great ſagacity to perceive how unequal ſuch foundations were, to the weight of the building deſigned to be raiſed on them. The Scots, with all their zeal and all their valour, could bring no revolution about, unleſs in concurrence with the Engliſh: and, among the latter, nothing was ripe for ſuch an undertaking but the temper of the people, if that was ſo. I thought, therefore, that the Pretender's friends in the North ſhould be kept from riſing, till thoſe in the South had put themſelves in a condition to act; and that in the mean while the utmoſt endeavours ought to be uſed with the King of France to eſpouſe the cauſe; and that a plan of the deſign, with a more particular ſpecification of the ſuccours deſired, as well as of the time when, and the place to which they ſhould be conveyed, ought to be writ for: all which, I was told by the Marſhal of Berwick, who had the principal direction, at that time, of theſe affairs in France and, I dare ſay very truly, had been often aſked but never ſent. I looked on this enterpriſe to be of the nature of thoſe, which can hardly be undertaken more than once; and I judged that the ſucceſs of it would depend on timing, as near as poſſible, together the inſurrection in both parts of the iſland, and the ſuccours from hence. The Pretender approved this opinion of mine. He inſtructed me accordingly: and I left Lorain, after having accepted the ſeals much againſt my inclination. I made one condition with him. It was this: that I ſhould be at liberty to quit a ſtation which my humour, and many other conſiderations, made me think myſelf very unfit for, whenever the occaſion upon which I engaged

gaged was over, one way or other: and I desire you to remember that I did so.

I arrived at Paris towards the end of July 1715. You will observe, that all I was charged with, and all by consequence that I am answerable for, was to solicit this court, and to dispose them to grant us the succours necessary to make the attempt, as soon as we should know certainly from England in what it was desired that these succours should consist, and whether they should be sent. Here I found a multitude of people at work, and every one doing what seemed good in his own eyes: no subordination, no order, no concert. Persons concerned in the management of these affairs, upon former occasions, have assured me, this is always the case. It might be so to some degree; but, I believe, never so much as now. The Jacobites had wrought one another up, to look on the success of the present designs as infallible. Every meeting-house which the populace demolished, every little drunken riot which happened, served to confirm them in these sanguine expectations: and there was hardly one amongst them who would lose the air of contributing by his intrigues to the restoration, which he took for granted, would be brought about, without him, in a very few weeks.

Care and hope sat on every busy Irish face. Those who could write and read had letters to shew, and those who had not arrived to this pitch of erudition, had their secrets to whisper. No sex was excluded from this ministry. Fanny Oglethorpe, whom you must have seen in England, kept her corner

corner in it, and Olive Trant was the great wheel of our machine.

I imagine that this picture, the lines of which are not in the leaſt too ſtrong, would ſerve to repreſent what paſſed on your ſide of the water at the ſame time. The letters which came from thence ſeemed to me to contain rather ſuch things as the writers wiſhed might be true, than ſuch as they knew to be ſo: and the accounts which were ſent from hence were of the ſame kind. The vanity of ſome, and the credulity of others, ſupported this ridiculous correſpondence; and I queſtion not but very many perſons, ſome ſuch I have known, did the ſame thing, from a principle which they took to be a very wiſe one: they imagined that they helped by theſe means to maintain, and to increaſe the ſpirit of party in England and France. They acted like Thaos, that turbulent Ætolian, who brought Antiochus into Greece: *Quibus mendaciis de rege, multiplicando verbis copias ejus, erexerat multorum in Grecia animos: iiſdem et regis ſpem inflabat, omnium votis eum arceſſi.* Thus were numbers of people employed under a notion of advancing the buſineſs, or from an affectation of importance, in amuſing and flattering one another, and in ſounding the alarm in the ears of the enemy, whom it was their intereſt to ſurpriſe. The government of England was put on its guard; and the neceſſity of acting, or of laying aſide, with ſome diſadvantage, all thoughts of acting for the preſent, was precipitated before any meaſures neceſſary to enable you to act had been prepared, or almoſt thought of.

If his majeſty did not, till ſome ſhort time after this, declare the intended invaſion to parliament, it was

was not for want of information. Before I came to Paris, what was doing had been discovered. The little armament made at the Havre, which furnished the only means the Chevalier then had for his transportation into Britain, which had exhausted the treasury of St. Germains, and which contained all the arms and ammunition that could be depended upon for the whole undertaking, though they were hardly sufficient to begin the work even in Scotland, was talked of publicly. A minister less alert, and less capable than the Earl of Stair, would easily have been at the bottom of the secret, for so it was called, when the particulars of messages received and sent, the names of the persons from whom they came, and by whom they were carried, were whispered about at tea-tables and in coffee-houses.

In short, what by the indiscretion of people here, what by the rebound which came often back from London, what by the private interests and ambitious views of persons in the French court, and what by other causes, unnecessary to be examined now, the most private transactions came to light; and they who imagined that they trusted their heads to the keeping of one or two friends, were in reality at the mercy of numbers. Into such company was I fallen for my sins; and it is upon the credit of such a mob ministry, that the Tories have judged me capable of betraying a trust, or incapable of discharging it.

I had made very little progress in the business which brought me to Paris, when the paper so long expected was sent, in pursuance of former instances, from England. The unanimous sense of the principal persons engaged was contained in it. The whole had been dictated, word for word, to the

gentleman

gentleman who brought it over, by the Earl of Mar, and it had been delivered to him by the Duke of Ormond. I was driving in the wide ocean without a compaſs, when this dropped unexpectedly into my hands. I received it joyfully, and I ſteered my courſe exactly by it. Whether the perſons from whom it came, purſued the principles, and obſerved the rules which they laid down, as the meaſures of their own conduct and of ours, will appear by the ſequel of this relation.

This memorial aſſerted, that there were no hopes of ſucceeding in a preſent undertaking, for many reaſons deduced in it, without an immediate and univerſal riſing of the people in all parts of England, upon the Chevalier's arrival; and that this inſurrection was in no degree probable, unleſs he brought a body of regular troops along with him: that, if this attempt miſcarried, his cauſe and his friends, the Engliſh liberty and government, would be utterly ruined: but if, by coming without troops, he reſolved to riſque theſe and every thing elſe, he muſt ſet out ſo as not to arrive before the end of September O. S. to juſtify which opinion, many arguments were urged. In this caſe twenty thouſand arms, a train of artillery, five hundred officers with their ſervants, and a conſiderable ſum of money was demanded: and as ſoon as they ſhould be informed, that the Chevalier was in condition to make this proviſion, it was ſaid that notice ſhould be given him of the places to which he might ſend, and of the perſons who were to be truſted. I do not mention ſome inconveniencies which they touched upon, ariſing from a delay; becauſe their opinion was clearly for this delay, and becauſe that they could

not ſuppoſe that the Chevalier would act, or that thoſe about him would adviſe him to act, contrary to the ſenſe of all his friends in England. No time was loſt in making the proper uſe of this paper. As much of it as was fit to be ſhewn to this court was tranſlated into French, and laid before the King of France. I was now able to ſpeak with greater aſſurance, and in ſome ſort to undertake conditionally for the event of things

The propoſal of violating treaties, ſo lately and ſo ſolemnly concluded, was a very bold one to be made to people, whatever their inclinations might be, whom the war had reduced to the loweſt ebb of riches and power. They would not hear of a direct and open engagement, ſuch as the ſending a body of troops would have been; neither would they grant the whole of what was aſked in the ſecond plan. But it was impoſſible for them, or any one elſe, to foreſee how far thoſe ſteps which they were willing to take, well improved, might have encouraged or forced them to go. They granted us ſome ſuccours, and the very ſhip in which the Pretender was to tranſport himſelf, was fitted out by Depine d'Anicant, at the King of France's expence. They would have concealed theſe appearances as much as they could; but the heat of the Whigs, and the reſentment of the court of England might have drawn them in. We ſhould have been glad indirectly to concur in fixing theſe things upon them: and, in a word, if the late king had lived ſix months longer, I verily believe, there had been war again between England and France. This was the only point of time when theſe affairs had, to my apprehenſion, the leaſt reaſonable appearance even of poſ-

ſibility:

ſibility: all that preceded was wild and uncertain: all that followed was mad and deſperate. But this favourable aſpect had an extreme ſhort duration. Two events ſoon happened, one of which caſt a damp on all we are doing, and the other rendered vain and fruitleſs all we had done. The firſt was the arrival of the Duke of Ormond in France, the other was the death of the king.

We had founded the Duke's name high. His reputation and the opinion of his power were great. The French began to believe that he was able to form and to head a party; that the troops would join him; that the nation would follow the ſignal whenever he drew his ſword; and the voice of the people, the echo of which was continually in their ears, confirmed them in this belief. But when, in the midſt of all theſe bright ideas, they ſaw him arrive, almoſt literally alone, when, to excuſe his coming, I was obliged to tell them, that he could not ſtay; they ſunk at once from their hopes: and that which generally happens happened in this caſe; becauſe they had had too good an opinion of the cauſe, they began to form too bad an one. Before this time, if they had no friendſhip for the Tories, they had at leaſt ſome conſideration and eſteem. After this I ſaw nothing but compaſſion in the beſt of them, and contempt in the others.

When I arrived at Paris, the King was already gone to Marly, where the indiſpoſition which he had begun to feel at Verſailles increaſed upon him. He was the beſt friend the Chevalier had; and when I engaged in this buſineſs, my principal dependence was on his perſonal character. This failed me to a great degree he was not in a condition

to exert the ſame vigour as formerly. The miniſters, who ſaw ſo great an event as his death to be probably at hand, a certain minority, an uncertain regency, perhaps confuſion, at beſt a new face of government and a new ſyſtem of affairs, would not for their own ſakes, as well as for the ſake of the public, venture to engage far in any new meaſures, All I had to negotiate by myſelf firſt, and in conjunction with the Duke of Ormond ſoon afterwards, languiſhed with the king. My hopes ſunk as he declined, and died when he expired. The event of things has ſufficiently ſhewn that all thoſe, which were entertained by the Duke and the Jacobite party under the regency, were founded on the groſſeſt deluſions imaginable. Thus was the project become impracticable before the time arrived, which was fixed by thoſe who directed things in England, for putting it in execution.

The new government of France appeared to me like a ſtrange country. I was little acquainted with the roads. Moſt of the faces I met with were unknown to me, and I hardly underſtood the language of the people. Of the men who had been in power under the late reign, many were diſcarded, and moſt of the others were too much taken up with the thoughts of ſecuring themſelves under this, to receive applications in favour of the pretender. The two men who had the greateſt appearance of favour and power were D'Agueſſeu and Noailles. One was made chancellor, on the death of Voiſin, from attorney general; and the other was placed at the head of the treaſury. The firſt paſſes for a man of parts, but he never acted out of the ſphere of the

the law: I had no acquaintance with him before this time; and when you consider his circumstances and mine, you will not think it could be very easy for me to get access to him now. The latter I had known extremely well whilst the late king lived: and from the same court principle, as he was glad to be well with me then, he would hardly know me now. The * minister who had the principal direction of foreign affairs I lived in friendship with, and I must own to his honour, that he never encouraged a design, which he knew that his court had no intention of supporting.

There were other persons, not to tire you with farther particulars upon this head, of credit and influence, with whom I found indirect and private ways of conversing: but it was in vain to expect any more than civil language from them, in a case which they found no disposition in their master to countenance, and in favour of which they had no prejudices of their own. The private engagements into which the Duke of Orleans had entered with his Majesty, during the life of the late king, will abate of their force as the regent grows into strength, and would soon have had no force at all if the Pretender had met with success; but in these beginnings they operated very strongly. The air of this court was to take the counterpart of all which had been thought right under Lewis the fourteenth, *Cele resemble trop à l'ancien système*, was an answer so often given that it became a jest, and almost a proverb. But to finish this account with a fact which is incredible, but strictly true; the very

* M. de Huxelles.

peace, which had ſaved France from ruin, and the makers of it, were become as unpopular at this court, as at the court of Vienna.

The Duke of Ormond flattered himſelf in this ſtate of things, that he had opened a private and ſure channel of arriving at the regent, and of bending him to his purpoſes. His Grace and I lived together at this time in an houſe which one of my friends had lent me. I obſerved that he was frequently loſt, and that he made continual excuſions out of town, with all the myſterious precaution imaginable. I douted at firſt whether theſe intrigues related to buſineſs or pleaſure. I ſoon diſcovered with whom they were carried on, and had reaſon to believe that both were mingled in them. It is neceſſary that I explain this ſecret to you.

Mrs. Trant, whom I have named above, had been preparing herſelf for the retired abſtemious life of * a Carmelite, by taking a ſurfeit of the pleaſures of Paris; when a little before the death of the Queen, or about that time, ſhe went into England. What ſhe was entruſted, either by the Chevalier, or any other perſon, to negotiate there, I am ignorant of; and it imports not much to know. In that journey ſhe made or renewed an acquaintance with the Duke of Ormond. The ſcandalous chronicle affirms that ſhe brought with her, when ſhe returned into France, a woman, of whom I have not the leaſt knowledge, but who was probably handſome; ſince without beauty ſuch a mer-

* She uſed to pretend a reſolution of turning nun. She is ſince married to the Duke of Bouillon's brother, who was too much diſhonoured by his former life, to be ſo even by this ſcandalous match.

chandize

chandize would not have been ſaleable, nor have anſwered the deſign of the importer; and that ſhe made this way her court to the regent. Whatever her merit was, ſhe kept a correſpondence with him, and put herſelf upon that foot of familiarity, which he permits all thoſe, who contribute to his pleaſures, to aſſume. She was placed by him, as ſhe told me herſelf, where I found her ſometime after that which I am ſpeaking of, in the houſe of an ancient gentlewoman, who had formerly been maid of honour to Madame, and who had contracted at court a ſpirit of intrigue which accompanied her in her retreat.

Theſe two had aſſociated to them the Abbé de Teſieu, in all the political part of their buſineſs; for I will not ſuppoſe that ſo reverend an eccleſiaſtic entered into any other ſecret. This Abbé is the regent's ſecretary: and it was chiefly through him that the private treaty had been carried on between his maſter and the Earl of Stair in the King's reign. Whether the prieſt had ſtooped at the lure of a cardinal's hat, or whether he acted the ſecond part by the ſame orders that he acted the firſt, I know not. This is ſure, and the Britiſh miniſter was not the bubble of it, that whilſt he concerted meaſures on one hand to traverſe the pretender's deſigns, he teſtified on the other all the inclination poſſible to his ſervice. A mad fellow who had been an intendant in Normandy, and ſeveral other politicians of the loweſt form, were at different times taken into this famous junto.

With theſe worthy people his Grace of Ormond negotiated; and no care was omitted on his part to keep me out of the ſecret. The reaſon of which as far as I am able to gueſs at, ſhall be explained to

you

you by and by. I might very juſtly have taken this proceeding ill, and the Duke will not be able to find in my whole conduct towards him any thing like it; I proteſt to you very ſincerely I was not in the leaſt moved at it.

He advanced not a ſtep in his buſineſs with theſe ſham miniſters, and yet imagined that he got daily ground. I made no progreſs with the true ones, but I ſaw it. Theſe, however, were not our only difficulties. We lay under another, which came from your ſide, and which embarraſſed us more. The firſt hindered us from working forward to our point of view, but the ſecond took all point of view from us.

A paper was ſent into England juſt before the death of the King of France, which had been drawn by me at Chaville in concert with the Dukes of Ormond and Berwic, and with Monſieur de Torcy. This paper was an anſwer to the memorial received from thence. The ſtate of this country was truly repreſented in it; the difference was fixed between what had been aſked, and what might be expected from France; and upon the whole it was demanded what our friends would do, and what they would have us to do? The reply to this came through the French ſecretary of ſtate to our hands. They declared themſelves unable to ſay anything till they ſhould ſee what turn affairs would take on ſo great an event as the death of the King, the report of which had reached them.

Such a declaration ſhut our mouths and tied our hands. I confeſs I knew neither how to ſolicit, nor what to ſolicit; this laſt meſſage ſuſpending the project on which we had acted before, and which I

kept

kept as an inſtruction conſtantly before mine eyes. It ſeemed to me uncertain, whether you intended to go on, or whether your deſign was to ſtifle, as much as poſſible, all paſt tranſactions; to lie perfectly ſtill; to throw upon the court the odium of having given a falſe alarm, and to wait till new accidents at home,, and a more favourable conjuncture abroad, might tempt you to reſume the enterprize. Perhaps this would have been the wiſeſt game you could have played: but then, you ſhould have concerted it with us who acted for you here. You intended no ſuch thing, as appeared afterwards: and therefore thoſe who acted for the party at London, whoever they were, muſt be deemed inexcuſable for leaving things on the foot of this meſſage, and giving us no advice fit to be depended upon for many weeks. Whilſt preparations were to be made, and the work was to be ſet a-going by aſſiſtance from hence, you might reaſonably expect to hear from us, and to be determined by us: But when all hopes of this kind ſeemed to be gone, it was your part to determine us, and we could take no reſolution here, but that of conforming ourſelves to whatever ſhould come preſcribed from England.

Whilſt we were in this condition, the moſt deſperate that can be imagined, we began to receive verbal meſſages from you, that no more time was to be loſt, and that the Chevalier ſhould come away. No man was, I believe, ever ſo embarraſſed as I found myſelf at that time. I could not imagine that you would content yourſelves by looſe verbal meſſages, after all that had happened, to call us over; and I knew by experience, how little ſuch meſſages are to be depended on. For, ſoon after I engaged

gaged in these affairs, a monk arrived at Bar, dispatched, as he affirmed, by the Duke of Ormond, in whose name he insisted that the Chevalier should hasten into Britain, and that nothing but his presence was wanting to place the crown on his head. The fellow delivered his errand so positively, and so circumstantially, that the resolution was taken at Bar to set out, and my rendezvous to join the Chevalier was appointed me. This method to fetch a king with as little ceremony as one would invite a friend to supper, appeared somewhat odd to me, who was then very new in these affairs. But when I came to talk with the man, for, by good luck he had been sent for from Bar to Paris, I easily discerned that he had no such commission as he pretended to, and that he acted of his own head. I presumed to oppose the taking any resolution upon his word, though he was a monk: and soon after we knew from the Duke of Ormond himself, that he had never sent him.

This example made me cautious; but that which determined my opinion was, that I could never imagine, without supposing you all run mad, that the same men who judged this attempt unripe for execution, unless supported by regular troops from France, or at least by all the other assistances which are enumerated above, while the design was much more secret than at present; when the king had no fleet at sea, nor more than 8000 men dispersed over the whole island; when we had the good wishes of the French court on our side, and were sure of some particular assistances, and of a general connivance; that the same men, I say, should press for making it now without any other preparation,

preparation, when we had neither money, arms, ammunition, nor a ſingle company of foot; when the government of England was on its guard, national troops were raiſed, foreign forces ſent for, and France, like all the reſt of the continent, againſt us. I could not conceive ſuch a ſtrange combination of accidents as ſhould make the neceſſity of acting increaſe gradually upon us, as the means of doing ſo were taken from us.

Upon the whole matter, my opinion was, and I did not obſerve the Duke of Ormond to differ from me, that we ſhould wait till we heard from you in ſuch a manner, as might aſſure us of what you intended to do yourſelves, and of what you expected from us; and that in the mean while we ſhould go as far as the little money which we had, and the little favour which was ſhewn us would allow, in getting ſome embarkations ready on the coaſt.

Sir George Byng had come into the road of Havre, and had demanded by name, ſeveral ſhips which belonged to us to be given up to him. The regent did not think fit to let him have the ſhips; but he ordered them to be unloaded, and their cargoes were put into the king's magazines. We were in no condition to repair the loſs; and therefore, when I mention embarkations, you will pleaſe to underſtand nothing more than veſſels to tranſport the Pretender's perſon, and the perſons of thoſe who ſhould go over with him. This was all we could do, and this was not neglected.

We were thus employed when a gentleman arrived from Scotland to repreſent the ſtate of that country, and to require a definitive anſwer from the Chevalier, whether he would have the inſurrection

rection to be made immediately, which they apprehended they might not be able to make at all if they were obliged to defer it much longer. This gentleman was sent instantly back again, and was directed to let the persons he came from know, that the Chevalier was desirous to have the rising of his friends in England and Scotland so adjusted, that they might mutually assist each other, and distract the enemy; that he had not received a final answer from his friends in England, but that he was in daily expectation of it; that it was very much to be wished, that all attempts in Scotland could be suspended till such time as the English were ready; but that if the Scots were so pressed, that they must either submit or rise immediately, he was of opinion they should rise, and he would make the best of his way to them.

What this forwardness in the Scots, and this uncertainty and backwardness in the English must produce, it was not hard to foresee; and therefore, that I might neglect nothing in my power to prevent any false measures, as I was conscious to myself that I had neglected nothing to promote true ones, I dispatched a gentleman to London, where I supposed the Earl of Mar to be, some days before the message I have just spoken of was sent to Scotland. I desired him to make my compliments to Lord Mar, and to tell him from me, that I understood it to be his sense, as well as the sense of all our friends that Scotland could do nothing effectually without the concurrence of England, and that England would not stir without assistance from abroad; that he might assure himself no such assistance could be depended upon; and that I begged him to make the inference

inference from theſe propoſitions. The gentleman went; but upon his arrival at London he found that the Earl of Mar was already ſet out to draw the Highlanders into arms. He communicated his meſſage to a perſon * of confidence, who undertook to ſend it after his Lordſhip: and this was the utmoſt which either he or I could do in ſuch a conjuncture.

You were now viſibly departed from the very ſcheme which you had ſent us over, and from all the principles which had been ever laid down. I did what I could to keep up my own ſpirit, as well as the ſpirits of the Chevalier, and of all thoſe with whom I was in correſpondence: I endeavoured even to deceive myſelf. I could not remedy the miſchief, and I was reſolved to ſee the concluſion of the perillous adventure. But I own to you, that I thought then, and that I have not changed my opinion ſince, that ſuch meaſures as theſe would not be purſued by any reaſonable man, in the moſt common affairs of life. It was with the utmoſt aſtoniſhment that I ſaw them purſued in the conduct of an enterpriſe, which had for it's object nothing leſs than the diſpoſition of crowns, and for the means of bringing it about nothing leſs than a civil war.

Impatient that we heard nothing from England, when we expected every moment to hear that the war was begun in Scotland; the Duke of Ormond and I reſolved to ſend a perſon † of confidence to London. We inſtructed him to repeat to you the former accounts, which we had ſent over, to let you know how deſtitute the Chevalier was, either

* Mr. Lewis, who belonged to the Earl of Oxford.

† Mr. Ezechiel Hamilton: he got all the papers by heart.

of actual support, or even of reasonable hopes; and to desire that you would determine whether he should go to Scotland, or throw himself on some part of the English coast. This person was further instructed to tell you, that, the Chevalier being ready to take any resolution at a moment's warning, you might depend on his setting out the instant he received your answer: and therefore that to save time, if your intention was to rise, you would do well to act immediately, on the assurance that the plan you prescribed, be it what it would, should be exactly complied with. We took this resolution the rather, because one of the pacquets which had been prepared in cypher, to give you an account of things, which had been put above three weeks before into Monsieur de Torcy's hands, and which by consequence we thought to be in yours, was by this time sent back to me by this minister, I think open, with an excuse that he durst not take it upon him to forward it.

The person dispatched to London returned very soon to us, and the answer he brought was*, that since affairs grew daily worse, and could not mend by delay, our friends in England had resolved to declare immediately, and that they would be ready to join the Chevalier on his landing: that his person would be as safe there as in Scotland, and that, in every other respect, it was better that he should land in England; that they had used their utmost endeavours, and that they hoped the western counties were in a good posture to receive him.

* Lansdown gave this answer in the name of the persons privy to the secret.

To

To this was added, a general indication of the place he ſhould come to, as near to Plymouth as poſſible.

You muſt agree, that this was not the anſwer of men who knew what they were about. A little more preciſion was neceſſary in dictating a meſſage, which was to have ſuch conſequences: and eſpecially ſince the gentleman could not fail to acquaint the perſons he ſpoke with, that the Chevalier was not able to carry men enough to ſecure him from being taken, even by the firſt conſtable. Notwithſtanding this, the Duke of Ormond ſet out from Paris, and the Chevalier from Bar. Some perſons were ſent to the north of England, and others to London, to give notice that they were both on their way. Their routs were ſo ordered, that the Duke of Ormond was to ſail from the coaſt of Normandy ſome days before the Chevalier arrived at St. Malo, to which place the duke was to ſend immediate notice of his landing; and two gentlemen acquainted with the country, and perfectly well known to all our friends in thoſe parts, were diſpatched before, that the people of Devonſhire and Somerſetſhire, who were, we concluded, in arms, might be appriſed of the ſignals that were to be made from the ſhips, and might be ready to receive the duke.

On the coaſt of France, and before his embarkation, the duke heard that ſeveral of our principal friends had been ſeized, immediately after the perſon who came laſt from them had left London; that the others were all diſperſed; and that the conſternation was univerſal. He embarked notwithſtanding this melancholy news, and, ſupported by nothing but the firmneſs of his temper, he went over to the place appointed: he did more than his part,

and he found that our friends had done leſs than theirs. One of the gentlemen, who had paſſed over before him, and had traverſed part of the country, joined him on the coaſt, and aſſured him that there was not the leaſt room to expect a riſing. In a word, he was refuſed a night's lodging in a country which we had been told was in a good poſture to receive the Chevalier, and where the duke expected that multitudes would repair to him.

He returned to the coaſt of Britany after this uncomfortable expedition, where the Chevalier arrived about the ſame time from Lorain. What his Grace propoſed by the ſecond attempt, which he made as ſoon as the veſſel could be refitted, to land in the ſame part of the iſland, I profeſs myſelf to be ignorant. I writ him my opinion at the time, and I have always thought, that the ſtorm in which he had like to have been caſt away, and which forced him back to the French coaſt, ſaved him from a much greater peril, that of periſhing in an attempt as full of extravagant raſhneſs, and as void of all reaſonable meaning, as any of thoſe adventures which have rendered the hero of La Mancha immortal.

The Chevalier had now but one of theſe two things left him to do, one was to return to Bar, the other was to go to Scotland, where there were people in arms for him. He took this laſt reſolution. He left Britany, where he had as many miniſters as there were people about him, and where he was eternally teized with noiſy diſputes about what was to be done in circumſtances, in which no reaſonable thing could be done. He ſent to have a veſſel got ready for him at Dunkirk, and he croſſed the country as privately as he could.

Whilſt

Whilſt all theſe things paſſed, I remained at Paris, to try if by any means ſome aſſiſtance might be at laſt procured; without which it was evident, even to thoſe who flattered themſelves the moſt, that the game was up.

No ſooner was the Duke of Ormond gone from Paris, on the deſign which I have mentioned, and Mrs. Trant, who had accompanied him part of the way, returned, but I was ſent for to a little houſe at Madrid in the Bois de Boulogne, where ſhe lived with Mademoiſelle de Chauffery, the antient gentlewoman with whom the Duke of Orleans had placed her. Theſe two perſons opened to me what had paſſed whilſt the Duke of Ormond was here, and the hopes they had of drawing the regent into all the meaſures neceſſary to ſupport the attempts which were making in favour of the Chevalier.

By what they told me at firſt I ſaw that they had been truſted; and by what paſſed in the courſe of my treating with them, it appeared, that they had the acceſs which they pretended to. All, which I had been able to do by proper perſons and in proper methods, ſince the King of France's death, amounting to little or nothing, I reſolved, at laſt, to try what was to be done by this indirect way. I put myſelf under the conduct of theſe female managers: and, without having the ſame dependence on them as his Grace of Ormond had, I puſhed their credit and their power as far as they reached during the time I continued to ſee them. I met with ſmoother language and greater hopes than had been given me hitherto. A note ſigned by the regent, ſuppoſed to be writ to a woman, but which was to be explained to be intended for the Earl of Mar,

was put into my hands to be ſent to Scotland. I took a copy of it, which you may ſee at the end of theſe papers*. When Sir John Areſkine came to preſs for ſuccour, the regent was prevailed upon by theſe women to ſee him; but he carried nothing real back with him, except a quantity of gold, part of the money which we had drawn from Spain, and which was loſt with the veſſel, in a very odd manner, on the Scots coaſt. The Duke of Ormond had been promiſed ſeven or eight thouſand arms, which were drawn out of the magazines, and ſaid to be lodged, I think, at Compeigne. I uſed my utmoſt efforts that theſe arms might be carried forward to the coaſt, and I undertook for their tranſportation: but all was in vain; ſo that the likelihood of bringing any thing to effect in time appeared to me no greater, than I had found it before I entered into this intrigue.

I ſoon grew tired of a commerce, which nothing but ſucceſs could render tolerable: and reſolved to be no longer amuſed by the pretences, which were daily repeated to me, that the regent had entertained perſonal prejudices againſt me, and that he was inſenſibly, and by degrees to be dipped in our meaſures; that both theſe things required time, but that they would certainly be brought about, and that we ſhould then be able to anſwer all the expectations of the Engliſh and the Scots. The firſt of theſe pretences contained a fact, which I could hardly perſuade myſelf to be true, becauſe I knew very certainly, that I had never given his royal highneſs the leaſt occaſion for ſuch prejudices: the ſecond was

* This note has not been found among the author's papers.

a work which might ſpin out into a great and uncertain length. I took my reſolution to drive what related to myſelf to an immediate explanation, and what related to others to an immediate deciſion; not to ſuffer any excuſe for doing nothing to be founded on my conduct, nor the ſalvation, if I could hinder it, of ſo many gallant men as were in arms in Scotland, to reſt on the ſucceſs of ſuch womaniſh projects. I ſhall tell you what I did on the firſt head now, and what I did on the ſecond hereafter, in its proper place.

The fact which, it was ſaid, the regent laid to my charge, was a correſpondence with Lord Stair, and having been one night at his houſe, from whence I did not retire till three in the morning. As ſoon as I got hold of this, I deſired the marſhal of Berwick to go to him. The marſhal told him from me, that I had been extremely concerned to hear, in general, that I lay under his diſpleaſure; that a ſtory which, it was ſaid, he believed, had been related to me; that I expected the juſtice, which he could deny to no man, of having the accuſation proved, in which caſe I was contented to paſs for the laſt of human kind; or of being juſtified, if it could not be proved. He anſwered, that ſuch a ſtory had been related to him by ſuch perſons as he thought would not have deceived him; that he had been ſince convinced that it was falſe, and that I ſhould be ſatisfied of his regard for me: but that, he muſt own, he was very uneaſy to find, that I, who could apply to him through the marſhal d'Huxelles, could chuſe to treat with Mrs. Trant, and the reſt; for he named all the cabal, except his ſecretary, whom I had never met at Mademoiſelle Chauffery's.

Chauffery's. He added, that theſe people teized him, at my inſtigation, to death; and that they were not fit to be truſted with any buſineſs. He applied to ſome of them the ſevereſt epithets. The marſhal of Berwick replied, that he was ſure I ſhould receive the whole of what he had been pleaſed to ſay with the greateſt ſatisfaction; that I had treated with thoſe perſons much againſt my will; and, finally, that if his royal highneſs would not employ them, he was ſure I would never apply to them. In a converſation which I had, not long after, with him, he ſpoke to me in much the ſame terms as he had done to the marſhal. I went from him very ill edified as to his intentions of doing any thing in favour of the Chevalier; but I carried away with me this ſatisfaction, that he had aſſigned me, from his own mouth, the perſon through whom I ſhould make my applications to him; and through whom I ſhould depend on receiving his anſwers; that he had diſavowed all the little politic clubs, and had commanded me to have no more to do with them.

Before I reſume the thread of my narration, give me leave to make ſome reflections upon what I have been laſt ſaying to you. When I met with the Duke of Ormond at his return from the coaſt, he thought himſelf obliged to ſay ſomething to excuſe his keeping me out of a ſecret, which during his abſence I had been let into. His excuſe was, that the regent had exacted from him that I ſhould know nothing of the matter. You will obſerve, that the account which I have given you ſeems to contradict this aſſertion of his Grace, ſince it is hard to ſuppoſe, that, if the regent had exacted that I ſhould be kept

out

out of the ſecret, theſe women would have dared to let me into it; and ſince it is ſtill harder to ſuppoſe, that the regent would make this expreſs condition with the Duke of Ormond, and, the moment the Duke's back was turned, would ſuffer theſe women to teize him from me, and to bring me anſwers from him. I am, however, far from taxing the Duke with affirming an untruth. I believe the regent did make ſuch a condition with him: and I will tell you how I underſtand all this little management; which will explain a great deal to you. This prince, with wit and valour, has joined all the irreſolution of temper poſſible, and is, perhaps, the man in the world the leaſt capable of ſaying no to your face. From hence it happened, that theſe women, like multitudes of other people, forced him to ſay and do enough to give them the air of having credit with him, and of being truſted by him. This drew in the Duke of Ormond, who is not, I dare ſay, as yet undeceived. The regent never intended, from the firſt, to do any thing, even indirectly, in favour of the Jacobite cauſe. His intereſt was plainly on the other ſide, and he ſaw it. But then the ſame weakneſs in his character carried him, as it would have done his great uncle Gaſton, in the ſame caſe, to keep meaſures with the Chevalier. His double trimming character prevailed on him to talk with the Duke of Ormond: but it carried him no farther. I queſtion not but he did, on this occaſion, what you muſt have obſerved many men to do. We not only endeavour to impoſe on the world, but even on ourſelves. We diſguiſe our weakneſs, and work up in our minds an opinion, that the meaſure which we fall into

into by the natural or habitual imperfection of our character, is the effect of a principle of prudence, or of some other virtue. Thus the regent, who saw the Duke of Ormond, because he could not resist the importunity of Olive Trant, and who gave hopes to the Duke, because he can refuse nobody, made himself believe that it was a great strain of policy to blow up the fire, and to keep Britain embroiled. I am persuaded that I do not err in judging that he thought in this manner; and here I fix the reason of his excluding me out of the commerce which he had with the Duke of Ormond, of his affecting a personal dislike of me, and of his avoiding any correspondence with me upon these matters; till I forced myself in a manner upon him, and he could not keep me any longer at a distance without departing from his first principle, that of keeping measures with every body. He then threw me, or let me slide if you will, into the hands of these women; and when he found that I pressed him hard that way too, he took me out of their hands, and put me back again into the proper channel of business; where I had not been long, as you will see by and by, before the scene of amusement was finished.

Sir John Areskine told me, when he came from the first audience that he had of his royal highness, that he put him in mind of the encouragement which he had given the Earl of Mar to take arms. I never heard any thing of this kind, but what Sir John let drop to me. If the fact be true, you see that the Scots general had been amused by him with a witness. The English general was so in his turn; and, while this was doing, the regent might think it best to have him to himself. Four eyes compre-

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hend more objects than two, and I was a little better acquainted with the characters of people, and the mass of the country, than the Duke, though this court had been at first a strange country to me in comparison of the former.

An infinity of little circumstances concurred to make me form this opinion, some of which are better felt than explained, and many of which are not present to my memory. That which had the greatest weight with me, and which is, I think, decisive, I will mention. At the very time when it is pretended that the regent treated with the Duke of Ormond, on the express condition that I should know nothing of the matter; two * persons of the first rank and greatest credit in this court, when I made the most pressing instances to them in favour of the Chevalier, threw out in conversation to me, that I should attach myself to the Duke of Orleans, that in my circumstances I might want him, and that he might have occasion for me. Something was intimated of pensions, and establishment, and of making my peace at home. I would not understand this language, because I would not break with the people who held it; and when they saw that I would not take the hints they ceased to give them.

I fancy that you see by this time the motives of the regent's conduct. I am not, I confess, able to explain to you those of the Duke of Ormond's: I cannot so much as guess at them. When he came into France, I was careful to shew him all the friendship, and all the respect possible. My friends

* Marshal d'Huxelles, Marquis d'Effiat: twenty-five thousand pounds offered by the last.

were

were his, my purſe was his, and even my bed was his. I went further, I did all thoſe things which touch moſt ſenſibly people who have been uſed to pomp. I made my court to him, and haunted his levee with aſſiduity. In return to this behaviour, which was the pure effect of my good will, and which no duty that I owed his Grace, no obligation that I had to him, impoſed upon me; I have great reaſon to ſuſpect that he went at leaſt half way in all which was ſaid or done againſt me. He threw himſelf blindly into the ſnare which was laid for him; and inſtead of hindering, as he and I in concert might have done, thoſe affairs from languiſhing in the manner they did ſeveral months, he furniſhed this court with an excuſe for not treating with me, till it was too late to play even a ſaving game; and he neither drove the regent to aſſiſt the Chevalier, nor to declare that he would not aſſiſt him; though it was fatal to the cauſe in general, and to the Scots in particular, not to bring one of the two about.

It was Chriſtmas 1715, before the Chevalier ſailed for Scotland. The battle of Dunblain had been fought, the buſineſs of Preſton was over; there remained not the leaſt room to expect any commotion in his favour among the Engliſh; and many of the Scots, who had declared for him began to grow cool in the cauſe. No proſpect of ſucceſs could engage him in this expedition; but it was become neceſſary for his reputation. The Scots, on one ſide, ſpared not to reproach him, I think unjuſtly, for his delay; and the French, on the other, were extremely eager to have him gone. Some of thoſe, who knew little of Britiſh affairs, imagined

that

that his preſence would produce miraculous effects. You muſt not be ſurpriſed at this. As near neighbours as we are, ninety nine in an hundred among the French are as little acquainted with the inſide of our iſland, as with that of Japan. Others of them were uneaſy to ſee him ſkulking about in France, and to be told of it every hour by the Earl of Stair. Others again imagined, that he might do their buſineſs by going into Scotland, though he ſhould not do his own; that is, they flattered themſelves that he might keep a war for ſometime alive, which would employ the whole attention of our government; and for the event of which they had very little concern. Unable from their natural temper, as well as their habits, to be true to any principle, they thought and acted in this manner, whilſt they affected the greateſt friendſhip to the King, and whilſt they really deſired to enter into more intimate engagements with him. Whilſt the Pretender continued in France, they could neither avow him nor favour his cauſe: if he once ſet his foot on Scots ground, they gave hopes of indirect aſſiſtance: and if he could maintain himſelf in any corner of the iſland, they could look upon him, * it was ſaid, as a king. This was their language to us. To the Britiſh miniſter they denied, they foreſwore, they renounced; and yet the † man of the beſt head in all their councils, being aſked by Lord Stair what they intended to do; anſwered, before he was aware, that they pretended to be neuters. I leave you to judge how this ſlip was taken up.

* Diſcourſe of Abbé d'Eſtrees, afterwards Archbiſhop of Cambray.

† Marquis d'Huxelles.

As soon as I received advice, that the Chevalier was sailed from Dunkirk, I renewed, I redoubled all my applications. I neglected no means, I forgot no argument which my understanding could suggest to me. What the Duke of Ormond rested upon, you have seen already: and I doubt very much whether Lord Mar, if he had been here in my place, would have been able to employ measures more effectual than those which I made use of. I may, without any imputation of arrogance, compare myself on this occasion with his Lordship, since there was nothing in the management of this affair above my degree of capacity; nothing equal, either in extent or difficulty, to the business which he was a spectator of, and which I carried on when we were secretaries of state together under the late Queen.

The King of France, who was not able to furnish the Pretender with money himself, had writ some time before his death to his grandson, and had obtained a promise of 400,000 crowns from the King of Spain. A small part of this sum had been received by the Queen's treasurer at St. Germains, and had been either sent to Scotland, or employed to defray the expences which were daily making on the coast. I pressed the Spanish ambassador at Paris, I solicited by Lawless Alberoni, at Madrid; and I found * another more private and more promising way of applying to him. I took care to have a number of officers picked out of the Irish troops, which serve in that country; their routs were given them, and I sent a ship to receive and transport

* Marquis Monti.

port them. The money came in so slowly, and in such trifling sums, that it turned to little account; and the officers were on their way when the Chevalier returned from Scotland.

In the summer endeavours had been used to prevail on the King of Sweden to transport from Gottenburgh, the troops he had in that neighbourhood into Scotland, or into the north of England. He had excused himself, not because he disliked the proposition, which, on the contrary, he thought agreeable to his interest; but for reasons of another kind. First, because the troops at hand for this service consisted in horse, not in foot, which had been asked, and which were alone proper for such an expedition: secondly, because a declaration of this sort might turn the protestant princes of the empire, from whose offices he had still some prospect of assistance, against him: and thirdly, because although he knew that the King of Great Britain was his enemy, yet they were not in war together, nor had the latter acted yet a while openly enough against him to justify such a rupture. At the time I am speaking of, these reasons were removed by the King of Sweden's being beat out of the empire, by the little consequence which his management of the protestant princes was to him, and by the declaration of war which the King as Elector of Hanover made. I took up this negotiation therefore again. The regent appeared to come into it. He spoke fair to the Baron de Spar, who pressed him on his side, as I pressed him on mine, and promised, besides the arrears of the subsidy due to the Swedes, an immediate advance of fifty thousand

crowns, for the enterprise on Britain. He kept the officer who was to be dispatched, I know not how long booted; sometimes on pretence that in the low state of his credit he could not find bills of exchange for the sum, and sometimes on other pretences; and by these delays he evaded his promise. The French were very frank in declaring, that they could give us no money, and that they would give us no troops. Arms, ammunition, and connivance, they made us hope for. The latter in some degree we might have had, perhaps; but to what purpose was it to connive, when, by a multitude of little tricks, they avoided furnishing us with arms and ammunition, and when they knew that we were utterly unable to furnish ourselves with them? I had formed the design of engaging French privateers in the Pretender's service. They were to have carried whatever we should have had to send to any part of Britain in their first voyage, and after that, to have cruised under his commission. I had actually agreed for some, and it was in my power to have made the same bargains with others. Sweden on one side, and Scotland on the other, would have afforded them retreats: and if the war had been kept up in any part of the mountains, I conceive the execution of this design would have been of the greatest advantage to the Pretender. It failed, because no other part of the work went on. He was not above six weeks in his Scots expedition, and these were the things I endeavoured to bring to bear in his absence. I had no great opinion of my success before he went; but when he had made the last step which it was in his power to make, I resolved to suffer neither him nor the Scots to be any

longer

longer bubbles of their own credulity, and of the the ſcandalous artifice of this court. It would be tedious to enter into a longer narrative of all the uſeleſs pains I took. To conclude therefore in a converſation which I had with the M. d'Huxelles, I took occaſion to declare, that I would not be the inſtrument of amuſing the Scots; and that ſince I was able to do them no other ſervice, I would at leaſt inform them, that they muſt flatter themſelves no longer with hopes of ſuccour from France. I added, that I would ſend them veſſels which, with thoſe already on the coaſt of Scotland, might ſerve to bring off the Pretender, the Earl of Mar, and as many others as poſſible. The marſhal approved my reſolution, and adviſed me to execute it as the only thing which was left to do. On this occaſion he ſhewed no reſerve, he was very explicit: and yet, in this very point of time, the promiſe of an order was obtained, or pretended to be obtained, from the regent, for delivering thoſe ſtores of arms and ammunition which belonged to the Chevalier, and which had been put into the French magazines when Sir George Byng came to Havre. Caſtel Blanco is a Spaniard, who married a daughter of Lord Melford, and who, under that title, ſet up for a meddler in Engliſh buſineſs. I cannot juſtly tell whether the honour of obtaining this promiſe was aſcribed to him, to the junto in the Bois de Bologne, or to any one elſe. I ſuppoſe they all aſſumed a ſhare in the merit. The project was, that the ſtores ſhould be delivered to Caſtel Blanco; that he ſhould enter into a recognizance to carry them to Spain, and from thence to the Weſt Indies; that I ſhould provide a veſſel for this purpoſe,

which he ſhould appear to hire or buy; and that when ſhe was at ſea ſhe ſhould ſail directly for Scotland. You cannot believe that I reckoned much on the effect of this order: but accuſtomed to concur in meaſures, the inutility of which I ſaw evidently enough, I concurred in this likewiſe. The neceſſary care was taken, and in a fortnight's time the ſhip was ready to ſail, and no ſuſpicion of her belonging to the Chevalier, or of her deſtination, was gone abroad.

As this event made no alteration in my opinion, it made none in the diſpatches which I prepared, and ſent to Scotland. In them I gave an account of what was in negotiation. I explained to him what might be hoped for in time, if he was able to maintain himſelf in the mountains without the ſuccours he demanded from France. But from France, I told him plainly, that it was in vain to expect the leaſt part of them. In ſhort, I concealed nothing from him. This was all I could do to put the Chevalier and his council in a condition to judge what meaſures to take: but theſe diſpatches never came to his hands. He was ſailed from Scotland juſt before the gentleman, whom I ſent, arrived on the coaſt. He landed at Graveline about the twenty-ſecond of February; and the firſt orders he gave, were to ſtop all the veſſels which were going on his account to the country from whence he came.

I ſaw him the morning after his arrival at St. Germains, and he received me with open arms. I had been, as ſoon as we heard of his return, to acquaint the French court with it. They were not a little uneaſy; and the firſt thing which the M. d'Huxelles ſaid to me upon it was, that the Chevalier

lier ought to proceed to Bar with all the diligence poſſible, and to take poſſeſſion of his former aſylum before the Duke of Lorrain had time to deſire him to look out for a reſidence ſome where elſe. Nothing more was meant by this propoſal, than to get him out of the dominions of France immediately. I was not in my mind averſe to it, for other reaſons. Nothing could be more diſadvantageous to him, than to be obliged to paſs the Alps, or to reſide in the Papal territory on this ſide of them. Avignon was already named for his retreat, in common converſation; and I know not whether, from the time he left Scotland, he ever thought of any other. I imagined that by ſurpriſing the Duke of Lorrain, we ſhould furniſh that prince with an excuſe to the King, and to the Emperor; that we might draw the matter into length, and gain time to negotiate ſome other retreat, than that of Avignon, for the Chevalier. The Duke's good will there was no room to doubt of; and by what the Prince of Vaudemont told me at Paris, ſome time afterwards, I am apt to think we ſhould have ſucceeded. In all events, it could not be wrong to try every meaſure, and the Pretender would have gone to Avignon with much better grace, when he had done in the ſight of the world, all he could to avoid it.

I found him in no diſpoſition to make ſuch haſte: he had a mind, on the contrary, to ſtay ſome time at St. Germains, and in the neighbourhood of Paris, and to have a private meeting with the regent. He ſent me back to Paris, to ſolicit this meeting. I writ, I ſpoke to the Marſhal d'Huxelles, I did my beſt to ſerve him in his own way. The Marſhal

ſhal anſwered me by word of mouth, and by letter. He refuſed me by both. I remember he added this circumſtance, that he found the regent in bed, and acquainted him with what the Chevalier deſired; that the regent roſe up in a paſſion, ſaid that the things which were aſked were puerilities, and ſwore that he would not ſee him. I returned without having been able to ſucceed in my commiſſion; and I confeſs, I thought the want of ſucceſs on this occaſion, no great misfortune.

It was two or three o'clock on the Sunday or Monday morning when I parted from the Pretender. He acquieſced in the determination of the regent, and declared that he would inſtantly ſet out for Lorrain; his trunks were packed, his chaiſe was ordered to be at the door at five, and I ſent to Paris, to acquaint the miniſter that he was gone. He aſked me how ſoon I ſhould be able to follow him, gave me commiſſions for ſome things, which he deſired I ſhould bring after him; and, in a word, no Italian ever embraced the man he was going to ſtab, with greater ſhew of affection and confidence.

Inſtead of taking poſt for Lorrain, he went to the little houſe in the Bois de Boulogne, where his female miniſters reſided; there he continued lurking for ſeveral days, and pleaſing himſelf with the air of myſtery and buſineſs, whilſt the only real buſineſs which he ſhould have had at that time lay neglected. He ſaw the Spaniſh and Swediſh miniſters in this place. I cannot tell, for I never thought it worth aſking, whether he ſaw the Duke of Orleans: poſſibly he might. To have been teized into ſuch a ſtep, which ſignified nothing, and which gave the

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cabal an air of credit and importance, is agreeable enough to the levity of his Royal Highneſs's character.

The Thurſday following the Duke of Ormond, came to ſee me, and after the compliment of telling me, that he believed I ſhould be ſurpriſed at the meſſage he brought, he put into my hands a note to himſelf, and a little ſcrip of paper directed to me, and drawn in the ſtile of a juſtice of peace's warrant. They were both in the Chevalier's hand-writing, and they were dated on the Tueſday, in order to make me believe that they had been writ on the road, and ſent back to the Duke: his Grace dropped in our converſation with great dexterity, all the inſinuations proper to confirm me in this opinion. I knew at this time his maſter was not gone; ſo that he gave me two very riſible ſcenes, which are frequently to be met with when ſome people meddle in buſineſs; I mean that of ſeeing a man labour with a great deal of aukward artifice to make a ſecret of a nothing, and that of ſeeing yourſelf taken for a bubble, when you know as much of the matter, as he who thinks that he impoſes on you.

I cannot recollect preciſely the terms of the two papers. I remember that the kingly laconic ſtile of one of them, and the expreſſion of having no further occaſion for my ſervice made me ſmile. The other was an order to give up the papers in my office; all which might have been contained in a letter-caſe of a moderate ſize. I gave the duke the ſeals and ſome papers which I could readily come at. Some others, and indeed all ſuch as I had not deſtroyed, I ſent afterwards to the Chevalier: and I took care to convey to him, by a ſafe hand, ſeveral of

of his letters, which it would have been very improper the Duke ſhould have ſeen. I am ſurpriſed that he did not reflect on the conſequence of my obeying his order literally. It depended on me to have ſhewn his general what an opinion the Chevalier had of his capacity. I ſcorned the trick; and would not appear picqued, when I was far from being angry. As I gave up, without ſcruple, all the papers which remained in my hands, becauſe I was determined never to make uſe of them; ſo I confeſs to you, I took a ſort of pride in never aſking for thoſe of mine which were in the Pretender's hands: I contented myſelf with making the Duke underſtand how little need there was to get rid of a man in this manner, who had made the bargain which I had done at my engagement; and with taking this firſt opportunity to declare, that I would never more have to do with the Pretender or his cauſe.

That I might avoid being queſtioned and quoted in the moſt curious and the moſt babbling town in the world, I related what had paſſed to three or four of my friends, and hardly ſtirred abroad, during a fortnight, out of a little lodging which very few people knew of. At the end of this term the Marſhal of Berwic came to ſee me, and aſked me what I meant, to confine myſelf to my chamber, when my name was trumpeted about in all the companies of Paris, and the moſt infamous ſtories were ſpread concerning me. This was the firſt notice I had, and it was ſoon followed by others. I appeared immediately in the world, and found there was hardly a ſcurrilous tongue which had not been let looſe on my ſubject; and that thoſe perſons whom the Duke of Ormond and Earl of Mar muſt influ-

ence,

ence, or might ſilence, were the loudeſt in defaming me.

Particular inſtances wherein I had failed were cited; and, as it was the faſhion for every Jacobite to affect being in the ſecret, you might have found a multitude of vouchers to facts, which, if they had been true, could in the nature of them be known to very few perſons.

This method, of beating down the reputation of a man by noiſe and impudence, impoſed on the world at firſt, convinced people who were not acquainted with me, and ſtaggered even my friends. But it ceaſed in a few days to have any effect againſt me. The malice was too groſs to paſs upon reflection. Theſe ſtories died away almoſt as faſt as they were publiſhed, for this very reaſon, becauſe they were particular.

They gave out, for inſtance, that I had taken to my own uſe a very great ſum of the Chevalier's money, when it was notorious that I had ſpent a great part of my own in his ſervice; and never would be obliged to him for a farthing: in which caſe, I believe I was ſingle. Upon this head it was eaſy to appeal to a very honeſt gentleman, the Queen's treaſurer at St. Germain's, through whoſe hands, and not through mine, went the very little money which the Chevalier had.

They gave out, that whilſt he was in Scotland he never heard of me, though it was notorious that I ſent him no leſs than five expreſſes during the ſix weeks which he conſumed in this expedition. It was eaſy, on this head, to appeal to the perſons, to whom my diſpatches had been committed.

Theſe

These lies, and many others of the same sort, which were founded on particular facts, were disproved by particular facts, and had not time, at least at Paris, to make any impression. But the principal crime, with which they charged me then, and the only one which since that time they have insisted upon, is of another nature. This part of their accusation is general, and it cannot be refuted without doing what I have done above, deducing several facts, comparing these facts together, and reasoning upon them: nay, that which is worse, is, that it cannot be fully refuted without the mention of some facts, which, in my present circumstances, it would not be very prudent, though I should think it very lawful for me, to divulge. You see that I mean the starving the war in Scotland, which it is pretended might have been supported, and might have succeeded too, if I had procured the succours which were asked, nay, if I had sent a little powder. This the Jacobites, who affect moderation and candour, shrug their shoulders at: they are sorry for it, but Lord Bolinbroke can never wash himself clean of this guilt; for these succours might have been obtained: and a proof that they might, is, that they were so by others. These people leave the cause of this mismanagement doubtful, between my treachery and my want of capacity. The Pretender, with all the false charity and real malice of one who sets up for devotion, attributes all his misfortunes to my negligence.

The letters which were writ by my secretary, above a year ago, into England; the marginal notes which have been made since to the letter from Avignon; and what is said above, have set this affair

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in so clear a light, that whoever examines, with a fair intention, must feel the truth, and be convinced by it. I cannot, however, forbear to make some observations on the same subject here. It is even necessary that I should do so in the design of making this discourse the foundation of my justification to the Tories at present, and to the whole world in time.

There is nothing which my enemies apprehend so much as my justification: and they have reason. But they may comfort themselves with this reflection, that it will be a misfortune, which will accompany me to my grave, that I suffered a chain of accidents to draw me into such measures and such company; that I have been obliged to defend myself against such accusations and such accusers; that by associating with so much folly, and so much knavery, I am become the victim of both; that I was distressed by the former, when the latter would have been less grievous to me, since it is much better in business to be yoked to knaves than fools; and that I put into their hands the means of loading me, like the scape-goat, with all the evil consequences of their folly.

In the first letters which I received from the Earl of Mar, he writ for arms, for ammunition, for money, for officers, and all things frankly, as if these things had been ready, and I had engaged to supply him with them, before he set up the standard at the Brae of Mar: whereas our condition could not be unknown to his Lordship; and you have seen that I did all I could to prevent his reckoning on any assistance from hence. As our hopes at this court decreased, his Lordship rose in his demands: and

at the time when it was visible that the regent intended nothing less than even privately and indirectly to support the Scots, the Pretender and the Earl of Mar writ for regular forces and a train of artillery; which was in effect to insist that France should enter into a war for them. I might, in answer to the first instances, have asked Lord Mar what he did in Scotland? and what he meaned by drawing his countrymen into a war at this time, or at least upon this foot? He, who had dictated not long before a memorial, wherein it was asserted, that to have a prospect of succeeding in this enterprise there must be an universal insurrection, and that such an insurrection was in no sort probable, unless a body of troops was brought to support it? He, who thought that the consequence of failing, when the attempt was once made, must be the utter ruin of the cause, and the loss of the British liberty? He, who concurred in demanding as a pis-aller, and the least which could be insisted on, arms, ammunition, artillery, money, and officers? I say, I might have asked what he meant to begin the dance when he had not the least assurance of any succour, but, on the contrary, the greatest reason imaginable to believe this affair was become as desperate abroad by the death of the most Christian King, as it was at home by the discovery of the design, and by the measures taken to defeat it?

Instead of acting this part, which would have been wise, I took that which was plausible. I resolved to contribute all I could to support the business, since it was begun. I encouraged his Lordship as long as I had the least ground for doing so; and I confirmed the Pretender in his resolution of going

ing to Scotland, when he had nothing better left him to do. If I have any thing to reproach myſelf with, in the whole progreſs of the war in Scotland, it is having encouraged Lord Mar too long. But on the other hand, if I had given up the cauſe, and had writ deſpondingly to him, before this court had explained itſelf as fully as the Marſhal d'Huxelles did in the converſation which is mentioned above, it is eaſy to ſee what turn would have been given to ſuch a conduct.

The true cauſe of all the misfortunes which happened to the Scots, and to thoſe who took arms in the north of England, lies here; that they roſe without any previous certainty of foreign help, in direct contradiction to the ſcheme which their leaders themſelves had formed. The excuſe which I have heard made for this, is that the act of parliament for curbing the Highlanders was near to be put in execution; that they would have been diſarmed, and entirely diſabled from riſing at any other time, if they had not roſe at this. You can judge better than I of the validity of this excuſe. It ſeems to me, that by management they might have gained time, and that even when they had been reduced to the dilemma ſuppoſed, they ought to have got together under pretence of reſiſting the infractions of the union, without any mention of the Pretender, and have treated with the government on this foot. By theſe means they might probably have preſerved themſelves in a condition of avowing their deſign when they ſhould be ſure of being backed from abroad: at the worſt they might have declared for the Chevalier when all other expedients failed them. In a word, I take this excuſe not

to be very good, and the true reaſon of this conduct to have been the raſhneſs of the people, and the inconſiſtent meaſures of their head.

But admitting the excuſe to be valid, it remains ſtill an undeniable truth, that this is the original fountain from whence all thoſe waters of bitterneſs flowed, which ſo many unhappy people have drunk of. I have ſaid already, that the neceſſity of acting was precipitated before any meaſures to act with ſucceſs had been taken; and that the neceſſity of doing ſo ſeemed to increaſe as the means of doing ſo were taken away. To whom is this to be aſcribed? Is it to be aſcribed to me, who had no ſhare in theſe affairs till a few weeks before the Duke of Ormond was forced to abandon England, and the diſcovery of the intended invaſion was publiſhed to parliament and to the world? or is it to be aſcribed to thoſe who had from the firſt been at the head of this undertaking.

Unable to defend this point, the next reſort of the Jacobites is to this impudent and abſurd affirmation, that, notwithſtanding the diſadvantages under which they took arms, they ſhould have ſucceeded, if the indirect aſſiſtances, which were aſked from France, had been obtained: nay, that they ſhould have been able to defend the Highlands, if I had ſent them a little powder. Is it poſſible that a man ſhould be wounded with ſuch blunt weapons? Much more than powder was aſked for from the firſt; and I have already ſaid, that when the Chevalier came into Scotland, regular troops, artillery, *&c.* were demanded. Both he and the Earl of Mar judged it impoſſible to ſtand their ground without ſuch aſſiſtance as theſe. How ſcandalous then muſt

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it be deemed, that they ſuffer their dependents to ſpread in the world, that for want of a little powder I forced them to abandon Scotland? The Earl of Mar knows, that all the powder in France would not have enabled him to ſtay at Perth as long as he did, if he had not had another ſecurity: and when that failed him, he muſt have quitted the party, if the regent had given us all that he made ſome of us expect.

But to finiſh all that I intend to ſay on a ſubject which has tired me, and perhaps you: the Jacobites affirm, that the indirect aſſiſtances, which they deſired, might have been obtained: and I confeſs, that I am inexcuſable if this fact be true. To prove it, they appeal to the little politicians of whom I have ſpoken ſo often. I affirm, on the contrary, that nothing could be obtained here to ſupport the Scots, or to encourage the Engliſh. To prove the aſſertion, I appeal to the miniſters with whom I negotiated, and to the regent himſelf, who, whatever language he may hold in private with other people, cannot controvert with me the truth of what I advance. He excluded me formerly, that he might the more eaſily avoid doing any thing; and perhaps he has blamed me ſince, that he might excuſe his doing nothing. All this may be true, and yet it will remain true, that he would never have been prevailed upon to act directly againſt his intereſt in the only point of view which he has, I mean the crown of France, and againſt the unanimous ſenſe of all his miniſters. Suppoſe that in the time of the late Queen, when ſhe had the peace in view, a party in France had implored her aſſiſtance, and had applied to Margery Fielding, to Iſrael, to my

lady Oglethorpe, to Dr. Battle, and Lieutenant General Stewart; what succeſs do you imagine ſuch applications would have had? The Queen would have ſpoke them fair, ſhe would ſpeak otherwiſe to no body: but do you imagine ſhe would have made one ſtep in their favour? Olive Trant, Migny, Mademoiſelle Chauffery, a dirty abbé Brigault, and Mr Dillon, are characters very appoſite to theſe: and what I ſuppoſe to have paſſed in England is not a whit more ridiculous that what really paſſed here.

I ſay nothing of the ſhips, which the Jacobites pretend that they ſent into Scotland three weeks or a month after the Pretender was returned. I believe they might have had my Lord Stair's connivance then, as well as the regent's. I ſay nothing of the order, which they pretend to have obtained, and which I never ſaw, for the ſtores that were ſeized at Havre to be delivered to Caſtel Blanco. I have already ſaid enough on this head; and you cannot have failed to obſerve, that this ſignal favour was never obtained by theſe people till the Marſhal d'Huxelles had owned to me, that nothing was to be expected from France, and that the only thing which I could do was to endeavour to bring the Pretender, the Earl of Mar, and the principal perſons who were moſt expoſed, off: neither he nor I imagining that any ſuch would be left behind.

When I began to appear in the world, upon the advertiſements which my friends gave me of the clamour that was raiſed againſt me, you will eaſily think I did not enter into ſo many particulars as I have done with you. I ſaid even leſs than you have ſeen, in thoſe letters which Brinſden writ into England, in March and April was twelve month; and

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yet the clamour ſunk immediately. The people of conſideration at this court beat it down, and the court of St. Germains grew ſo aſhamed of it, that the Queen thought fit to purge herſelf of having had any ſhare in encouraging the diſcourſes which were held againſt me, or having been ſo much as let into the ſecret of the meaſure which preceded them. The provocation was great, but I reſolved to act without paſſion. I ſaw the advantage the Pretender and his council, who diſpoſed of things better for me than I ſhould have done for myſelf, had given me: but I ſaw likewiſe, that I muſt improve this advantage with the utmoſt caution.

As I never imagined that he would treat me in the manner he did, nor that his miniſters could be weak enough to adviſe them to it; I had reſolved, on his return from Scotland, to follow him till his reſidence ſhould be fixed ſomewhere or other: after which, having ſerved the Tories in this, which I looked upon as their laſt ſtruggle for power, and having continued to act in the Pretender's affairs till the end of the term for which I embarked with him; I ſhould have eſteemed myſelf to be at liberty, and ſhould in the civileſt manner I was able have taken my leave of him. Had we parted thus, I ſhould have remained in a very ſtrange ſituation during the reſt of my life: but I had examined myſelf thoroughly, I was determined, I was prepared.

On one ſide he would have thought that he had a ſort of right on any future occaſion to call me out of my retreat; the Tories would probably have thought the ſame thing: my reſolution was taken to refuſe them both, and I foreſaw, that both would condemn me. On the other ſide, the conſideration

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of his keeping meaſures with me, joined to that of having once openly declared for him, would have created a point of honour, by which I ſhould have been tied down; not only from ever engaging againſt him, but alſo from making my peace at home. The Chevalier cut this gordian knot aſunder at one blow. He broke the links of that chain which former engagements had faſtened on me, and gave me a right to eſteem myſelf as free from all obligations of keeping meaſures with him, as I ſhould have continued if I had never engaged in his intereſt: I took therefore, from that moment, the reſolution of making my peace at home, and of employing all the unfortunate experience I had acquired abroad, to undeceive my friends, and to promote the union and the quiet of my country.

The Earl of Stair had received a full power to treat with me whilſt I was engaged with the Pretender, as I have been ſince informed. He had done me the juſtice to believe me incapable to hearken, in ſuch circumſtances, to any propoſals of that kind: and, as much friendſhip as he had for me, as much as I had for him, we entertained not the leaſt even indirect correſpondence together during that whole time. Soon afterwards he employed a perſon * to communicate to me the diſpoſition of his Majeſty to grant me my pardon, and his own deſire to give me on this occaſion, all the proofs he could of his inclination in my favour. I embraced the offer, as it became me to do, with all poſſible ſenſe of the King's goodneſs, and of his

* SALADIN of Geneva, then at Paris.

Lord-

Lordſhip's friendſhip †. We met, we talked together, and he wrote to the court on the ſubject. The turn which the miniſters gave to this matter was, to enter into a treaty to reverſe my attainder, and to ſtipulate the conditions on which this act of grace ſhould be granted me.

The notion of a treaty ſhocked me. I reſolved never to be reſtored, rather than go that way to work; and I opened myſelf without any reſerve to Lord Stair. I told him, that I looked on myſelf to be obliged in honour and in conſcience to undeceive my friends in England, both as to the ſtate of foreign affairs, as to the management of the Jacobite intereſt abroad, and as to the characters of perſons; in every one of which points I know them to be moſt grofsly and moſt dangerouſly deluded: that the treatment I had received from the Pretender and his adherents would juſtify me to the world in doing this: that if I remained in exile all my life, he might be aſſured, that I would never more have to do with the Jacobite cauſe; and that if I was reſtored, I ſhould give it an effectual blow, in making that apology which the Pretender has put me under a neceſſity of making: that in doing this I flattered myſelf that I ſhould contribute ſomething to the eſtabliſhment of the King's government, and to the union of his ſubjects; but that this was all the merit which I could promiſe to have: that if the court believed theſe profeſſions to be ſincere, a treaty with me was unneceſſary for them; and that

† There will be added, at the end of this relation, an original letter from the Earl of STAIR to Mr. CRAGGS, giving a full account of the tranſaction here mentioned.

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if they did not believe them ſo, a treaty with them was dangerous for me: that I was determined in this whole tranſaction to make no one ſtep which I would not own in the face of the world; that in other circumſtances it might be ſufficient to act honeſtly, but that in a caſe as extraordinary as mine, it was neceſſary to act clearly, and to leave no room for the leaſt doubtful conſtruction.

The Earl of Stair, as well as Mr. Craggs, who arrived ſoon after in France, came into my ſenſe. I have reaſon to believe, that the King has approved it likewiſe, upon their repreſentations, ſince he has been pleaſed to give me the moſt gracious aſſurances of his favour. What the effect of all this may be, in the next, or in any other ſeſſion, I know not; but this is the foot on which I have put myſelf, and on which I ſtand at the moment I write to you. The Whigs may continue inveterate, and by conſequence fruſtrate his Majeſty's good intentions towards me; the Tories may continue to rail at me, on the credit of ſuch enemies as I have deſcribed to you, in the courſe of this relation; neither the one nor the other ſhall make me ſwerve out of the path which I have traced to myſelf.

I have now led you through the ſeveral ſtages which I propoſed at firſt; and I ſhould do wrong to your good underſtanding, as well as to our mutual friendſhip, if I ſuſpected that you could hold any other language to me, than that which Dolabella uſes to Cicero: *Satisfactum eſt jam a te, vel officio, vel familiaritati; ſatisfactum etiam partibus.* The King, who pardons me, might complain of me, the Whigs might declaim againſt me, my family

mily might reproach me for the little regard which I have ſhewn to my own, and to their intereſts; but where is the crime I have been guilty of towards my party, and towards my friends? In what part of my conduct will the Tories find an excuſe for the treatment which they have given me? As Tories, ſuch as they were when I left England, I defy them to find any. But here lies the ſore, and tender as it is, I muſt lay it open. Thoſe amongſt them, who rail at me now, are changed from what they were, or from what they profeſſed themſelves to be, when we lived and acted together. They were Tories then, they are Jacobites now. Their objections to the courſe of my conduct, whilſt I was in the Pretender's intereſt are the pretence; the true reaſon of their anger is, that I renounce the Pretender for my life. When you were firſt driven into this intereſt, I may appeal to you for the notion which the party had. You thought of reſtoring him by the ſtrength of the Tories, and of oppoſing a Tory king to a Whig king. You took him up as the inſtrument of your revenge, and of your ambition. You looked on him as your creature, and never once doubted of making what terms you pleaſed with him. This is ſo true, that the ſame language is ſtill held to the catechumens in Jacobitiſm. Were the contrary to be avowed even now, the party in England would ſoon diminiſh. I engaged on this principle when your orders ſent me to Commercy, and I never acted on any other. This ought to have been part of my merit towards the Tories; and it would have been ſo if they had continued in the ſame diſpoſitions. But they are changed, and this very thing is become my crime.

Inſtead

Inſtead of making the Pretender their tool, they are his. Inſtead of having in view to reſtore him on their own terms, they are labouring to do it without any terms; that is, to ſpeak properly, they are ready to receive him on his. Be not deceived; there is not a man on this ſide of the water, who acts in any other manner. The Church-of-England Jacobite, and the Iriſh Papiſt, ſeem in every reſpect to have the ſame cauſe. Thoſe on your ſide of the water, who correſpond with theſe, are to be comprehended in the ſame claſs: and from hence it is, that the clamour raiſed againſt me has been kept up with ſo much induſtry, and is redoubled on the leaſt appearance of my return home, and of my being in a ſituation to juſtify myſelf.

You have ſeen already what reaſons the Pretender, and the ſeveral ſorts of people who compoſe his party here, had to get rid of me, and to cover me to the utmoſt of their power, with infamy. Their views were as ſhort in this caſe, as they are in all others. They did not ſee, at firſt, that this conduct would not only give me a right, but put me under a neceſſity of keeping no farther meaſures with them, and of laying the whole myſtery of their iniquity open. As ſoon as they diſcovered this, they took the only courſe which was left them, that of poiſoning the minds of the Tories, and of creating ſuch prejudices againſt me whilſt I remained in a condition of not ſpeaking for myſelf, as will, they hope, prevent the effect of whatever I may ſay, when I am in a condition of pleading my own cauſe. The bare apprehenſion that I ſhall ſhew the world that I have been guilty of no crime, ren-

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ders me criminal among these men: and they hold themselves ready, being unable to reply either in point of fact or in point of reason, to drown my voice in the confusion of their clamour.

The only crimes I am guilty of I own. I own the crime of having been for the Pretender, in a very different manner from those with whom I acted. I served him as faithfully, I served him as well as they; but I served him on a different principle. I own the crime of having renounced him, and of being resolved never to have to do with him as long as I live. I own the crime of being determined sooner or later, as soon as I can, to clear myself of all the unjust aspersions which have been cast upon me; to undeceive, by my experience, as many as I can of those Tories who may have been drawn into error; and to contribute, if ever I return home, as far as I am able, to promote the national good of Britain, without any other regard. These crimes do not, I hope, by this time appear to you to be of a very black dye. You may come, perhaps, to think them virtues, when you have read and considered what remains to be said; for, before I conclude, it is necessary that I open one matter to you, which I could not weave in sooner, without breaking too much the thread of my narration. In this place, unmingled with any thing else, it will have, as it deserves to have, your whole attention.

Whoever composed that curious piece of false fact, false argument, false English, and false eloquence, the letter from Avignon, says, that I was not thought the most proper person to speak about religion. I confess I should be of his mind, and

ſhould include his patrons in my caſe, if the practice of it was to be recommended: for ſurely it is unpardonable impudence, to impoſe by precept what we do not teach by example. I ſhould be of the ſame mind, if the nature of religion was to be explained, if its myſteries were to be fathomed, and if this great truth was to be eſtabliſhed, that the church of England has the advantage over all other churches in purity of doctrine, and in wiſdom of diſcipline. But nothing of this kind was neceſſary. This would have been the talk of reverend and learned divines. We of the laity had nothing more to do, than to lay in our claim that we could never ſubmit to be governed by a prince who was not of the religion of our country. Such a declaration could hardly have failed of ſome effect towards opening the eyes, and diſpoſing the mind even of the Pretender. At leaſt, in juſtice to ourſelves, and in juſtice to our party, we, who were here, ought to have made it; and the influence of it on the Pretender ought to have become the rule of our ſubſequent conduct.

In thinking in this manner, I think no otherwiſe now than I have always thought; and I cannot forget, nor you neither, what paſſed when, a little before the death of the Queen, letters were conveyed from the Chevalier to ſeveral perſons, to myſelf among others. In the letter to me the article of religion was ſo aukwardly handled, that he made the principal motive of the confidence we ought to have in him, to conſiſt in his firm reſolution to adhere to popery. The effect which this epiſtle had on me, was the ſame which it had on thoſe Tories to whom I communicated it at that time; it made us reſolve to have nothing to do with him.

Some

Some time after this, I was assured by several, and I make no doubt but others have been so too, that the Chevalier at the bottom was not a bigot: that whilst he remained abroad, and could expect no succour, either present or future, from any princes but those of the Roman catholic communion, it was prudent, whatever he might think, to make no demonstration of a design to change: but that his temper was such, and he was already so disposed, that we might depend on his compliance with what should be desired of him, if ever he came amongst us, and was taken from under the wing of the Queen his mother. To strengthen this opinion of his character, it was said that he had sent for Mr. Lesly over; that he allowed him to celebrate the church of England service in his family: and that he had promised to hear what this divine should represent on the subject of religion to him. When I came abroad, the same things, and much more, were at first insinuated to me; and I began to let them make impression upon me, notwithstanding what I had seen under his hand. I would willingly flatter myself, that this impression disposed me to incline to Jacobitism, rather than allow that the inclination to Jacobitism disposed me easily to believe what, upon that principle, I had so much reason to wish might be true. Which was the cause, and which the effect, I cannot well determine: perhaps they did mutually occasion each other. Thus much is certain, that I was far from weighing this matter as I ought to have done, when the solicitation of my friends, and the persecution of my enemies, precipitated me into engagements with the Pretender.

I was willing to take it for granted, that since you were as ready to declare, as I believed you at that time, you must have had entire satisfaction on the article of religion. I was soon undeceived; this string had never been touched. My own observation, and the unanimous report of all those who from his infancy have approached the Pretender's person, soon taught me how difficult it is to come to terms with him on this head, and how unsafe to embark without them.

His religion is not founded on the love of virtue, and the detestation of vice; on a sense of that obedience which is due to the will of the Supreme Being; and a sense of those obligations which creatures, formed to live in a mutual dependence on one another, lie under. The spring of his whole conduct is fear. Fear of the horns of the devil, and of the flames of hell. He has been taught to believe, that nothing but a blind submission to the church of Rome, and a strict adherence to all the terms of that communion, can save him from these dangers. He has all the superstition of a capuchin; but I found on him no tincture of the religion of a prince. Do not imagine that I loose the reins to my imagination, or that I write what my resentments dictate: I tell you simply my opinion. I have heard the same description of his character made by those who knew him best; and I conversed with very few among the Roman catholics themselves, who did not think him too much a Papist.

Nothing gave me, from the beginning, so much uneasiness as the consideration of this part of his character, and of the little care which had been taken to correct it. A true turn had not been given

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to the firſt ſteps which were made with him. The Tories, who engaged afterwards, threw themſelves as it were at his head. He had been ſuffered to think, that the party in England wanted him, as much as he wanted them. There was no room to hope for much compliance on the head of religion, when he was in theſe ſentiments, and when he thought the Tories too far advanced to have it in their power to retreat: and little dependence was at any time to be placed on the promiſes of a man capable of thinking his damnation attached to the obſervance, and his ſalvation to the breach of theſe very promiſes. Something, however, was to be done: and I thought that the leaſt which could be done, was to deal plainly with him, and to ſhew him the impoſſibility of governing our nation by any other expedient, than by complying with that which would be expected from him as to his religion. This was thought too much by the Duke of Ormond and Mr. Leſlie; although the Duke could be no more ignorant than the miniſter, how ill the latter had been uſed, how far the Chevalier had been from keeping the word which he had given, and on the faith of which Mr. Leſlie had come over to him. They both knew, that he not only refuſed to hear himſelf, but that he ſheltered the ignorance of his prieſts, or the badneſs of his cauſe, or both, behind his authority, and abſolutely forbid all diſcourſe concerning religion. The Duke ſeemed convinced, that it would be time enough to talk of religion to him when he ſhould be reſtored, or, at ſooneſt, when he ſhould be landed in England; that, the influence under which he had lived being at a diſtance, the reaſonableneſs of what we

might propose, joined to the apparent necessity which would then stare him in the face, could not fail to produce all the effects which we could desire.

To me this whole reasoning appeared fallacious. Our business was not to make him change appearances on this side of the water, but to prepare him to give those which would be necessary on the other: and there was no room to hope, that if we could gain nothing on his prejudices here, we should be able to overcome them in Britain. I would have argued just as the Duke of Ormond and Leslie, if I had been a Papist; and I saw well enough, that some people about him, for in a great dearth of ability there was cunning to be met with, affected nothing more than to keep off all discourse of religion. To my apprehension it was exceeding plain, that we should find, if we were once in England, the necessity of going forward at any rate with him, much greater than he would find that of complying with us I thought it an unpardonable fault to have taken a formal engagement with him, when no previous satisfaction had been obtained on a point, at least, as essential to our civil as to our religious rights; to the peace of the state, as to the prosperity of the church: and I looked on this fault to be aggravated by every day's delay. Our silence was unfair, both to the Chevalier and to our friends in England. He was induced by it to believe, that they would exact far less from him, than we knew they expected: and they were confirmed in an opinion of his docility, which we knew to be void of all foundation. The pretence of removing that influence, under which he had lived, was frivolous, and should never have been urged to me, who saw plainly

plainly that, according to the measures pursued by the very persons who urged it, he must be environed in England by the same people that surrounded him here; and that the court of St. James's would be constituted, if ever he was restored, in the same manner as that of St. Germains was.

When the draught of a declaration, and other papers which were to be dispersed in Great Britain, came to be settled, it appeared that my apprehension and distrust were but too well founded. The Pretender took exception against several passages, and particularly against those, wherein a direct promise of securing the churches of England and Ireland was made. He was told, he said, that he could not, in conscience, make such a promise; and, the debate being kept up a little while, he asked me, with some warmth, why the Tories were so desirous to have him, if they expected those things from him which his religion did not allow? I left these draughts, by his order, with him, that he might consider and amend them. I cannot say that he sent them to the Queen to be corrected by her confessor, and the rest of her council: but I firmly believe it. Sure I am, that he took time sufficient to do this, before he sent them from Bar, where he then was, to Paris, whither I was returned When they were digested in such a manner as satisfied his casuists, he made them be printed: and my name was put to the declaration, as if the original had been signed by me. I had hitherto submitted my opinion to the judgment of others; but on this occasion I took advice from myself. I declared to him, that I would not suffer my name to be at the bottom of this paper. All the copies which came

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to my hands I burnt, and another was printed off, without any counterſigning.

The whole tenor of the amendments was one continued inſtance of the groſſeſt bigotry: and the moſt material paſſages were turned with all the Jeſuitical prevarication imaginable. As much as it was his intereſt, at that time, to cultivate the reſpect which many of the Tories really had for the memory of the late Queen, and which many others affected, as a farther mark of their oppoſition to the court, and to the Whig party; as much as it was his intereſt to weave the honour of her name into his cauſe, and to render her, even after her death, a party to the diſpute; he could not be prevailed upon to give her that character which her enemies allowed her, nor to make uſe of thoſe expreſſions in ſpeaking of her, which, by the general manner of their application, are come to be little more than terms of reſpect, and words of form, proper in the ſtyle of public acts. For inſtance:

She was called in the original draught, "his ſiſter of glorious and bleſſed memory." In that which he publiſhed, the epithet of "bleſſed" was left out, her eminent juſtice, and her exemplary piety, were occaſionally mentioned. In lieu of which he ſubſtituted a flat, and, in this caſe, an invidious expreſſion, "her inclinations to juſtice."

Not content with declaring her neither juſt nor pious in this world, he did little leſs than declare her damned in the other, according to the charitable principles of the church of Rome.

"When it pleaſed Almighty God to take her to "himſelf," was the expreſſion uſed in ſpeaking of the death of the Queen. This he erafed, and inſtead

ſtead thereof inſerted theſe words: "When it "pleaſed Almighty God to put a period to her "life."

He graciouſly allowed the univerſities to be nurſeries of loyalty; but did not think that it became him to ſtyle them *nurſeries of religion.*

Since his father paſſes already for a ſaint, and ſince reports are encouraged of miracles which they ſuppoſe to be wrought at his tomb, he might have allowed his grandfather to paſs for a martyr: but he ſtruck out of the draught theſe words, "that "bleſſed martyr who died for his people," which were applied to King Charles the firſt, and would ſay nothing more of him than that "he fell a ſacri- "fice to rebellion."

In the clauſe which related to the churches of England and Ireland, there was a plain and direct promiſe inſerted of "effectual proviſion for their "ſecurity; and for their re-eſtabliſhment in all "thoſe rights which belong to them." This clauſe was not ſuffered to ſtand, but another was formed, wherein all mention of the church of Ireland was omitted, and nothing was promiſed to the church of England but the ſecurity, and "re-eſtabliſhment "of all thoſe rights, privileges, immunities, and "poſſeſſions which belong to her," and wherein he had already promiſed, by his declaration of the twentieth of July, to ſecure and "protect all her "members."

I need make no comment on a proceeding ſo eaſy to be underſtood. The drift of theſe evaſions, and of this affected obſcurity is obvious enough, at leaſt it will appear ſo by the obſervations which remain to be made.

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He was so afraid of admitting any words which might be construed into a promise of his consenting to those things, which should be found necessary for the present or future security of our constitution, that in a paragraph where he was made to say, that he thought himself obliged to be solicitous for the prosperity of the church of England, the word *prosperity* was expunged; and we were left by this mental reservation to guess what he was solicitous for. It could not be for her prosperity: that he had expunged. It must therefore be for her destruction, which in his language would have been styled, her conversion.

Another remarkable proof of the same kind is to be found towards the conclusion of the declaration. After having spoke of the peace and flourishing estate of the kingdom, he was made to express his readiness to concert with the two houses such further measures, as should be thought necessary for securing the same to future generations. The design of this paragraph you see. He and his council saw it too, and therefore the word *securing* was laid aside, and the word *leaving* was inserted in lieu of it.

One would imagine, that a declaration corrected in this manner might have been suffered to go abroad without any further precaution. But these papers had been penned by protestants; and who could answer that there might not be still ground sufficient from the tenor of them to insist on every thing necessary for the security of that religion? The declaration of the twentieth of July had been penned by a priest of the Scots college, and the expressions had been measured so as to suit perfectly

with

with the conduct which the Chevalier intended to hold; so as to leave room to distinguish him, upon future occasions, with the help of a little pious sophistry, out of all engagements which he seemed to take in it. This orthodox paper was therefore to accompany the heretical paper into the world, and no promise of moment was to stand in the latter, unless qualified by a reference to the former. Thus the church was to be secured in the rights, *&c.* which belong to her. How? No otherwise than according to the declaration of the month of July. And what does that promise? Security and protection to the members of this church in the enjoyment of their property. I make no doubt, but Bellarmine, if he had been the Chevalier's confessor, would have passed this paragraph thus amended. No engagement whatever taken in favour of the church of Ireland, and a happy distinction found between securing that of England, and protecting her members. Many a useful project for the destruction of heretics, and for accumulating power and riches to the see of Rome, has been established on a more slender foundation.

The same spirit reigns through the whole. Civil and religious rights are no otherwise to be confirmed, than in conformity to the declaration of July; nay the general pardon is restrained and limited to the terms prescribed therein.

This is the account which I judged too important to be omitted, and which I chose to give you altogether. I shall surely be justified at present in concluding, that the Tories are grossly deluded in their opinion of this prince's character, or else that they sacrifice all, which ought to be esteemed precious and

sacred

ſacred among men, to their paſſions. In both theſe caſes I remain ſtill a Tory, and am true to the party. In the firſt, I endeavour to undeceive you by an experience purchaſed at my expence, and for your ſakes: in the ſecond, I endeavour to prevail on you to revert to that principle from which we have deviated. You never intended, whilſt I lived amongſt you, the ruin of your country; and yet every ſtep, which you now make towards the reſtoration you are ſo fond of, is a ſtep towards this ruin. No man of ſenſe, well informed, can ever go into meaſures for it, unleſs he thinks himſelf and his country in ſuch deſperate circumſtances, that nothing is left them but to chuſe of two ruins that which they like beſt.

The exile of the Royal Family, under Cromwell's uſurpation, was the principal cauſe of all thoſe misfortunes, in which Britain has been involved, as well as of many of thoſe which have happened to the reſt of Europe, during more than half a century.

The two brothers, Charles and James, became then infected with popery to ſuch degrees, as their different characters admitted of. Charles had parts; and his good underſtanding ſerved as an antidote to repel the poiſon. James, the ſimpleſt man of his time, drank off the whole chalice. The poiſon met in his compoſition, with all the fear, all the credulity, and all the obſtinacy of temper proper to increaſe its virulence, and to ſtrengthen its effect. The firſt had always a wrong bias upon him: he connived at the eſtabliſhment, and indirectly contributed to the growth of that power, which afterwards diſturbed the peace, and threatened the liberty of

Europe

Europe ſo often; but he went no farther out of the way. The oppoſition of his parliaments, and his own reflections ſtopped him here. The prince and the people were indeed mutually jealous of one another, from whence much preſent diſorder flowed, and the foundation of future evils was laid: but his good and his bad principles combating ſtill together, he maintained, during a reign of more than twenty years, in ſome tolerable degree, the authority of the crown, and the flouriſhing eſtate of the nation. The laſt, drunk with ſuperſtitious, and even enthuſiaſtic zeal, ran headlong into his own ruin whilſt he endeavoured to precipitate ours. His parliament and his people did all they could to ſave themſelves by winning him. But all was vain: he had no principle on which they could take hold. Even his good qualities worked againſt them, and his love of his country went halves with his bigotry. How he ſucceeded, we have heard from our fathers. The revolution of one thouſand ſix hundred and eighty eight, ſaved the nation, and ruined the King.

Now the Pretender's education has rendered him infinitely leſs fit than his uncle, and at leaſt as unfit as his father, to be king of Great Britain. Add to this, that there is no reſource in his underſtanding. Men of the beſt ſenſe find it hard to overcome religious prejudices, which are of all the ſtrongeſt; but he is a ſlave to the weakeſt. The rod hangs like the ſword of Damocles over his head, and he trembles before his mother and his prieſt. What, in the name of God, can any member of the church of England promiſe himſelf from ſuch a character? Are we by another revolution to return into the

ſame ſtate from which we were delivered by the firſt? Let us take example from the Roman Catholics, who act very reaſonably in refuſing to ſubmit to a Proteſtant prince. Henry the fourth had at leaſt as good a title to the crown of France, as the Pretender has to ours. His religion alone ſtood in his way, and he had never been king if he had not removed that obſtacle. Shall we ſubmit to a Popiſh prince, who will no more imitate Henry the fourth in changing his religion, than he will imitate thoſe ſhining qualities which rendered him the honeſteſt gentleman, the braveſt captain, and the greateſt prince of his age? Allow me to give a looſe to my pen for a moment on this ſubject. General benevolence, and univerſal charity ſeem to be eſtabliſhed in the goſpel as the diſtinguiſhing badges of Chriſtianity. How it happens I cannot tell; but ſo it is, that in all ages of the church, the profeſſors of Chriſtianity ſeem to have been animated by a quite contrary ſpirit. Whilſt they were thinly ſcattered over the world, tolerated in ſome places, but eſtabliſhed nowhere, their zeal often conſumed their charity. Paganiſm, at that time the religion by law eſtabliſhed, was inſulted by many of them; the ceremonies were diſturbed, the altars thrown down. As ſoon as by the favour of Conſtantine the numbers were increaſed, and the reigns of government were put into their hands, they began to employ the ſecular arm, not only againſt different religions, but againſt different ſects which aroſe in their own religion. A man may boldly affirm, that more blood has been ſhed in the diſputes between Chriſtian and Chriſtian, than has ever been drawn from the whole body of them in the perſecutions of the heathen

heathen emperors, and in the conquests of the Mahometan princes. From these they have received quarter, but never from one another. The Christian religion is actually tolerated among the Mahometans, and the domes of churches and mosques arise in the same city. But it will be hard to find an example, where one sect of Christians has tolerated another which it was in their power to extirpate. They have gone farther in these later ages: what was practised formerly has been taught since. Persecution has been reduced into system, and the disciples of the meek and humble Jesus have avowed a tyranny, which the most barbarous conquerors never claimed. The wicked subtilty of casuists has established breach of faith with those who differ from us, as a duty in opposition to faith; and murder itself has been made one of the means of salvation. I know very well that the reformed churches have been far from going those cruel lengths, which are authorised by the doctrine as well as example of that of Rome; tho' Calvin put a flaming sword on the title of a French edition of his Institute, with this motto, *Je ne suis point venu mettre la paix, mais l'epee*: but I know likewise, that the difference lies in the means, and not in the aim of their policy. The church of England, the most humane of all of them, would root out every other religion, if it was in her power. She would not hang and burn; her measures would be milder, and therefore, perhaps, more effectual.

Since then there is this inveterate rancour among Christians, can any thing be more absurd, than for those of one persuasion to trust the supreme power, or any part of it, to those of another? Particularly

muſt it not be reputed madneſs in thoſe of our religion, to truſt themſelves in the hands of Roman Catholics? Muſt it not be reputed impudence in a Roman Catholic to expect that we ſhould? he who looks upon us as heretics, as men in rebellion againſt a lawful, nay a divine authority, and whom it is therefore meritorious, by all ſorts of ways, to reduce to obedience. There are many, I know, amongſt them who think more generouſly, and whoſe morals are not corrupted by that which is called religion: but this is the ſpirit of the prieſthood, in whoſe ſcale that ſcrap of a parable, *Compel them to come in*, which they apply as they pleaſe, outweighs the whole decalogue. This will be the ſpirit of every man who is bigot enough to be under their direction: and ſo much is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe.

During your laſt ſeſſion of parliament, it was expected that the Whigs would attempt to repeal the occaſional bill. The ſame jealouſy continues: there is, perhaps, foundation for it. Give me leave to aſk you, upon what principle we argued for making this law; and upon what principle muſt you argue againſt the repeal of it. I have mentioned the principle in the beginning of this diſcourſe. No man ought to be truſted with any ſhare of power under a government, who muſt, to act conſiſtently with himſelf, endeavour the deſtruction of that very government. Shall this propoſition paſs for true when it is applied to keep a Preſbyterian from being mayor of a corporation, and ſhall it become falſe, when it is applied to keep a Papiſt from being King? The propoſition is equally true in both caſes; but the argument drawn from it is juſt ſo much ſtronger in the latter, than in the former caſe, as the miſchiefs, which

may

may result from the power and influence of a king, are greater than those which can be wrought by a magistrate of the lowest order. This seems to my apprehension to be *argumentum ad hominem*, and I do not see by what happy distinction a Jacobite Tory could elude the force of it.

It may be said, and it has been urged to me, that if the Chevalier was restored, the knowledge of his character would be our security; *habet fœnum in cornu*: there would be no pretence for trusting him, and by consequence it would be easy to put such restrictions on the exercise of the regal power, as might hinder him from invading or sapping our religion and liberty. But this I utterly deny. Experience has shewn us how ready men are to court power and profit; and who can determine, how far either the Tories or the Whigs would comply, in order to secure to themselves the enjoyment of all the places in the kingdom? Suppose however, that a majority of true Israelites should be found, whom no temptation could oblige to bow the knee to Baal; in order to preserve the government on one hand, must they not destroy it on the other? The necessary restrictions would in this case be so many, and so important, as to leave hardly the shadow of a monarchy, if he submitted to them: and if he did not submit to them, these patriots would have no resource left but in rebellion. Thus, therefore, the affair would turn, if the Pretender was restored. We might, most probably lose our religion and liberty by the bigotry of the prince, and the corruption of the people. We should have no chance of preserving them, but by an entire change of the whole frame of our govern-

ment, or by another revolution. What reaſonable man would voluntarily reduce himſelf to the neceſſity of making an option among ſuch melancholy alternatives?

The beſt which could be hoped for, were the Chevalier on the throne, would be, that a thread of favourable accidents, improved by the wiſdom and virtue of parliament, might keep off the evil day during his reign. But ſtill the fatal cauſe would be eſtabliſhed, it would be entailed upon us, and every man would be appriſed that ſooner or later the fatal effect muſt follow. Conſider a little what a condition we ſhould be in, both with reſpect to our foreign intereſt, and our domeſtic quiet, whilſt the reprieve laſted, whilſt the Chevalier or his ſucceſſors made no direct attack upon the conſtitution.

As to the firſt, it is true indeed, that princes and ſtates are friends or foes to one another, according as the motives of ambition drive them. Theſe are the firſt principles of union and diviſion amongſt them. The Proteſtant powers of Europe have joined in our days to ſupport and aggrandize the houſe of Auſtria, as they did, in the days of our forefathers, to defeat her deſigns, and to reduce her power; and the moſt Chriſtian King of France has more than once joined his councils and his arms too, with the councils and arms of the moſt Mahometan Emperor of Conſtantinople. But ſtill there is, and there muſt continue, as long as the influence of the papal authority ſubſiſts in Europe, another general, permanent and invariable diviſion of intereſts. The powers of earth, like thoſe of heaven, have two diſtinct motions. Each of them rolls in his own political orb, but each of them

them is hurried at the ſame time round the great vortex of his religion, If this general notion be juſt, apply it to the preſent caſe. Whilſt a Roman holds the rudder, how can we expect to be ſteered in our proper courſe? His political intereſt will certainly incline him to direct our firſt motion right; but his miſtaken religious intereſt will render him incapable of doing it ſteddily.

As to the laſt, our domeſtic quiet; even whilſt the Chevalier, and thoſe of his race, concealed their game, we ſhould remain in the moſt unhappy ſtate which human nature is ſubject to, a ſtate of doubt and ſuſpence. Our preſervation would depend on making him the object of our eternal jealouſy, who to render himſelf and his people happy, ought to be that of our entire confidence.

Whilſt the Pretender and his ſucceſſors forbore to attack the religion and liberty of the nation, we ſhould remain in the condition of thoſe people who labour under a broken conſtitution, or who carry about them ſome chronical diſtemper. They feel a little pain at every moment; or a certain uneaſineſs, which is ſometimes leſs tolerable than pain, hangs continually on them, and they languiſh in the conſtant expectation of dying perhaps in the ſevereſt torture.

But if the fear of hell ſhould diſſipate all other fears in the Pretender's mind, and carry him, which is frequently the effect of that paſſion, to the moſt deſperate undertakings; if among his ſucceſſors a man bold enough to make the attempt ſhould ariſe, the condition of the Britiſh nation would be ſtill more deplorable. The attempt ſucceeding, we ſhould fall into tyranny; for a change of religion could

could never be brought about by consent; and the same force that would be sufficient to enslave our consciences, would be sufficient for all the other purposes of arbitrary power. The attempt failing, we should fall into anarchy, for there is no medium when disputes between a prince and his people are arrived at a certain point; he must either be submitted to, or deposed.

I have now laid before you even more than I intended to have said when I took my pen; and I am persuaded, that if these papers ever come to your hands, they will enable you to cast up the account between party and me. Till the time of the Queen's death it stands, I believe, even between us. The Tories distinguished me by their approbation, and by the credit which I had amongst them; and I endeavoured to distinguish myself in their service, under the immediate weight of great discouragement, and with no very distant prospect of great danger. Since that time the account is not so even, and I dare appeal to any impartial person, whether my side in it be that of the debtor. As to the opinion of mankind in general, and the judgment which posterity will pass on these matters, I am under no great concern. *Suum cuique decus posteritas rependit.*

FROM

FROM THE

EARL of STAIR,

His Majesty's ambassador at Paris,

TO

JAMES CRAGGS junior, Esq.

Secret Letter *

MONSIEUR,

VOUS avéz vu par ma depêche l'état de la negociation. J'ai à present à vous parler, en particulier, de Bolingbroke.

Je l'ai vu chéz moi le jour aprés l'arrivée de Mr. Pitt : et nous avons eu ensemble une conversation d'une heure et demie ; dont la substance est, que lui, Bolingbroke, rentroit, du meilleur de son cœur, dans son devoir envers son roi et sa patrie : et que rien au monde étoit capable de le détacher de cette resolution, quand même sa majesté ne trouveroit

* This letter, which with several more private and secret letters, had been returned to Lord Stair by his correspondent, was communicated to the editor of these papers, some time ago, by a relation of his Lordship ; and it is copied here, exactly, from the original in his own hand-writing.

pas

pas à propos de lui faire grace. Qu'il étoit prêt, dès ce moment, à s'employer avec moi dans ce païs-ici pour le ſervice du roi, ſi je croyois qu'il y pouvoit être utile à quelque choſe ; et qu'il me communiqueroit tout ce qui viendroit à ſa connoiſſance qui me pourroit être de quelque uſage, et qu'il m'aideroit voluntiers de toutes les lumieres qu'il pourroit avoir acquiſes per ſes habitudes ici.

Il me dit, que je ſçavois bien, par ſon caractere, qu'il ne faiſoit pas les choſes à demi ; qu'en rentrant en ſon devoir il ſe propoſoit de ſervir le roi et ſa patrie avec zèle et avec affection. Que pour cet effet, il ſe croiroit obligé, par toutes les obligations du devoir, de la reconnoiſſance, de l'honneur et de l'interêt même, d'informer le roi de tout ce que ſon experience lui pourroit ſuggérer d'utile pour le ſervice de ſa majeſté, pour l'affermiſſement de la tranquillité publique, et pour prévenir tous les projets qui ſe pourront former en faveur de ſes ennemis. Qu'il feroit tout ce qui dependroit de lui de faire renter les toris qui ont embraſsé le parti du prétendant dans leur devoir, en leur faiſant voir quelle eſpece d'homme le prétendant étoit ; et qu'ils ſe trompoint s'ils croyoient qu'ils pourroient avoir de la ſûreté avec lui ou pour leur liberté ou pour leur religion. Que pour pouvoir faire cela, il étoit neceſſaire, même pour le ſervice du roi, que lui Bolingbroke, ne fût pas perdu de reputation, qu'il ne puſsât pas pour délateur.

Il inſiſta beaucoup ſur cet article. " Ce que je " propoſe de faire, me dit-il, eſt digne d'un hon- " nête homme, convaincu de ſon erreur et touché " d'un vari repentir ; c'eſt ce que je ferai hautement et à la face de l'univers : et permettés-moi " d'ajouter,

" d'ajouter, que c'eſt un ſervice réel que je " rendrai au roi et à ma patrie. Mais de conſen- " tir àtrahir des particuliers, ou à réveler ce qui " m'a été confié, ce ſeroit me deſhonnorer à " jamais."

Je ne dois pas oublier à vous dire, qu'outre ſon éloignement pour le prétendant, il m'a temoigné beaucoup de dépit contre la France : et je ſuis sûr qu'il me parloit ſincerement.

Je ſerai bien-aiſe d'être inſtruit au plutôt touchant les intentions du roi a ſon égard, et de ce que je dois lui promettre au nom de ſa majeſté ; afin qu'il puiſſe être en état de ſe rêtirer de ce païs-ici, où j'appréhende qu'il ne fait pas bon pour lui.

Pour moi ; je vous avoue franchement, que je crois qu'il m'a parlé dans la ſincérité de ſon cœur ; qu'il eſt reſolu de faire ſon mieux pour abattre le parti du prétendant, et pour le déraciner tout-a-fait ſi cela dependoit de lui : et il me paroit certain, qu'il n'y a perſonne qui puiſſe nuire au prétendant au point qu'il le peut faire.

A'la fin de nôtre converſation, il me ſerra la main, et me dit : " Milord, ſi l'on me fait la juſ- " tice de croire que mes profeſſions ſont ſinceres, " plus ils menagent ma reputation, plus ils font le " ſervice du roi. Si au contraire ils me ſoupçon- " nent de ne pas marcher droit, ils auront raiſon " d'exiger de moi des conditions que j'aurai en " même tems raiſon comme un honnête homme, " de refuſer. Les difficultés que je fais de pro- " mettre trop, peuvent ſervir de garans que je " tiendrai ce à quoi je m'engage. En tout cas, le " tems et ma conduite uniforme convaincront tout

" le

" le monde de la droiture de mes intentions : et il
" vaut mieux attendre ce tems avec patience, quel-
" que long qu'il puiſſe être, que d'arriver avec pre-
" cipitation à ſon but en ſortant du grand chemin
" de l'honneur et de la probité."

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE Present STATE of the NATION,

Principally with regard to her

TAXES AND HER DEBTS.

AND ON THE

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THEM.

Mihi autem non minori curæ eſt qualis reſpublica poſt mortem meam futura ſit, quam qualis hodie ſit.

CIC. in Lael.

SOME
REFLECTIONS
ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION,

Principally with regard to her TAXES and her DEBTS; and on the Cauſes and Conſequences of them.

SINCE we are got out of a war, the leaſt ſucceſsful, and the moſt expenſive that this nation ever made; after having taken part, threeſcore years together, like principal actors, in all the other wars, and all the negotiations, of the continent: it is time, ſurely, that we recal our attention homewards, and conſider the preſent ſtate of our own country, particularly with reſpect to her taxes and her debts; to the nature and application of the former, to the riſe and progreſs of the latter, to the neceſſity, and to the means, of diminiſhing both.

The revolution of our government in 1688, makes a moſt remarkable æra in the hiſtory of Britain on many accounts, and on none more than on that which is the ſubject of theſe papers. The public revenue, in neat money, amounted, at that time

to no more than two millions annually; which were sufficient to defray the ordinary expences of the crown, as well as to maintain a fleet, and a greater army than was necessary for the defence of the country at that time. This revenue was raised without any tax on land or malt, and by a very few of those innumerable duties which have been since laid, to the oppression of the landed and mercantile interest of the nation. These duties have been so mortgaged too, that we are unable at this time, to send a cock-boat to sea, or to keep a single centinel at Whitehall gate, without a land-tax.

The public debts, that of the bankers included, amounted to little more than three hundred thousand pounds, at the beginning of this æra. They amount now to fourscore millions. To discover how this great change in our national circumstances has been brought about, is surely an object of reasonable, and may be such of useful, curiosity.

King William engaged in a necessary war with France, as soon as he came to the throne. It was necessary that he should maintain the revolution he had made, and assert his right to the crown he had acquired by the best of all titles, the free gift of a people whom he had delivered from impending destruction, from popery and slavery. This war might be thought necessary too in another respect.

From the treaty of Westphalia, and from the Pyrenean to the accession of King William to our throne, the power and ambition of France had grown up together, and were become exorbitant. No efforts had been made sufficient to reduce, scarce any sufficient to resist, the former. No measures had been concerted, no preparations had been made

made, to disappoint the latter in that great object, the acquisition of the Spanish monarchy to the house of Bourbon. From the Revolution this alarm was taken, which should have been taken sooner. The spirit of our court was changed, the eyes of our people were opened, and all men saw how neneceſſary it was to preserve, in concert with the Spaniards, the succession of their monarchy to the house of Austria, instead of suffering it to fall into that of Bourbon, which was excluded from it by the most solemn engagements.

Queen Anne came to the throne at the eve of another great war, of a war against France and Spain, which her predeceſſor was ready to undertake, though he had not actually declared it when he died, in order to procure some reasonable satisfaction to the Emperor for a succession, which had been then lost to his family by his own fault.

King William, who engaged for so much more in the first grand alliance, would engage for no more than this in the second. But the private interest of her ministers, the intrigues of her allies, and the rashness of a party, drew the Queen much farther: and it must be confessed, that a subserviency to the court of Vienna, which has cost us so dear, began in her time, not in King William's, though her heart was, what she declared it to be, entirely English, and though he was censured, I think very unjustly, for too great regard to foreign interests, and too little for those of Britain.

The war King William waged was not very successful: and yet, if the Emperor would have consented to send his second son into Spain, during the life of Charles the second, King William would

have ſucceeded in both the objects of this war. He had maintained himſelf on the throne, and obliged France to promiſe, that ſhe would not diſturb him in the poſſeſſion of it. As to the other object, no treaties of partition would have been thought neceſſary by him in that caſe; neither would this nation have had any thing more to do, when the Spaniſh ſucceſſion was open, than to ſupport, with the concurrence of that whole nation, an Auſtrian prince, who was actually on the ſpot with an Auſtrian army, and who had been already declared preſumptive heir. Thus we might have had a defenſive war to make, with great advantages on our ſide; and the events of the offenſive war, which we were obliged to make afterwards, ſhew ſufficiently what would have been the ſucceſs of the other. The councils of Vienna laid us wantonly, if I may ſay ſo, under great diſadvantages; and King William therefore reſolved, like a wiſe prince, to expoſe neither this country, nor his own, to the hard taſk of recovering the whole Spaniſh monarchy out of the hands of Philip. He accommodated his ſyſtem to the circumſtances of the time; and aimed at no more now, than to force the French and Spaniards to come into ſome compoſition about the Auſtrian pretenſions, about trade, about barriers, and about effectual means to hinder a future union of France and Spain under one monarch.

This was all that he meaned. But they who delighted in war, becauſe they hoped to get immenſely by it, and they who amuſed themſelves and others with vain ſpeculations, about a thing very real in itſelf, about a balance of power, enſnared both England and Holland into engagements for dethroning Philip,

Philip, and ſetting up Charles in his room, though we had acknowledged the former, though the Caſtilians were ſtrongly attached to him, and though he was in quiet poſſeſſion of the Spaniſh dominions in both hemiſpheres. Flattered by groundleſs hopes of a revolution, in favour of his rival, and fluſhed by the firſt ſucceſs of our arms, this precipitate engagement was approved and ſupported by us, notwithſtanding the abſurd conduct of the Emperor, and the wiſe reſerve of King William; both of which ſhould have put us more on our guard, and have made us leſs ſanguine.

It is perhaps worth while to make an obſervation in this place, which was made at the time we ſpeak of by Spaniards who acknowledged Philip the fifth in compliance with the will of Charles the ſecond, and yet were averſe to the influence and authority which France aſſumed over them. They obſerved, that Cromwell had forced them to give their Infanta to Lewis the fourteenth, by joining his arms with thoſe of France againſt them, and that we went about to force them, half a century afterwards, by a new war, to an abſolute dependence on France.

The court of Vienna, deſirous to acquire the Italian dominions, and too indifferent about Spain and the Weſt Indies, made her profit of our raſhneſs. She left the whole weight of the war on England and Holland. She did worſe. She not only neglected the war by contributing little or nothing to it, except the name of Auſtria and the claims of that family; ſhe ſacrificed the ſucceſs of the common cauſe, for ſo it was called improperly enough by her, whenever any little inferior intereſt, that ſeemed to be hers more immediately, came in the way:

way: by which she not only prolonged the war, but increased the annual expence of it to England, and Holland, without taking any share in this expence on herself, that deserves to be mentioned.

Experience was lost upon us. Our political delirium continued. It grew in some sort habitual by the artifice employed at home, and by the victories obtained abroad. The war languished however upon the whole, notwithstanding our utmost efforts; the weight of Austria grew every year heavier on us, whilst that of Spain grew every year lighter on France; the Spaniards were able to defend themselves against us at last, and the success of our enemies in Spain made them amends for our victories in Flanders.

The dethronement of Philip in favour of Charles, was become evidently a chimerical project in the year 1710, at the latest, and it became in the following year so ineligible, by the death of the Emperor Joseph, to whom his younger brother Charles succeeded, that one cannot conceive the men who clamoured for it, even then, to have been in earnest; since their aim, in that case, must have been to set the Imperial and Spanish crowns on the same head, against the common interest of Europe, and the fundamental principal of the war.

But though we could not conquer Spain by a war, we might have reduced the exorbitant power of France by a peace. We might have stripped her of that barrier wherein this exorbitant power consisted chiefly; as every man who knew what he meaned, when he talked of this exorbitant power, must have intended. We might have laid her as open to the incursions of her neighbours, as her neigh-

neighbours were to hers; as open as she had been when a prince Casimir, or any other general of Reitres, could penetrate without a siege, and sometimes without a battle, into the heart of her provinces.

But we would not do the latter, because we could not do the former. We acted like men who thought, that the exorbitant power of one family could not be reduced, unless a power as exorbitant was raised in another; and who never looked back to preceding centuries, to consider the usurpations, the tyranny, and the bigotry, that the house of Austria had exercised, in the fulness of her power, and would exercise again, if she was ever restored to the same.

We were disappointed in our great political views, after two wars that had lasted twenty five years, with a very short interval between them. We had done our utmost to defeat that scheme of ambition France had opened to herself, and of danger to all her neighbours, by the Pyrenean treaty; and, though this danger affected us less than any other nation engaged in the alliance, we had exhausted ourselves to maintain it.

When King William entered, immediately after the Revolution, on this great scene of action, the unincumbered condition of this nation, which has been hinted at above, was such, that he might have been supported in it, by good management, as profusely as he was, and even more effectually, by the revenue then subsisting, by a land-tax, by the excise on malt, and by some additional subsidies, all of which would have been raised within the year. A scheme of this kind was prepared and offered. It

was

was allowed to be practicable: but it was rejected for a reaſon that appeared plauſible in political refinement, and has proved moſt pernicious in its conſequences. It was ſaid, that a new government, eſtabliſhed againſt the ancient principles, and actua engagements of many, could not be ſo effectually ſecured any way, as it would be if the private fortunes of great numbers were made to depend on the preſervation of it; and that this could not be done unleſs they were induced to lend their money to the public, and to accept ſecurities under the preſent eſtabliſhment. Thus the method of funding, and the trade of ſtock jobbing began. Thus were great companies created, the pretended ſervants, but, in many reſpects, the real maſters of every adminiſtration.

I do not pretend to determine how far the wiſdom of our legiſlature might have provided, at the beginning of the new war, againſt the growth and ſpreading of that cancerous humour, which had begun to gnaw our vitals in the former. All I am to obſerve is, that, a monied intereſt being firmly eſtabliſhed by this time, and ſuch numbers being accuſtomed to make immenſe profit at the public expence, there is no room to wonder if we proceeded on the ſame plan during the reign of Queen Anne. We did ſo: and the debts contracted in this war being added to thoſe of the former, the whole of our debt amounted to little leſs than fifty millions.

Having accumulated ſo immenſe a debt, the Queen put an end to the war. She could not attempt to alter the ſyſtem of it whilſt it continued, without throwing the whole alliance into confuſion, after ſome of the principal allies had declared, on the death of Joſeph, that they would not conſent

Charles

Charles ſhould be King of Spain, as well as Emperor.

The intereſt of Britain required, no doubt, that we ſhould turn our eyes from the continent to our own iſland, and that we ſhould improve the opportunity and the advantages which a peace gave us. Whatever prejudices have been propagated induſtriouſly againſt that of Utrecht, thus much at leaſt is certain: we were obliged no longer, by treaties, to aſſume any other part in the affairs of the continent, than that which the immediate intereſt of our own country required. The opportunity and the means of diminiſhing taxes, reviving commerce, and paying debts, were open to us.

This pacific ſcheme ought to have been purſued, no doubt, till we had retrieved our affairs, and recovered our former ſtrength in ſome degree, and till we were prepared to take any part in future events, which our honour or intereſt might require. Nay, this ſcheme was the more neceſſary to be purſued; if France was left too powerful, no matter by whoſe fault, as I am ready to admit that ſhe was; and if the two branches of Bourbon were to be looked upon, in this century, like the two branches of Auſtria in the laſt, as inſeparable allies, united by blood and by joint ambition. It was the more eaſy to be purſued too, becauſe a long minority was beginning in France, and many other circumſtances of characters and of ſituation, extremely favourable to it, concurred in that court and country.

This ſhould have been the ſcheme of our policy; but unhappily it was not. The late King, as Elector of Hanover, had reaſon, no doubt, to deſire the acquiſition of Bremen and Verden. Our nation contributed

contributed to it with her money, and forced it with her arms; though it was made in contradiction to the engagements that the crown of England had taken, when King William gave his guaranty to the treaty of Travendahl. This acquisition became the first link of a political chain, by which we were dragged back into new and expensive broils, the consequences whereof we feel at this hour.

When the King acquired these duchies, it became necessary to procure the investiture of them: and I will say, because I can demonstrate, that these investitures might have been procured, and the Emperor flattered with the acquisition of Sicily, by measures as effectual, and much more consistent with former treaties and the public tranquillity, than those that were taken. The house of Austria sacrificed the success of the war to the immediate acquisition of Naples. We sacrificed all the advantages of the peace, to procure her that of Sicily in the manner we did procure it. I have heard it said, whilst these affairs were in transaction, that the treaty of quadruple alliance would compleat that of Utrecht. But the event has shewn, and it was obvious to foresee, that one of these treaties would unravel the system of the other. If we had maintained the neutrality of Italy, as we were obliged to do by treaty, even indulging the Emperor in the acquisition of Italy, and yielding to the house of Savoy the eventual successions, which we stipulated should be given to Spain; the intention of the treaty of Utrecht would have been preserved, and France, by concurring in these measures, would have shewn her sincerity in maintaining the settlement of Europe. But when she became a party to the quadruple alliance, she

mean-

meaned nothing more than to give the Spaniſh branch of Bourbon an opportunity of reannexing to that crown the Italian dominions: and we were groſsly her bubbles, when we triumphed that ſhe entered into the quadruple alliance, and made a ſham war to oblige Philip to accede to it.

As long, then, as there were hopes of obtaining an extraordinary inveſtiture of Bremen and Verden, we flattered the Emperor at no ſmall expence. As ſoon as it became apparent that this inveſtiture could be obtained in no other manner than it had been granted formerly, we inſulted him. We imputed to him deſigns he has conſtantly diſowned, and we have never proved; after which we complained of his ingratitude, we threatened war, and we prepared for it, by maintaining, with great profuſion, a ſtanding army of Heſſians in Germany. The ſame men who complained ſo lately that France had been left too powerful by the treaty of Utrecht, and that great danger would ariſe from her cloſe connection with Spain, complained now of the too great power of the Houſe of Auſtria, and of the danger that would ariſe from a good underſtanding between the Emperor and King Philip. In ſhort, our politics were not only variable, but incomprehenſible to every man who knew the ſtate and intereſt of Great Britain, but was not ſo well appriſed of the ſeveral turns of intereſt which were to be ſerved abroad.

When our miniſters had once departed from the ſtraight line of Britiſh policy, the difficulty of returning to it became every year greater, and the inclination every year leſs. We continued buſy and buſtling in every court of Europe. We negotiated againſt the Emperor in concert with France, and

pave her thereby the means of regaining more of that credit and influence in the empire, which ſhe had formerly had, than ſhe could have acquired without our aſſiſtance. We contrived to make peace abroad, almoſt as chargeable to us as war. Abuſes of every kind were ſuffered at home. Trade was neither eaſed nor encouraged; and the gradual payment of our debt was utterly neglected, by a miniſter rather deſirous to keep his country under this oppreſſion, than ignorant of the means to deliver her from it. Whilſt we acted in this manner, France grew frugal, ſhe made the debts ſhe could not pay ſit more lightly on her, ſhe raiſed her credit, and ſhe extended her commerce. In ſhort, her ſtrength increaſed, and ours diminiſhed. We were reduced to a ſtate of weakneſs we had never felt before; and this very weakneſs was urged as a reaſon for bearing tamely the loſſes our merchants ſuſtained, and all the affronts our government received, leſt we ſhould be drawn into a war by uſing repriſals, the common right of nations.

As tame as we were, the inſolence of the Spaniards, the reaſonable impatience of our merchants, and this very tameneſs of our government, made a ſea-war unavoidable, juſt before the death of the Emperor Charles the ſixth; which event brought the principal powers of Europe into the field, ſet the whole continent into a flame, and formed one of thoſe conjunctures, wherein our honour and intereſt may oblige us to take a part, and for which therefore we ſhould always be prepared.

We were in no degree ſo prepared, after ſix or ſeven and twenty years of peace: and yet when we took a part, we took the moſt laviſh and the moſt impolitic

impolitic that we could take. It was a miſerable part by ſea at firſt, and through the whole courſe of the war by land. I ſhall recal neither what we did, nor what we neglected to do; and I wiſh, for the honour of my country, that the whole may be buried in oblivion. Thus much only it is to my purpoſe to obſerve. Firſt, that our councils ſeemed to be the echoes of thoſe free booters, Trenck and Mentzel, who talked of nothing leſs than conquering the two Alſatias and the three biſhopricks, and of laying Champagne waſte, whilſt all our offenſive projects on the Rhine were daily diſappointed: and ſecondly, that we declined all overtures of peace, when the ſeat of the war was transferred, with great advantage to France, from Germany to the Netherlands, where we reſolved to wage it, whether the Dutch would or no, and where we were beat on every ſpot on which my Lord Marlborough had conquered.

Every defeat in this war, like every triumph in the laſt, became a reaſon for continuing it; and this management, when no avowable reaſon could be given for it, gave ſuſpicious and refining perſons occaſion to throw out a great deal of ſlander; for ſuch, I hope, it was. In ſhort, whatever the reaſons were, we continued this inauſpicious war ſo long, and we puſhed it ſo far beyond our ſtrength, that we were within a few months of bankruptcy, when the French granted us, miraculouſly, the ſame terms that they would have granted two or three years before; and when they might have marched, without much trouble or oppoſition, after taking Maeſtricht, into the heart of the Seven Provinces:

for our laſt reſource, a Muſcovite army, was too far off to have enabled ours to make a ſtand.

By making the war in the low countries, almoſt wholly at our own expence, and without any proſpect of ſucceſs, we meant to cauſe ſuch a diverſion to the forces of France, as might leave Germany nothing to fear on the Rhine, and as might give time and opportunity to the Empreſs Queen to drive the French and Spaniards out of Lombardy. We ſacrificed ourſelves for theſe purpoſes; but in this war, as in the laſt, the court of Vienna ſacrificed nothing. From the time the French had been obliged, more by the ſickneſs of their troops, and the ill conduct of their generals, than by the force of her arms, to abandon Germany, the Empreſs, Queen ſeemed to make war juſt as it ſuited her conveniency, to ſave all the expence ſhe could in the Netherlands, to plunder all ſhe could in Italy, and to make us pay the whole immenſe ſubſidies which we gave her for both.

In the Netherlands we were outnumbered vaſtly, by the deficiencies of her quotas: and in Italy, where we had thrown the Genoeſe into the arms of France and Spain, with great and juſt indignation againſt us for the treaty we had made at Worms, and had, however, obliged them to ſubmit after the battle of Placentia; we loſt the whole advantage of it by the inſatiable avarice and extreme brutality of the Auſtrians. Yet we continued our efforts on that ſide ſtill; and the ſham ſiege of Genoa, for it was no more, and the harmleſs invaſions of Provence and Dauphiny, had no other meaning, than to amuſe and impoſe on us in the exceſs of our zeal.

Our

Our expences in every part of this ſtrange war, particularly in the Netherlands, were made without meaſure, becauſe without controul; as they will be ſoon convinced who look into the artillery, forage, hoſpital, and other contingent accounts. The parliamentary aids from the year 1740 excluſively, to the year 1748 incluſively, amount to fifty-five millions, five hundred twenty-two thouſand, nine hundred fifty-nine pounds, ſixteen ſhillings and three-pence, and the new debt we have contracted to more than thirty millions; which are near twenty millions more of debt than France has contracted in the ſame time: a ſum that will appear incredible to future generations, and is ſo almoſt to the preſent. There are three reflections to be made on this ſtate, which muſt add to our aſtoniſhment. Firſt, that the greateſt part of this vaſt expence has been granted on account of the war, chiefly ſince there remained no reaſon for continuing it; that is, ſince the time when it was in our power to have had a peace at leaſt as good as that we have now obtained; and I place this æra no higher than the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and forty ſeven incluſively, though I might place it higher, perhaps, on very good grounds. Secondly, that the debt contracted in it exceeds by much that of King William's, or that of Queen Anne's war; though both of them were much longer, and the laſt not only more widely, but carried into countries the diſtance of which and many other circumſtances increaſed every article of our expence extraordinarily. Thirdly, that we have thrown by our negotiations and by the late war, into the hands of the houſe of Bourbon, much more dominion in Italy,

than would have induced the French at Gertruydenberg to have recalled Philip, and to have given up Spain and the Indies; which they were ready to do at thoſe conferences, as Buys and Vanderduſſen acquainted the miniſters of the allies, in making one of their reports to that aſſembly.

Bad as our condition is, let us not deſpair. Not to deſpair of the commonwealth, whatever her condition be, is the principle of a true patriot, that is, of a faithful ſervant to his prince and country: and we may find an example to this purpoſe, which deſerves to be quoted, in a book that is in the hands of moſt people, and that, I hope, is not unread at court, I mean the Duke of Sully's Memoirs. In them we find that Henry the fourth turned his whole application to every thing that might be uſeful or even convenient to his kingdom, without ſuffering things that happened out of it to paſs unobſerved by him, as ſoon as he had put an end to the civil wars of France, and had concluded peace with Spain at Vervins. Is there a man, either prince or ſubject, who can read, without the moſt elevated and the moſt tender ſentiments, the language he held to Sully at this time, when he thought himſelf dying of a great illneſs he had at Monceaux? "My friend!" ſaid he, "I have no "fear of death. You who have ſeen me expoſe "my life ſo often, when I might ſo eaſily have "kept out of danger, know this better than any "man. But I muſt confeſs that I am unwilling to "die, before I have raiſed this kingdom to the "ſplendour I have propoſed to myſelf; and be"fore I have ſhewn my people that I love them like "my children, by diſcharging them from a part

"of

'of the taxes that have been laid on them, and "by governing them with gentleneſs."

The ſtate of France was then even worſe than the ſtate of Great Britain is now: the debts as heavy, many of the provinces entirely exhauſted, and none of them in a condition of bearing any new impoſition. The ſtanding revenues brought into the King's coffers no more than thirty millions though an hundred and fifty millions were raiſed on the people: ſo great were the abuſes of that government in raiſing of money: and they were not leſs in the diſpenſation of it. The whole ſcheme of the adminiſtration was a ſcheme of fraud, and all who ſerved, cheated the public, from the higheſt offices down to the loweſt; from the commiſſioners * of the treaſury down to the under-farmers and the under-treaſurers. Sully beheld this ſtate of things, when he came to have the whole ſuperintendency of affairs, with horror. He was ready to deſpair; but he did not deſpair. Zeal for his maſter, zeal for his country, and this very ſtate ſeemingly ſo deſperate, animated his endeavours: and the nobleſt thought that ever entered into the mind of a miniſter, entered into his. He reſolved to make, and he made, the reformation of abuſes, the reduction of expences, and a frugal management, the ſinking fund for the payment of national debts, and the ſufficient fund for all the great things he intended to do, without overcharging the people.

He ſucceeded in all. The people were immediately eaſed, trade revived, the king's coffers were filled, a maritime power was created, and every

* Conſelliers dans le conſeil des finances.

thing

thing neceſſary was prepared to put the nation in a condition of executing great deſigns whenever great conjunctures ſhould offer themſelves. Such was the effect of twelve years of wiſe and honeſt adminiſtration: and this effect would have ſhewed itſelf in great enterpriſes againſt the houſe of Auſtria, more formidable in thoſe days than the houſe of Bourbon has been in ours, if Henry the fourth had not been ſtabbed by one of thoſe aſſaſſins, into whoſe hands the intereſt of this houſe, and the frenzy of religion, had put the dagger more than once.

When we conſider, in theſe memorials, and in others which are come down to us, the deplorable condition to which France was reduced at the end of the ſixteenth century, we feel ſome of that horror which Sully himſelf felt; and are ready to confeſs, that the ruin of that kingdom, bankruptcy, and confuſion, muſt have followed, if the opportunity, which this peaceful conjuncture gave, had not been improved immediately and as wiſely, and as vigorouſly as it was. Shall we not ſee our own deplorable condition, and the neceſſary conſequences of it in the ſame light? Shall we not be much more ſtrongly affected by them? Are not we as near to bankruptcy, as the French nation was at that time, and much more ſo than they are at this time? May not confuſion follow it here as well as there? And finally, may not the joint ambition of two branches of Bourbon, in ſome future conjuncture, produce effects as fatal, and much more ſo to us, if we continue in our preſent ſtate of impotence till ſuch a conjuncture happens, as were to be feared by France,

France, at the time we ſpeak of, from the joint ambition of two branches of Auſtria? In ſhort, we have much to apprehend, unleſs we have the courage and the virtue to probe our domeſtic wounds to the bottom, and to apply immediately not palliative, but the moſt ſpecific remedies. If we do this; inſtead of fearing others, we may become once more formidable ourſelves. But this is certain, that they, who get firſt out of a diſtreſs common to us and to our neighbours, will give the law to the reſt.

It may be ſaid, that we have no Sullys among us. I ſhall not take on me to determine whether we have or no. But I will venture to ſay, after Sully himſelf, that although good princes may be wanting to good miniſters; yet good miniſters will never be wanting to a prince, who has diſcernment enough to find them, who chuſes them for their ſuperiour parts experience, and integrity; and who reſolves to ſupport them, as Henry the fourth ſupported Sully, againſt favourite miſtreſſes, the cabals of the court, and the factions of the ſtate.

It may be ſaid again, that a king of France has power enough by the conſtitution of that government, to ſupport a miniſter who checks corruption, reforms abuſes, and maintains a frugal management of the public revenue. But it may be aſked, how a miniſter, who ſhould undertake this, could be ſupported in a government like ours, where he would be ſure to have for his enemies all thoſe, who have ſhared ſo long the public ſpoils, or who hope to ſhare them, and where theſe enemies would have the means and opportunities of ſupplanting him, notwithanding the protection of his maſter? I anſwer

fwer, by the parliament. How many miniſters have there been, to whom much national miſchief was imputed juſtly, and no one national good could be aſcribed, and who were long ſupported by the favour of the crown, and by the concurrence of the two houſes, which this favour and their own management procured them? Shall theſe ſupports be ſufficient for a wicked or a weak miniſter; and ſhall innocence and ability, with the ſame favour and better management, be reckoned for nothing? I cannot think ſo ill, even of the preſent age, as degenerate as it is. It is degenerate no doubt; but I have heard men complain of this degeneracy, who promoted it firſt, and ſought their excuſe in it afterwards.

The delegated power of a miniſter, under the legal prerogatives of the crown, is ſufficient to carry on a ſyſtem of reformation and frugality in the ordinary courſe of things, if the miniſter really intends it: and whenever extraordinary powers are wanting for extraordinary operations, as they muſt be in ſuch a ſtate as ours, they will be effectual, if granted; and if refuſed, they who refuſe them, not the miniſter, will ſuffer by the refuſal, and be anſwerable to the nation for it. The moneyed man may continue to enjoy a little more revenue by this refuſal: but his fortune will be more precarious, and more liable to ſome future reverſe. The merchant will continue to trade, the landed man to plow and ſow, without even a proſpect of being relieved from their ſervitude, not for the honeſt creditors alone, but for uſurers and ſtock jobbers, for thoſe leeches who fill themſelves continually with the blood of the nation, and never ceaſe to ſuck it. The nation in the

mean

mean time will be reduced to the utmoſt poverty: and it behoves thoſe particularly, who have brought us ſo near it, to ſhew that this was not their object, by concurring zealouſly with thoſe, who have uſed, and will continue to uſe their beſt endeavours to prevent it.

The difficulties we have to ſtruggle with would not be ſo great as they are, notwithſtanding the immenſe profuſion to which the late war gave occaſion and pretence; if we did not feel in this inſtance, as we feel in others, the fatal conſequences of a precedent adminiſtration. The payment of our debts might have been eaſily provided for in that time: nay, fourteen years, which are little more than two thirds of it, would have been ſufficient to reduce them to twenty millions. If this had been done, the memory of the perſon, who was at the head of that adminiſtration, and had the ſole power of it, might have deſerved honour.

Let us nouriſh in ourſelves, and cultivate in others, ſentiments more elevated than theſe, and more worthy of the Britiſh genius. The greater our national diſtreſs and danger are, the greater ſhould the efforts be of every particular man to relieve his country from the one, and thereby to guard it againſt the other. We are in a criſis that muſt turn either to life or death, and that cannot turn to the former unleſs remedies are applied much more effectual than thoſe of mountebanks, who find their account in palliating evils and in prolonging diſeaſes. To palliate and to prolong would be, in our caſe, to kill, or to do ſomething worſe than kill, to break our conſtitution entirely, to render an accidental illneſs habitual and incurable.

One

One or two ſhillings in the pound, it is ſaid, will be leſſened this year upon land; and whatever is wanting for the current ſervice, over and above the two ſhillings that remain, and the malt, will be borrowed on the credit of the ſinking fund at three *per cent.* The bait will be tempting; for ſo muſt every diminution of taxes be to thoſe who have crouched ſo long under the weight of ſo many. But I may venture to ſay, that it will be no more than a bait; and that they, who ſwallow it, will have reaſon to repent of their raſhneſs, when they find, as they will find very probably, that the natural effect of ſuch meaſures muſt prevent the diſcharge of any conſiderable part of our debt, except in a term of years much longer than the proſperity and even the ſafety of our government admits.

I ſay the ſafety, as well as the proſperity: and ſome reflections very plain and obvious, though made by few, will juſtify me for ſaying ſo. As to the firſt, trade gave us wealth, wealth gave us power, and power raiſed our iſland to be, at one time, a match for France. If we deſire to return into the ſame ſtate, we muſt return by the ſame ſteps which raiſed us to it: and he, who ſhould make a ſcheme for the payment of our debts, without a principal regard to the improvement of our trade, would make a very ſilly ſcheme. But it would be juſt as ſilly, to make a ſcheme for both in ſuch a manner, as would render neither practicable.

The neceſſity of diminiſhing taxes, in order to improve our trade, becomes a good reaſon, not for the ſtrange purpoſe to which it is applied by ſome, but for haſtening all the operations neceſſary to ſink our debts, in order to haſten that diminution of taxes,

taxes, which will become practicable when a part of our debt is sunk, and which will facilitate extremely the discharge of the rest. The truth is, that if we defer these operations too long, we may be never able to perform them with equal advantage, nor, by keeping pace with our neighbours, to renew our strength as fast, as they are intent to renew theirs. Our neighbours have suffered by former wars, and have been exhausted by the last, as well, though, I apprehend, not so much as we. France, for instance, has contracted in the late war no more than one third of the additional debt we have contracted in it, as I believe on very good authority: and she has been able to assign funds, which pay the interest of this debt regularly, and sink yearly a part of the principal. I am not so well apprised of the actual state of Spain. But the treasures of the West-Indies are poured into her daily; and as she has been long recovered, or recovering, from her antient indolence and ignorance, she seems to apply herself to the augmentation of her maritime force, to the improvement of her trade, and even to that of domestic manufactures. In a word, what has been said before may be repeated here: they, who get soonest out of the present common distress, will give the law to others, or be at least in a condition of not receiving it from any one.

As to national safety, we shall do well to observe how much the system of dominion and power in Europe is less favourable at present to our political interests and views, than it was when we undertook to mend it. Spain was falling, but not fallen into the hands of France, at the beginning of this centu-

ry: and though the Spaniſh nation, as well as court, gave their monarchy afterwards to a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, that they might prevent the diſmemberment of it; yet they were averſe enough, by long habits of hoſtility, to a French government. Fortune and we have done ſo well at laſt, that theſe two nations are now cloſely united by intereſt, and by habit, and that Spain is therefore more than ever eſtranged from us: the proofs of which are not only recent, but, I fear, actual.

The frontier of France has been the great ſupport of her exorbitant power, as wiſe men foreſaw fourſcore years ago, when Lewis the fourteenth began to raiſe that wall of braſs which reaches from the Alps to the Ocean, that it would become. This frontier is now more compact than ever by the acquiſition of Lorain. The branches of the houſe of Bourbon have taken root in Italy as well as in Spain. France has learned by experience to raiſe and to maintain her credit, and to extend her commerce, for the protection and ſupport whereof ſhe ſeems more attentive than ever to increaſe her ſtrength by ſea: a ſtrength ſhe will always exert with great advantage over us in ſome reſpects, I mean in thoſe of order, frugal management, and ſtrict diſcipline.

The whole empire, except Bavaria and Cologn, was attached to us by inclination, as well as intereſt, in the war which began with this century. It is much otherwiſe now: and we may ſay, I fear, too truly, that the influence of France and Germany is little inferior to what it was whilſt the league of the Rhine ſubſiſted.

The Dutch commonwealth, our beſt alley, and in ſome ſort a barrier to Great Britain, is in a ſtate

of

of diſſolution; and has not, either without or within herſelf, thoſe means of recovery by conjuncture and by character, that ſhe has had on ſeveral occaſions from the time her government was firſt formed.

This ſhort ſtate may ſerve to ſhow how difficult it will be, till we have paid a good part of our debt, and reſtored our country in ſome meaſure to her former wealth and power, to maintain the dignity of Great Britain, to make her reſpected abroad, and ſecure from injuries, or even affronts, on the part of her neighbours. This may appear eaſy, for aught I know, to ſome men. But, ſure I am, it would appear difficult to Burleigh and Walſingham, if they were to riſe from the dead; notwithſtanding the ſucceſs they had in Queen Elizabeth's reign by doing much at little expence, and by employing management much more than force.

Theſe reflections, and ſuch as they ſuggeſt naturally to the mind, make it evident, that the future proſperity and ſafety of this country depend on the ſpeedy diminution of our national debts. Nothing elſe can ſecure us effectually againſt contingent events that may be of fatal conſequence to both. Recent experience has ſhewn how unfit we are become in every reſpect, except the courage of our common ſeamen and ſoldiers, to engage in war. We ſhall not therefore, I ſuppoſe, provoke it eaſily, or ſoon. But war may be brought upon us, though we ſhould not provoke it, nor go to the continent to ſeek it. Nay, we may be reduced to the melancholy dilemma of increaſing our annual expence to aſſert our rights, to protect our trade, and to maintain our dignity; or of ſitting tamely down and ſa-

crificing them all. I think, nay I hope, that we ſhould not do the laſt: and yet we ſhould have much greater difficulties to ſtruggle with in our preſent ſituation, than we had in the former, great as they were, if we attempted to do what was then ſo ſhamefully neglected. We cannot increaſe our expences now, nor ſhall we be able to do ſo till ſome part of our national debt be diſcharged, without mortgaging on the remainder of the ſinking fund; which would ſoon take away all hope of ever paying any part of this debt, and leave us nothing to mortgage but our land and our malt; whereas if a conſiderable part of this debt was diſcharged before any new war broke out, or we were reduced to any ſuch dilemma as I have mentioned, we ſhould find ourſelves, whilſt it laſted, in a much better condition of defence or offence, and we might be able, as ſoon as it was over, to reſume the ſame operations and to proceed in our great domeſtic concern.

Theſe conſiderations will have great weight with men, who are able to combine all that is to be combined on ſuch an important occaſion, and, by reflecting on the paſt, and by obſerving the preſent, to judge of the future. The only effectual and therefore neceſſary, remedies may appear violent, even to them: but they will conſider, and every man ought to conſider, that if we cannot bear our diſtemper, and will not bear our cure, the political body muſt periſh. This miſerable ſtate will create juſtly the indignation of mankind. But this indignation ſhould turn againſt thoſe who have brought us into it, not againſt thoſe who would deliver us from it. This is the language of reaſon dictated by public

public ſpirit: but private intereſt and narrow views will dictate another.

The moneyed men will complain loudly that they are expoſed to perpetual reductions of intereſt, which have ſerved to no other purpoſe than to nouriſh the profuſion of ſucceſſive adminiſtrations: and, if this was to continue, their complaints would be juſt, and the hardſhips impoſed upon them intolerable. It is, therefore, juſt that neither they ſhould conſent to this new reduction of intereſt, which may be called a new tax upon them, nor the landed men to the continuance of that old and heavy tax on land, unleſs they have the utmoſt ſecurity that the whole ſhall be applied to its proper uſe. There will be ſtill complaints; and we ſhall hear the melancholy condition to which the widow and the orphan, whoſe ſmall but ſole fortunes are in the funds, will be reduced, moſt pathetically diſplayed. The anſwer will be, however, obvious. If the widow and the orphan, who have their eſtates in money, ſuffer by the reduction of intereſt; the widow and the orphan, who have their eſtates in land, will ſuffer by the continuance of the tax upon it: and both one and the other muſt take their ſhare in the common calamity of their country. But the truth is, that the feeble voice of the widow and the orphan will be little heard. The great din will be raiſed by ſtockjobbers and uſurers, by the principal men in our great companies, who, born to ſerve and to obey, have been bred to command even government itſelf. Theſe men will roar aloud, and endeavour, by ſilent intrigue, as well as by noiſe, to obſtruct every meaſure that tends to emancipate government out of their hands, to make

the Exchequer, what it ought to be, the great ſpring of public credit, and the great ſcene of all tranſactions relative to public receipts and payments.

Let theſe men learn therefore to ſubmit, and to reaſon, as old Bateman did, when the reduction of intereſt was agreed to in the year 1717. He told my Lord Stanhope, he was glad this reſolution had been taken; becauſe, though his intereſt diminiſhed, he ſhould think his principal more ſecure than ever. On the whole complaints from this quarter will make little impreſſion on a miniſter, who knows, that though ſuch men have been employed whilſt new debts were to be contracted every year, and the public, like an extravagant ſpendthrift, was obliged to deal with uſurers on their own terms; yet they are not to be conſulted when debts are to be paid, and the public to be taken out of their hands; who knows, in ſhort, that his arms are longer than theirs, and makes them feel that he will keep or not keep meaſures with them, according to their behaviour; who purſues ſteddily the wiſe and honeſt deſign of rendering his own, and every future adminiſtration, independent of them.

Much oppoſition will ariſe from two other quarters, the country and the court; in which I ſhould apprehend that the leaſt plauſible might be the moſt ſucceſsful.

The landed man will think it hard, that he is not ſuffered to enjoy a little eaſe, after having borne the burden and heat of the day during a long courſe of expenſive peace and of ruinous war. All that can be ſaid, to perſuade him that an immediate diminution of the land tax is contrary to his intereſt, will paſs for deception and paradox. He will be

apt

apt to reaſon like his country tenants, who are always frightened at an immediate expence, though remote, and yet great profit muſt be the certain conſequence of it. Let ſuch a man look back then and take his leſſon from what is paſt. He will find that, whilſt he winked at profuſion, becauſe he was flattered by abatements on the land-tax, debts were contracted, that have coſt him much more than the continuance of that tax would have coſt him. If we look back to the firſt ten years of his preſent majeſty's reign, we ſhall find this very remarkably verified. Let the ſame man, after he has looked back, look forward again. He will ſee, that as any diminution of the land-tax, to be ſupplied out of the produce of the ſinking fund, or by borrowing, even at three *per cent.* on the credit of it, muſt prevent, or retard, which may be equivalent to preventing, the diſcharge of any conſiderable part of our debt; ſo he will continue expoſed to have the whole tax laid anew, on the firſt occaſion, either real or pretended. He may find himſelf, after a little reſpite, under the load of the ſame tax, and of an increaſed debt: and this may be all he will get by refuſing to bear a little longer, for his own ſake, and for an important object, what he has borne ſeveral years for the ſake of others, and for the ſupport of a moſt unſucceſsful war; for ſuch it may be reckoned, after the French were beat at Dettinghen.

On the other ſide, if he is wiſe enough to deſire, that the four ſhillings in the pound be continued for a few years, he will have his ſhare in the common benefits of diminiſhing public debts, increaſing public credit, improving trade, and reſtoring national

onal prosperity. He may entertain the comfortable hope of a time, when he, or his posterity, will have no need of consenting to any tax at all on land in time of peace; since the annual produce of other funds will be sooner or later, in this method, sufficient to defray the annual expence of the government. He may acquire an advantage that will make him ample amends for what it cost him. Such of the taxes, whether of excise or of customs, as bear hardest on the poor labourers, and on our own manufactures, may be reduced gradually at least, without any considerable interruption of the operations necessary to discharge our national debt: and though he is little accustomed to think himself as much affected by other taxes, as he is by the land-tax, he will soon perceive, that a saving on every thing he eats, drinks, or wears, is a lasting and a large repayment of what this tax took from him, whilst he consented to continue it. He will find himself a gainer, not only by what he saves in his expences, but by the improvement of his estate; for the whole system of national wealth and prosperity are intimately connected.

The courtier will complain loudly, authoritatively, and pompously, that any retrenchments on our annual expences may do more hurt, than the saving can do good. But I believe it not hard to shew, that three shillings, or three shillings and sixpence in the pound on land, leaving the rest of the four shillings to go to the sinking fund, would be more than sufficient to anfwer all necessary expences in time of peace. Wise men are able to do a great deal with a little; every knave or fool is ready to do a little with a great deal. The former know

that

that good policy consists in observing two sorts of œconomy, the greater and the less: to proportion, by the first, our expences to our circumstances, and to those of our neighbours, and to do it with the utmost frugality that these circumstances, combined together, will admit: to controul, by the second, in the most strict and regular manner, the dispensation of the public treasure, from the highest down to the lowest offices of the state. It is of the utmost importance, at this time especially, that both these kinds of œconomy be practised. Our well-being, even our security, depends upon them. If we do not pay our debts, we must sink under the load of them: and if we go about to pay them, without practising these two sorts of œconomy, the ridiculous figure which I have seen in a Dutch print, of a man toiling and sweating to cord a rope of hay, whilst an ass bites it off at the other end, as fast as he cords it, will be our proper emblem.

Extreme frugality was one of the means employed by the great minister who has been quoted above: and the success he had in similar circumstances, should encourage the practice of the same frugality in ours. But he employed another expedient likewise, which is not less necessary here than it was there, nor in our time than it was in his. The expedient I mean, is that of reforming abuses. Sully rendered this reformation no inconsiderable fund for the payment of public debts. Whether we can do so, as effectually as he did, or no, I determine not. But thus much is certain; such a reformation will make all future services be carried on at a cheaper rate for the public; and saving is often the surest way of gaining. Materials might be collected,

ed, not for a pamphlet, but for a regular treatiſe under diſtinct heads, concerning the abuſes and corruptions, which prevail among us in every part of the public ſervice, and concerning the conſequences of them: I know not too whether ſome work of this kind ſhould not be undertaken, as invidious as it may ſeem, if nothing is done to reform theſe abuſes, and to extinguiſh this corruption.

They were creeping forward long ago; but ſince a certain period, they have advanced with very large ſtrides. Frauds were connived at, perhaps encouraged, and corruption was propagated formerly by principal men, who had, for the moſt part, more ambition than avarice, and who raiſed by theſe means, a formidable party that might ſupport them in power. But in proceſs of time, and in favourable conjunctures, the contagion roſe higher, and ſpread ſtill wider; principal men became parties to the greateſt frauds; and the higheſt of thoſe who governed, and the loweſt of thoſe who were governed, contributed, in their degrees, to the univerſal rapine. The greateſt particular cheat, whereof any example can be found, was, I believe, that which arrears of ſubſidies to foreign princes, and arrears of pay to foreign troops, gave the opportunity and the means of executing.

I am ſenſible that the repreſentation I have made of the degeneracy of our age and people, may give occaſion to ſay, that the very things I have been pleading for are impracticable. It will be aſked, what expectation can be entertained of raiſing a diſintereſted public ſpirit, among men who have no other principle than that of private intereſt, who are individuals rather than fellow-citizens, who

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prey on one another, and are, in a ſtate of civil ſociety, much like to Hobbes's men in his ſuppoſed ſtate of nature? I muſt agree, though unwillingly, that the enterpriſe is difficult. But the more difficult it is, if nothing leſs can relieve us from the load of debt we lie under, nor prevent the conſequences of lying under it much longer; every attempt to raiſe this ſpirit, and to promote theſe meaſures, even the weakeſt, even mine, is commendable. The landed men are the true owners of our political veſſel: the monied men, as ſuch, are no more than paſſengers in it. To the firſt, therefore, all exhortations to aſſume this ſpirit ſhould be addreſſed. It is their part to ſet the example; and when they do ſo, they have a right to expect that the paſſengers ſhould contribute their proportion to ſave the veſſel. If they ſhould prove refractory, they muſt be told that there is a law in behalf of the public, more ſacred, and more ancient too, for it is as ancient as political ſociety, than all thoſe, under the terms of which they would exempt themſelves from any reduction of intereſt, and conſequently from any reimburſement of their principal; though this reduction, and this reimburſement, be abſolutely neceſſary to reſtore the proſperity of the nation, and to provide for her ſecurity in the mean time. The law I mean, is that which nature and reaſon dictate, and which declares the preſervation of the commonwealth to be ſuperior to all other laws.

If ſuch a co-operation of the landed and monied intereſts is once brought about, the way will lie ſmooth before us, and a proſpect of national proſperity at the end of it will open before us yearly.

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Even the proſpect will be of great advantage, both at home and abroad. We ſhall feel it in the riſe of our credit, in the confidence which our friends, and in the reſpect which our enemies will have for us: a reſpect that will be due juſtly to a people who exert ſo much vigour in the midſt of ſo much diſtreſs, and take effectual meaſures to reſtore their national ſtrength, and to reſume their former dignity, inſtead of languiſhing on under impotence and contempt.

The man who is not fired by ſuch conſiderations as theſe, muſt have no elevation of mind, no love for his country, no regard for poſterity, nor the leaſt tincture of that public morality which diſtinguiſhes a good from a bad citizen. I know that futility, ignorance, and every kind of profligacy, are general: but I know too that they are not univerſal, and therefore I do not deſpair. In all events, the merit of preſerving our country from beggary is little inferior to that of preſerving it from ſlavery. They who engage therefore in ſo good a cauſe, and purſue it ſteddily in that public ſpirit, a revival of which can alone ſave this nation from miſery, from oppreſſion, and perhaps from confuſion, the uſual conſequence of the other two; they will deſerve better, I preſume to ſay, the title of *ultimi Britanorum*, even if they ſhould be defeated by the worſt ſubjects of Britain, than that uſurer Brutus, and that ſevere exactor of contributions, Caſſius, deſerved the title of *ultimi Romanorum*, when they were defeated in another manner, by the worſt citizens of Rome.

After all that has been ſaid in theſe papers, and all that might be ſaid concerning the conduct of the

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houſe of Auſtria from the reign of King William to the preſent time; it may be proper to add ſomething by way of precaution, and to prevent very falſe concluſions, that many will be ready to draw from very true premiſes.

It is notoriouſly true, that a ſpirit of bigotry, of tyranny, and of avarice, in the court of Vienna, maintained long the troubles in Hungary, which might have been appeaſed much ſooner than they were. Thus a great and conſtant diverſion was kept up in favour of France, even at the time when the two houſes of Auſtria and Bourbon were ſtruggling for that great prize, the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, till the French troops took poſſeſſion of Paſſau, and the malecontents of Hungary raiſed contributions in the very ſuburbs of Vienna.

It is notoriouſly true, that we might have had nothing more than a defenſive war, as I have ſaid in the foregoing papers, to make againſt France, with an Auſtrian prince on the throne of Spain, at the death of Charles the ſecond; if the Emperor Leopald would have concurred in the wiſe and practicable meaſures which King William propoſed.

It is notoriouſly true, that we might have avoided the defeat at Almanza, and have ſupported much better the war in Spain; if a predilection for acquiſitions in Italy, had not determined the councils of Vienna to precipitate the evacuation of Mantua, wherein an army of French was blocked up after the battle of Turin, and which was let looſe in this manner, againſt the opinion of the Queen, and the States General, time enough to beat us at Almanza.

Finally, for I will deſcend into no more particu-

lars, it is notoriouſly true, that we might have taken Toulon, and have carried the war into the beſt provinces of France, for which Queen Anne had made, at a vaſt expence, all the neceſſary preparations; if the Auſtrians had not detached, in that very point of time, twelve thouſand men on the expedition to Naples, and if prince Eugene had not ſhewn too viſibly, before perſons ſtill alive, that the taking of Toulon was the leaſt of his objects.

Theſe facts are ſufficient to ſhew, how much the miſtaken policy of the court of Vienna has overloaded her allies, during more than half a century, and has defeated the great deſign which theſe allies, and Britain in particular, carried on for her, at the expence of infinite blood and treaſure. Now there are many in this kingdom very ready to conclude, from theſe facts, and from others of the ſame kind poſterior to theſe, that our experience ſhould teach us to neglect the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria, and to be regardleſs of all that paſſes on the continent for the time to come. But ſurely ſuch concluſions are very falſe. The principle of our conduct has been right, and our manner of purſuing it alone wrong. It was our neglect of the general intereſt of Europe, from the Pyrenean treaty to the revolution of our government in 1688, that gave to France a long opportunity, and the means of raiſing an exorbitant power. It has been zeal without knowledge, and a ſtrange ſubſerviency to private intereſts, which have almoſt exhauſted this country, and defeated all our endeavours for the public good ſince that time. This we may alter. The principle of policy we cannot, as long as the diviſion of power and property in Europe continues the ſame. We

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are an iſland indeed: but if a ſuperior power gives the law to the continent, I apprehend that it will give it to us too in ſome great degree. Our forefathers apprehended, with reaſon, the exorbitant power of the houſe of Auſtria; and thought that the pretenſions of Mary Queen of Scots might give, even when ſhe was a priſoner, opportunity and advantage, as they did no doubt, to this power to diſturb our peace, and even to invade our iſland. The exorbitant power of the two branches of the houſe of Bourbon, give ſurely in this reſpect, as well as in others, at leaſt the ſame cauſe of apprehenſion now. It is, therefore, plainly our intereſt, to maintain the rivalry between the families of Auſtria and of Bourbon; and for that purpoſe to aſſiſt the former on every occaſion againſt the latter, as far as the common cauſe of Europe, not her private ambition, requires; and as far as our national circumſtances may enable us to meaſure out our aſſiſtance in any conjuncture to her.

Theſe are the meaſures and proportions, according to which alone political ſocieties ought to unite in alliances, and to aſſiſt one another. There is a political, as well as a natural ſelf-love; and the former ought to be, to every member of a commonwealth, the ſame determining principle of action, where public intereſt is concerned, that the latter will be to him moſt certainly wherever his private intereſt is concerned. I have heard it often ſaid of one man, that he was a friend or an enemy to the houſe of Auſtria: and of another, that he was a friend or an enemy to the houſe of Bourbon. But theſe expreſſions proceed generally from paſſion and prepoſſeſſion; as the ſentiments they impute muſt

proceed, whenever they are real, from these causes, or from one which is still worse, from corruption. A wise prince, and a wise people, bear no regard to other states, except that which arises from the coincidence or repugnancy of their several interests; and this regard must therefore vary, as these interests will do, in the perpetual fluctuation of human affairs. Thus Queen Elizabeth and her people opposed the house of Austria, and supported the house of Bourbon, in the sixteenth century. Thus Queen Anne and her people opposed the house of Bourbon, and supported the house of Austria, in the eighteenth. The first, indeed, was done with wiser counsel; the last with greater force of arms. By the first, our country was enriched; by the last, it was impoverished——

N. B. These considerations were written thus far in the year 1749, but were never finished.

LETTERS,

ON THE

SPIRIT OF PATRIOTISM:

ON THE

Idea of a PATRIOT KING:

AND

On the STATE of PARTIES

At the Accession of

KING GEORGE the FIRST.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following papers were written ſeveral years ago, at the requeſt, and for the ſake of ſome particular friends, without any deſign of ever making them public. How they come to be made ſo at this time, it may be proper to give an account.—The original draughts were entruſted to a man, on whom the author thought he might entirely depend, after he had exacted from him, and taken his promiſe, that they ſhould never go into any hands, except thoſe of five or ſix perſons, who were then named to him. In this confidence the author reſted ſecurely for ſome years; and though he was not without ſuſpicion, that they had been communicated to more perſons than he intended they ſhould be, yet he was kept, by repeated aſſurances, even from ſuſpecting that any copies had gone into hands unknown to him. But this man was no ſooner dead, than he received information that an entire edition of 1500 copies of theſe papers had been printed; that this very man had corrected the preſs, and that he had left them in the hands of the printer, to be kept with great ſecrecy, till further order. The honeſt printer kept his word with him better than he kept his with his friend: ſo that the whole edition came at laſt into the hands of the author, except ſome few copies which this perſon had taken out of the heap, and carried away. Theſe are, doubtleſs, the copies, which have been handed about not very privately, ſince his death. The reſt were all

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deſtroyed in one common fire as ſoon as they were given up, except a copy or two, which have never been ſince out of the author's own hands. By theſe copies it appeared, that the man who had been guilty of this breach of truſt, had taken upon him further to divide the ſubject, and to alter and to omit paſſages, according to the ſuggeſtions of his own fancy.

What aggravates this proceeding extremely is, that the author had told him on ſeveral occaſions, among other reaſons why he would not conſent to the publication of theſe papers, that they had been writ in too much heat and hurry for the public eye, though they might be truſted to a few particular friends. He added, more than once, that ſome things required to be ſoftened, others perhaps to be ſtrengthened, and the whole moſt certainly to be corrected; even if they were to remain, as he then imagined they would, in the hands of a few friends only. This has been done ſince, that there might be one copy at leaſt more conformable to the author's intentions than thoſe which had gone abroad, or even than his original manuſcripts.

There is ſcarce a man in the world more detached from it, at this hour, than the author of theſe papers, or more indifferent to the cenſure of moſt people in it, having nothing to expect, nor any thing to fear from them. He might, therefore, in his way of life, and in his diſpoſition of mind, either not have known that ſcraps and fragments of theſe papers had been employed to ſwell a monthly magazine, and that the ſame honourable employment of them was to be continued; or, knowing it, he might have deſpiſed and neglected it. But ſome

of

of his friends thought that it was too much to suffer this breach of trust, and the licentious advantage taken of it, to make him appear the author of writings, which were become more properly the writings of others than his, considering how they had been garbled, and in what manner they were published. The editor therefore who has in his hands the genuine copy which the author reserved to himself, after reviſing and correcting the originals, resolved to publiſh it; since it was become impossible to hinder such as were not genuine from being retailed monthly or weekly to the world. Neither the author nor he would give offence wantonly to the living: but the author neither can, nor ought, on any account, to neglect what truth, honour, and the justice due to his own character require. Neither the author nor he affect to accuse ministers after their death, as the Egyptians formerly accused even their kings. There is the less reason to do so, since the former may be, and are accused, and without scruple, though without success for the most part, during their lives. The anecdotes here related were true, and the reflections made upon them were just, many years ago. The former would not have been related, if he who related them had not known them to be true; nor the latter have been made, if he who made them had not thought them just: and if they were true and just then, they must be true and just now, and always. The author therefore scorns to disown them: and the editor thinks that he has no excuse to make for publiſhing them.

LETTER

LETTER I.

On the SPIRIT of PATRIOTISM.

My LORD, 1736.

YOU have engaged me on a subject which interrupts the series of those letters I was writing to you; but it is one, which, I confess, I have very much at heart. I shall therefore explain myself fully, nor blush to reason on principles that are out of fashion among men, who intend nothing by serving the public, but to feed their avarice, their vanity, and their luxury, without the sense of any duty they owe to God or man.

It seems to me, that in order to maintain the moral system of the world at a certain point, far below that of ideal perfection, (for we are made capable of conceiving what we are incapable of attaining) but however sufficient upon the whole to constitute a state easy and happy, or, at the worst, tolerable: I say, it seems to me, that the Author of Nature has thought fit to mingle from time to time, among the societies of men, a few, and but a few of those, on whom he is graciously pleased to bestow a larger proportion of the ethereal spirit than is given in the ordinary course of his providence to the sons of men. These are they who engross

groſs almoſt the whole reaſon of the ſpecies, who are born to inſtruct, to guide, and to preſerve; who are deſigned to be the tutors and the guardians of human kind. When they prove ſuch, they exhibit to us examples of the higheſt virtue, and the trueſt piety: and they deſerve to have their feſtivals kept, inſtead of that pack of anachorites and enthuſiaſts with whoſe names the calendar is crowded and diſgraced. When theſe men apply their talents to other purpoſes, when they ſtrive to be great and deſpiſe being good, they commit a moſt ſacrilegious breach of truſt; they pervert the means, they defeat as far as lies in them the deſigns of providence, and diſturb in ſome ſort the ſyſtem of infinite wiſdom. To miſapply theſe talents is the moſt diffuſed, and therefore the greateſt of crimes in its nature and conſequences; but to keep them unexerted, and unemployed, is a crime too. Look about you, my Lord, from the palace to the cottage; you will find that the bulk of mankind is made to breathe the air of this atmoſphere, to roam about this globe, and to conſume, like the courtiers of Alcinous, the fruits of the earth. *Nos numerus ſumus, et fruges conſumere nati.* When they have trod this inſipid round a certain number of years, and begot others to do the ſame after them, they have lived: and if they have performed, in ſome tolerable degree, the ordinary moral duties of life, they have done all they were born to do. Look about you again, my Lord, nay look into your own breaſt, and you will find that there are ſuperior ſpirits, men who ſhew even from their infancy, though it be not always perceived by others, perhaps not always felt by themſelves, that they were

were born for ſomething more, and better. Theſe are the men to whom the part I mentioned is aſſigned. Their talents denote their general deſignation; and the opportunities of conforming themſelves to it, that ariſe in the courſe of things, or that are preſented to them by any circumſtances of rank and ſituation in the ſociety to which they belong, denote the particular vocation which it is not lawful for them to reſiſt, nor even to neglect. The duration of the lives of ſuch men as theſe is to be determined, I think, by the length and importance of the parts they act, not by the number of years that paſs between their coming into the world, and their going out of it. Whether the piece be of three, or of five acts, the part may be long: and he who ſuſtains it through the whole may be ſaid to die in the fulneſs of years; whilſt he who declines it ſooner, may be ſaid not to live out half his days.

I have ſometimes repreſented to myſelf the vulgar, who are accidentally diſtinguiſhed by the titles of king and ſubject, of lord and vaſſal, of nobleman and peaſant; and the few who are diſtinguiſhed by nature ſo eſſentially from the herd of mankind, that (figure apart) they ſeem to be of another ſpecies, in this manner. The former come into the world and continue in it like Dutch travellers in a foreign country. Every thing they meet has the grace of novelty; and they are fond alike of every thing that is new. They wander about from one object to another, of vain curioſity, or inelegant pleaſure If they are induſtrious, they ſhew their induſtry in copying ſigns, and collecting mottos and epitaphs. They loiter, or they trifle away their whole time: and their preſence or their ab-

ſence would be equally unperceived, if caprice or accident did not raiſe them often to ſtations, wherein their ſtupidity, their vices, or their follies, make them a public misfortune. The latter come into the world, or at leaſt continue in it after the effects of ſurpriſe and inexperience are over, like men who are ſent on more important errands. They obſerve with diſtinction, they admire with knowledge. They may indulge themſelves in pleaſure; but as their induſtry is not employed about trifles, ſo their amuſements are not made the buſineſs of their lives. Such men cannot paſs unperceived through a country. If they retire from the world, their ſplendor accompanies them, and enlightens even the obſcurity of their retreat. If they take a part in public life, the effect is never indifferent. They either appear like miniſters of divine vengeance, and their courſe through the world is marked by deſolation and oppreſſion, by poverty and ſervitude: or they are the guardian angels of the country they inhabit, buſy to avert even the moſt diſtant evil, and to maintain or to procure peace, plenty, and the greateſt of human bleſſings, liberty.

From the obſervation, that ſuperiority of parts is often employed to do ſuperior miſchief, no conſequence can be drawn againſt the truth I endeavour to eſtabliſh. Reaſon collects the will of God from the conſtitution of things, in this as in other caſes; but in no caſe does the divine power impel us neceſſarily to conform ourſelves to this will: and therefore from the miſapplication of ſuperior parts to the hurt, no argument can be drawn againſt this poſition, that they were given for the good of mankind. Reaſon deceives us not: we deceive ourſelves,

ſelves, and ſuffer our wills to be determined by other motives. Montaigne or Charron would ſay, *l'homme ſe pipe*, "man is at once his own ſharper, "and his own bubble." Human nature is her own bawd, ſays Tully, *Blanda conciliatrix et quaſi lena ſui.* He who conſiders the univerſal wants, imperfections, and vices of his kind, muſt agree that men were intended not only for ſociety, but to unite in commonwealths, and to ſubmit to laws. *Legum idcirco omnes ſervi ſumus, ut liberi eſſe poſſimus.* And yet this very man will be ſeduced by his own paſſions, or the paſſions and examples of others, to think or to act as if he thought, the very contrary. So he who is conſcious of ſuperior endowments, ſuch as render him more capable than the generality of men to ſecure and improve the advantages of ſocial life, by preſerving the commonwealth in ſtrength and ſplendor, even he may be ſeduced to think, or to act as if he thought, that theſe endowments were given him for the gratification of his ambition; and his other paſſions; and that there is no difference between vice and virtue, between a knave and an honeſt man, but one which a prince, who died not many years ago aſſerted, "that men of great ſenſe were therefore knaves, "and men of little ſenſe were therefore honeſt." But in neither of theſe caſes will the truth and reaſon of things be altered, by ſuch examples of human frailty. It will be ſtill true, and the reaſon will ſtill demonſtrate, that all men are directed, by the general conſtitution of human nature, to ſubmit to government; and that ſome men are in a particular manner deſigned to take care of that government on which the common happineſs depends.

The uſe that reaſon will make of ſuch examples will be only this, that ſince men are ſo apt in every form of life and every degree of underſtanding, to act againſt their intereſt and their duty too, without benevolence to mankind, or regard to the divine will; it is the more incumbent on thoſe, who have this benevolence and this regard at heart, to employ all the means that the nature of the government allows, and that rank, circumſtances of ſituation, or ſuperiority of talents, give them, to oppoſe evil, and promote good government; and contribute thus to preſerve the moral ſyſtem of the world, at that point of imperfection at leaſt, which ſeems to have been preſcribed to it by the Great Creator of every ſyſtem of beings.

Give me leave now, my Lord, to caſt my eyes for a moment homeward, and to apply what I have been ſaying to the preſent ſtate of Britain. That there is no profuſion of the ethereal ſpirit to be obſerved among us, and that we do not abound with men of ſuperior genius, I am ready to confeſs; but I think there is no ground for the complaints I have heard made, as if nature had not done her part in our age, as well as in former ages, by producing men capable of ſerving the commonwealth. The manners of our forefathers were, I believe, in many reſpects better: they had more probity perhaps, they had certainly more ſhow of honour, and greater induſtry. But ſtill nature ſows alike, though we do not reap alike. There are, and as there always have been, there always will be ſuch creatures in government as I have deſcribed above. Fortune maintains a kind of rivalſhip with wiſdom, and piques herſelf often in favour of fools as well as knaves.

knaves. Socrates uſed to ſay, that although no man undertakes a trade he has not learned, even the meaneſt; yet every one thinks himſelf ſufficiently qualified for the hardeſt of all trades, that of government. He ſaid this upon the experience he had in Greece. He would not change his opinion if he lived now in Britain. But however, ſuch characters as theſe would do little hurt, generally ſpeaking, or would not do it long, if they ſtood alone. To do great hurt, ſome genius, ſome knowledge, ſome talents in ſhort, natural or acquired, are neceſſary: leſs indeed, far leſs than are required to do good, but always ſome. Yet I imagine, not the worſt miniſter could do all the miſchief he does by the miſapplication of his talents alone, if it were not for the miſapplication of much better talents than his, by ſome who join with him, and the non-application, or the faint and unſteady exerciſe of their talents by ſome who oppoſe him; as well as the general remiſſneſs of mankind in acquiring knowledge, and in improving the parts which God has given him for the ſervice of the public. Theſe are the great ſprings of national misfortunes. There have been monſters in other ages, and other countries, as well as our ours; but they have never continued their devaſtations long, when there were heroes to oppoſe them. We will ſuppoſe a man imprudent, raſh, preſumptuous, ungracious, inſolent and profligate, in ſpeculation as well as practice. He can bribe, but he cannot ſeduce; he can buy, but he cannot gain; he can lye, but he cannot deceive. From whence then has ſuch a man his ſtrength? From the general corruption of the people, nurſed up to a full maturity under his ad-

miniſtration; from the venality of all orders and all ranks of men, ſome of whom are ſo proſtitute, that they ſet themſelves to ſale, and even prevent application. This would be the anſwer, and it would be a true one as far as it goes; but it does not account for the whole, corruption could not ſpread with ſo much ſucceſs, though reduced into ſyſtem; and though ſome miniſters with equal impudence and folly, avowed it by themſelves and their advocates, to be the principal expedient by which they governed, if a long and almoſt unobſerved progreſſion of cauſes and effects, did not prepare the conjuncture. Let me explain it and apply it, as I conceive it. One party had given their whole attention, during ſeveral years, to the project of enriching themſelves, and impoveriſhing the reſt of the nation; and, by theſe and other means, of eſtabliſhing their dominion under the government and with the favour of a family, who were foreigners, and therefore might believe, that they were eſtabliſhed on the throne by the good will and ſtrength of this party alone. This party in general were ſo intent on theſe views, and many of them, I fear, are ſo ſtill, that they did not advert in time to the neceſſary conſequences of the meaſures they abetted: nor did they conſider, that the power they raiſed, and by which they hoped to govern their country, would govern them with the very rod of iron they forged, and would be the power of a prince or miniſter, not that of a party long. Another party continued ſour, ſullen, and inactive, with judments ſo weak, and paſſions ſo ſtrong, that even experience, and a ſevere one ſurely, was loſt upon them. They waited, like the

Jews,

Jews, for a Meſſiah, that may never come; and under whom, if he did come, they would be ſtrangely diſappointed in their expectations of glory and triumph, and univerſal dominion. Whilſt they waited, they were marked out like the Jews, a diſtinct race, hewers of wood and drawers of water, ſcarce members of the community, though born in the country. All indifferent men ſtood as it were at a gaze: and the few, who were jealous of the court, were ſtill more jealous of one another; ſo that a ſtrength ſufficient to oppoſe bad miniſters was not eaſy to be formed. When this ſtrength was formed, and the inſufficiency or iniquity of the adminiſtration was daily expoſed to public view, many adhered at firſt to the miniſter, and others were ſince gained to his cauſe, becauſe they knew nothing of the conſtitution of their own, nor of the hiſtory of other countries; but imagined wildly, that things always went as they ſaw them go, and that liberty has been; and therefore may be preſerved under the influence of the ſame corruption. Others perhaps were weak enough to be frightened at firſt, as ſome are hypocritical enough to pretend to be ſtill, with the appellations of Tory and Jacobite, which are always ridiculouſly given to every man who does not bow to the brazen image that the king has ſet up. Others again might be perſuaded, that no fatal uſe at leaſt would be made of the power acquired by corruption; and men of ſuperior parts might and may ſtill flatter themſelves, that if this power ſhould be ſo employed, they ſhall have time and means to ſtop the effects of it. The firſt of theſe are ſeduced by their ignorance and futility; the ſecond, if they are not hypocrites, by their prejudices; the third,

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by their partiality and blind confidence; the laſt, by their preſumption; and all of them by the mammon of unrighteouſneſs, their private intereſt, which they endeavour to palliate and to reconcile as well as they can to that of the public; *et cæca cupiditate corrupti, non intelligunt ſe, dum vendunt, et vœnire.*

According to this repreſentation, which I take to be true, your lordſhip will agree that our unfortunate country affords an example in proof of what is aſſerted above. The Dutch travellers I ſpoke of, men of the ordinary, or below the ordinary ſize of underſtanding, though they are called by caprice, or lifted any other way into power, cannot do great and long miſchief, in a country of liberty; unleſs men of genius, knowledge, and experience, miſapply theſe talents, and become their leaders. A miniſterial faction will have as little ability to do hurt, as they have inclination to do good, if they were not formed and conducted by one of better parts than they: nor would ſuch a miniſter be able to ſupport, at the head of this truſty phalanx, the ignominious tyranny impoſed on his country, if other men, of better parts, and much more conſequence than himſelf, were not drawn in to miſapply theſe parts to the vileſt drudgery imaginable; the daily drudgery of explaining nonſenſe, covering ignorance, diſguiſing folly, concealing and even juſtifying fraud and corruption; inſtead of employing their knowledge, their elocution, their ſkill, experience and authority, to correct the adminiſtration and to guard the conſtitution. But this is not all: the example ſhews a great deal more. Your lordſhip's experience as well as mine will juſtify what I am going to ſay. It ſhews further, that ſuch a con-

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juncture could not be rendered effectual to preſerve power in ſome of the weakeſt and ſome of the worſt hands in the kingdom, if there was not a non application, or a faint and unſteady exerciſe of parts on one ſide, as well as an iniquitous miſapplication of them on the other: and I cannot help ſaying, let it fall where it will, what I have ſaid perhaps already, that the former is a crime but one degree inferior to the latter. The more genius, induſtry, and ſpirit are employed to deſtroy, the harder the taſk of ſaving our country becomes; but the duty increaſes with the difficulty, if the principles on which I reaſon are true. In ſuch exigences it is not enough that *genius* be oppoſed to *genius*, *ſpirit* muſt be matched by *ſpirit*. They, who go about to deſtroy, are animated from the firſt by ambition and avarice, the love of power and of money: fear makes them often deſperate at laſt. They muſt be oppoſed therefore, or they will be oppoſed in vain, by a ſpirit able to cope with ambition, avarice, and deſpair itſelf: by a ſpirit able to cope with theſe paſſions, when they are favoured and fortified by the weakneſs of a nation, and the ſtrength of government. In ſuch exigencies there is little difference, as to the merit of the effect, between oppoſing faintly and unſteadily, and not oppoſing at all: nay the former may be of worſe conſequence in certain circumſtances than in the latter. And this is a truth I wiſh with all my heart you may not ſee verified in our conntry, where many, I fear, undertake oppoſition not as a duty, but as an adventure: and looking on themſelves like volunteers, not like men liſted in the ſervice, they deem themſelves at liberty to take as much or as little of this trouble,

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and to continue in it as long, or end it as ſoon as they pleaſe. It is but a few years ago, that not the merchant alone, but the whole nation, took fire at the project of new exciſes. The project was oppoſed, not on mercantile conſiderations and intereſts alone, but on the true principles of liberty In parliament, the oppoſition was ſtrenuouſly enough ſupported for a time; but there was ſo little diſpoſition to guide and improve the ſpirit, that the chief concern of thoſe who took the lead ſeemed applied to keep it down; and yet your lordſhip remembers how high it continued againſt the projector; till it was calmed juſt before the elections of the preſent parliament, by the remarkable indolence and inactivity of the laſt ſeſſion of the laſt. But theſe friends of ours, my lord, are as much miſtaken in their ethics, as the event will ſhew they have been in their politics.

The ſervice of our country is no chimerical, but a real duty. He who admits the proofs of any other moral duty, drawn from the conſtitution of human nature, or from the moral fitneſs and unfitneſs of things, muſt admit them in favour of this duty, or be reduced to the moſt abſurd inconſiſtency. When he has once admitted the duty on theſe proofs, it will be no difficult matter to demonſtrate to him, that his obligation to the performance of it is in proportion to the means and the opportunities he has of performing it; and that nothing can diſcharge him from this obligation as long as he has theſe means and theſe opportunities in his power, and as long as this country continues in the ſame want of his ſervices. Theſe obligations then to the public ſervice, may become obligations for life on certain perſons. No doubt they may

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and ſhall this conſideration become a reaſon for denying or evading them? On the contrary, ſure it ſhould become a reaſon for acknowledging and fulfilling them, with the greateſt gratitude to the Supreme Being, who has made us capable of acting ſo excellent a part, and of the utmoſt benevolence to mankind. Superior talents, and ſuperior rank amongſt our fellow creatures, whether acquired by birth, or by the courſe of accidents, and the ſucceſs of our own induſtry, are noble prerogatives. Shall he who poſſeſſes them repine at the obligation they lay him under, of paſſing his whole life in the nobleſt occupation of which human nature is capable? To what higher ſtation, to what greater glory can any mortal aſpire, than to be, during the whole courſe of his life, the ſupport of good, the controul of bad government, and the guardian of public liberty? To be driven from hence by ſucceſsful tyranny, by loſs of health or of parts, or by the force of accidents, is to be degraded in ſuch a manner as to deſerve pity, and not to incur blame: but to degrade ourſelves, to deſcend voluntarily, and by choice, from the higheſt to a lower, perhaps to the loweſt rank among the ſons of Adam, to abandon the government of men for that of hounds and horſes, the care of a kingdom for that of a pariſh, and a ſcene of great and generous efforts in public life, for one of trifling amuſements and low cares, of ſloth and of idleneſs, what is it, my Lord? I had rather your Lordſhip ſhould name it than I. Will it be ſaid, that it is hard to exact from ſome men, in favour of others, that they ſhould renounce all the pleaſures of life, and drudge all their days in buſineſs, that others may indulge themſelves in eaſe? It will be ſaid without grounds. A life dedicated to

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the ſervice of our country admits the full uſe, and no life ſhould admit the abuſe of pleaſures: the leaſt are conſiſtent with a conſtant diſcharge of our public duty, the greateſt ariſe from it. The common, the ſenſual pleaſures to which nature prompts us, and which reaſon therefore does not forbid, though ſhe ſhould always direct, are ſo far from being excluded out of a life of buſineſs, that they are ſometimes neceſſary in it, and are always heightened by it: thoſe of the table, for inſtance, may be ordered ſo as to promote that which the elder Cato calls *vitæ conjunctionem*. In the midſt of public duties, private ſtudies, and an extreme old age, he found time to frequent the *ſodalitates*, or clubs of friends at Rome, and to ſit up all night with his neighbours in the country of the Sabines. Cato's virtue often glowed with wine; and the love of women did not hinder Cæſar from forming and executing the greateſt projects that ambition ever ſuggeſted. But if Cæſar, whilſt he laboured to deſtroy the liberties of his country, enjoyed theſe inferior pleaſures of life, which a man who labours to ſave thoſe liberties may enjoy as well as he; there are ſuperior pleaſures in a buſy life that Cæſar never knew, thoſe, I mean, that ariſe from a faithful diſcharge of our duty to the commonwealth. Neither Montaigne, in writing his eſſays, nor Des Cartes, in building new worlds, nor Burnet, in framing an antedeluvian earth, no nor Newton, in diſcovering and eſtabliſhing the true laws of nature on experiment, and a ſublimer geometry, felt more intellectual joys, than he feels who is a *real patriot*, who bends all the force of his underſtanding, and directs all his thoughts and actions to the good of his country.

try. When such a man forms a political scheme, and adjusts various and seemingly independent parts in it, to one great and good design, he is transported by imagination, or absorbed in meditation, as much and as agreeably as they: and the satisfaction that arises from the different importance of these objects, in every step of the work, is vastly in his favour. It is here that the speculative philosopher's labour and pleasure end. But he who speculates in order to *act*, goes on, and carries his scheme into execution. His labour continues, it varies, it increases; but so does his pleasure too. The execution indeed is often traversed, by unforeseen and untoward circumstances, by the perverseness or treachery of friends, and by the power or malice of enemies: but the first and the last of these animate, and the docility and fidelity of some men, make amends for the perverseness and treachery of others. Whilst a great event is in suspense, the action warms, and the very suspense, made up of hope and fear, maintains no unpleasing agitation in the mind. If the event is decided successfully, such a man enjoys pleasure proportionable to the good he has done; a pleasure like to that which is attributed to the Supreme Being, on a survey of his works. If the event is decided otherwise, and usurping courts, or overbearing parties prevail; such a man has still the testimony of his conscience, and a sense of the honour he has acquired, to sooth his mind, and support his courage. For although the course of state-affairs be, to those who meddle in them, like a lottery, yet it is a lottery wherein no good man can be

a loſer: he may be reviled, it is true, inſtead of being applauded, and may ſuffer violence of many kinds. I will not ſay, like Seneca, that the nobleſt ſpectacle which God can behold, is a virtuous man ſuffering, and ſtruggling with afflictions: but this I will ſay, that the ſecond Cato driven out of the forum, and dragged to priſon, enjoyed more inward pleaſure, and maintained more outward dignity, than they who inſulted him, and who triumphed in the ruin of their country. But the very example of Cato may be urged perhaps againſt what I have inſiſted upon: it may be aſked, what good he did at Rome, by dedicating his whole life to her ſervice? what honour to himſelf by dying at Utica? It may be ſaid, that governments have their periods, like all things human; that they may be brought back to their primitive principles during a certain time, but that when theſe principles are worn out, in the minds of men, it is a vain enterprize to endeavour to renew them: that this is the caſe of all governments, when the corruption of the people comes to a great pitch, and is grown univerſal: that when a houſe which is old, and quite decayed, though often repaired, not only cracks, but totters even from the foundations, every man in his ſenſes runs out of it, and takes ſhelter where he can, and that none but madmen continue obſtinate to repair what is irreparable, till they are cruſhed in the ruin. Juſt ſo, that we muſt content ourſelves to live under the government we like the leaſt, when that form which we like the moſt is deſtroyed or worn out; according to the counſel of Dolabella in one of his letters to Cicero. But, my Lord, if Cato could

could not save, he prolonged the life of liberty: the liberties of Rome would have been lost when Catiline attacked them, abetted probably by Cæsar and Crassus, and the worst citizens of Rome; and when Cicero defended them, abetted by Cato and the best. That Cato erred in his conduct, by giving way too much to the natural roughness of his temper, and by allowing too little for that of the Romans, among whom luxury had long prevailed, and corruption was openly practised, is most true. He was incapable of employing those seeming compliances that are reconcileable to the greatest steddiness, and treated unskilfully a crazy constitution. The safety of the commonwealth depended, in that critical conjuncture, on a *coalition of parties*, the *senatorian* and the *equestrian*: Tully had formed it, Cato broke it. But if this good, for I think he was not an able man, erred in the particular respects I have ventured to mention, he deserved most certainly the glory he acquired by the general tenor of his conduct, and by dedicating the whole labour of his life to the service of his country. He would have deserved more if he had persisted in maintaining the same cause to the end, and would have died I think with a better grace at *Munda* than at *Utica*. If this be so, if Cato may be censured, severely indeed, but justly, for abanding the cause of liberty, which he would not however survive; what shall we say of those who embrace it faintly, pursue it irresolutely, grow tired of it when they have much to hope, and give it up when they have nothing to fear.

My Lord, I have insisted the more on this duty which men owe to their country, because I came

out of England, and continue ſtill ſtrongly affected with what I ſaw when I was there. Our government has approached, nearer than ever before, to the true principles of it, ſince the revolution of 1688; and the acceſſion of the preſent family to the throne, has given the faireſt opportunities, as well as the juſteſt reaſons, for compleating the ſcheme of liberty, and improving it to perfection. But it ſeems to me, that, in our ſeparate world, as the means of aſſerting and ſupporting liberty are increaſed, all concern for it is diminiſhed. I beheld, when I was among you, more abject ſervility, in the manners and behaviour of particular men, than I ever ſaw in France, or than has been ſeen there, I believe, ſince the days of that Gaſcon, who, being turned out of the miniſter's door, leaped in again at his window. As to the bodies of men, I dare challenge your Lordſhip, and I am ſorry for it, to produce any inſtances of reſiſtance to the unjuſt demands, or wanton will of a court, that Britiſh parliaments have given, comparable to ſuch as I am able to cite to the honour of the *parliament of Paris*, and the whole body of the law in that country, within the ſame compaſs of time This abject ſervility may appear juſtly the more wonderful in Britain, becauſe the government of Britain has, in ſome ſort, the appearance of an oligarchy: and monarchy is rather hid behind it than ſhewn, rather weakened than ſtrengthened, rather impoſed upon than obeyed. The wonder therefore is, to obſerve how imagination and cuſtom, (a giddy fool, and a formal pedant) have rendered theſe cabals, or oligarchies, more reſpected than majeſty itſelf. That this ſhould happen in countries where princes, who have abſolute power,

power, may be tyrants themselves, or substitute subordinate tyrants, is not wonderful. It has happened often: but that it should happen in Britain, may be justly an object of wonder. In these countries, the people had lost the armour of their constitution; they were naked and defenceless. Ours is more compleat than ever. But though we have preserved the armour, we have lost the spirit of our constitution; and therefore we bear, from little engrossers of delegated power, what our fathers would not have suffered from true proprietors of the royal authority. Parliaments are not only what they always were, essential parts of our constitution, but essential parts of our administration too. They do not claim the executive power. No. But the executive power cannot be exercised without their annual concurrence. How few months, instead of years, have princes and ministers now to pass without inspection and controul? How *easy* therefore is it become to check every growing evil in the bud, to change every bad administration, to keep such farmers of government in awe, to maintain and revenge, if need be, the constitution? It is become so easy by the present form of our government, that corruption *alone* could not destroy us. We must want *spirit*, as well as *virtue*, to perish. Even able knaves would preserve liberty in such circumstances as ours, and highwaymen would scorn to receive the wages and do the drudgery of pick-pockets. But all is little, and low, and mean among us! Far from having the *virtues*, we have not even the *vices* of great men. He who had pride instead of vanity, and ambition but equal to his desire of wealth, could never bear, I do not say to be the understrapper to any

farmer of royal authority, but to see patiently one of them (at best his fellow, perhaps his inferior in every respect) lord it over him, and the rest of mankind, dissipating wealth, and trampling on the liberties of his country with impunity. This could not happen if there was the least spirit among us. But there is none. What passes among us for ambition, is an odd mixture of avarice and vanity: the moderation we have seen practised is pusillanimity, and the philosophy that some men affect is sloth. Hence it comes, that corruption has spread, and prevails.

I expect little from the principal actors that tread the stage at present. They are divided, not so much as it has seemed, and as they would have it believed, about *measures*: the true division is about their different *ends*. Whilst the minister was not hard pushed, nor the prospect of succeeding to him near, they appeared to have but one end, the reformation of the government. The destruction of the minister was pursued only as a preliminary, but of essential and indispensable necessity to that end. But when his destruction seemed to approach, the *object* of his *succession* interposed to the sight of many, and the *reformation* of the *government* was no longer their point of view. They divided the skin, at least in their thoughts, before they had taken the beast, and the common fear of hunting him down for others, made them all faint in the chace. It was *this*, and this alone that *has* saved him, or *has* put off his evil day. Corruption so much, and so justly complained of, could not have done it *alone*.

When I say that I expect little from the principal actors that tread this stage at present, I am far from

from applying to all of them, what I take to be true of the far greateſt part. There are men among them who certainly intend the good of their country, and whom I love and honour for that reaſon. But theſe men have been clogged, or miſled, or overborne, by others; and ſeduced by natural temper to inactivity, have taken any excuſe, or yielded to any pretence that favoured it. That they ſhould rouſe therefore in themſelves, or in any one elſe, the ſpirit they have ſuffered, nay helped to die away, I do not expect. I turn my eyes from the generation that is going off, to the generation that is coming on the ſtage. I expect good from them, and from none of them more than from you my Lord. Remember that the oppoſition in which you have engaged, at your firſt entrance into buſineſs, is not an oppoſition only to a bad adminiſtration of public affairs, but to an adminiſtration that ſupports itſelf by means, eſtabliſhes principles, introduces cuſtoms, repugnant to the conſtitution of our government, and deſtructive of all liberty; that you do not only combat preſent evils, but attempts to entail thoſe evils upon you and your poſterity; that if you ceaſe the combat, you give up the cauſe: and that he who does not renew on every occaſion his claim may forfeit his right.

Our diſputes were formerly, to ſay the truth, much more about perſons than things; or at moſt, about particular points of political conduct, in which we ſhould have ſoon agreed, if perſons, and perſonal intereſts had been leſs concerned, and the blind prejudice of party leſs prevalent. Whether the Big-endians or the Little-endians got the better, I believe no man of ſenſe and knowledge thought the conſtitution

ſtitution concerned; notwithſtanding all the clamour raiſed at one time about the *danger* of the *church*, and at another about the *danger* of the *Proteſtant ſucceſſion*. But the caſe is at this time vaſtly altered. The means of invading liberty more effectual, by the conſtitution of the *revenue*, than it ever had been invaded by *prerogative*, were not then grown up into ſtrength. They are ſo now; and a bold and an inſolent uſe is made of them. To reform the *ſtate* therefore is, and ought to be, the object of your oppoſition, as well as to reform the *adminiſtration*. Why do I ſay as well? It is ſo, and it ought to be ſo much more. Wreſt the power of the government, if you can, out of hands that have employed it weakly and wickedly ever ſince it was thrown into them, by a ſilly bargain made, in one reign, and a corrupt bargain made in another. But do not imagine this to be your ſole, or your principal buſineſs. You owe to your country, to your honour, to your ſecurity, to the preſent and to future ages, that no endeavours of yours be wanting to repair the breach that is made, and is encreaſing daily in the conſtitution, and to ſhut up with all the bars and bolts of law, the principal entries through which theſe torrents of corruption have been let in upon us. I ſay the *principal* entries; becauſe, however it may appear in pure ſpeculation, I think it would not be found in practice poſſible, no nor eligible neither, to ſhut them up *all*. As entries of corruption, none of them deſerve to be excepted: but there is a juſt diſtinction to be made, becauſe there is a real difference. *Some* of theſe entries are opened by the abuſe of powers, neceſſary to maintain ſubordination,

and

and to carry on even good government, and therefore neceſſary to be preſerved in the crown, notwithſtanding the abuſe that is ſometimes made of them; for no human inſtitution can arrive at perfection, and the moſt that human wiſdom can do, is to procure the ſame or greater good, at the expence of leſs evil. There will be always ſome evil either immediate or remote, either in cauſe or conſequence. But there are *other* entries of corruption, and theſe are by much the greateſt, for ſuffering of which to continue open no reaſon can be aſſigned, or has been pretended to be aſſigned, but that which is to every honeſt and wiſe man a reaſon for ſhutting them up; the encreaſe of the means of corruption, which are oftener employed for the ſervice of the oligarchy, than for the ſervice of the monarchy. Shut up *theſe*, and you will have nothing to fear from the *others*. By theſe, a more real and a more dangerous power has been gained to miniſters, than was loſt to the crown by the reſtraints on prerogative.

There have been periods when our government continued free, with ſtrong appearances of becoming abſolute. Let it be your glory, my Lord, and that of the new generation ſpringing up with you, that this government do not become abſolute at any future period, with the appearances of being free. However you may be employed, in all your councils, in all your actions, keep this regard to the conſtitution always in ſight. The ſcene that opens before you is great, and the part that you will have to act difficult. It is difficult indeed to bring men from ſtrong habits of corruption, to prefer honour to profit, and liberty to luxury; as it is hard to teach

teach princes the great art of governing all by all, or to prevail on them to practiſe it. But if it be a difficult, it is a glorious attempt; an attempt worthy to exert the greateſt talents, and to fill the moſt extended life. Purſue it with courage, my Lord, nor deſpair of ſucceſs.

——*Deus hæc fortaſſe benigna*
Reducet in ſedem vice.

A parliament, nay one houſe of parliament, is able at any time, and at once, to deſtroy any corrupt plan of power. Time produces every day new conjunctures: Be prepared to improve them. We read in the Old Teſtament of a city that might have eſcaped divine vengeance, if five righteous men had been found in it. Let not our city periſh for want of ſo ſmall a number: and if the generation that is going off could not furniſh it, let the generation that is coming on furniſh a greater.

We may reaſonably hope that it will, from the firſt eſſays which your Lordſhip, and ſome others of our young ſenators, have made in public life. You have raiſed the hopes of your country by the proofs you have given of ſuperior parts. Confirm theſe hopes by proofs of uncommon induſtry and application, and perſeverence. Superior parts, nay even ſuperior virtue, without theſe qualities, will be inſufficient to ſupport your character and your cauſe. How many men have appeared in my time, who have made theſe eſſays with ſucceſs, and have made no progreſs afterwards. Some have dropped from their firſt flights down into the vulgar crowd, have been diſtinguiſhed, nay heard of, no more! Others with

with better parts, perhaps with more preſumption, but certainly with greater ridicule, have perſiſted in making theſe eſſays towards buſineſs all their lives, and have never been able to advance farther in their political courſe, than a premeditated harangue on ſome choice ſubject. I never ſaw one of theſe important perſons ſit down after his oration, with repeated hear-hims ringing in his ears, and inward rapture glowing in his eyes, that he did not recal to my memory the ſtory of a conceited member of ſome parliament in France, who was overheard, after his tedious harangue, muttering moſt devoutly to himſelf, *Non nobis, Domine, non nobis; ſed nomine tuo da gloriam!*

Eloquence, that leads mankind by the ears, gives a nobler ſuperiority than power, that every dunce may uſe, or fraud, that every knave may employ, to lead them by the noſe. But eloquence muſt flow like a ſtream that is fed by an abundant ſpring, and not ſpout forth a little frothy water on ſome gaudy day, and remain dry the reſt of the year. The famous orators of Greece and Rome were the ſtateſmen and miniſters of thoſe commonwealths. The nature of their governments, and the humour of thoſe ages made elaborate orations neceſſary. They harangued oftener than they debated: and the *ars dicendi* required more ſtudy, and more exerciſe of mind, and of body too, among them, than are neceſſary among us. But as much pains as they took in learning how to conduct the ſtream of eloquence, they took more to enlarge the fountain from which it flowed. Hear Demoſthenes, hear Cicero, thunder againſt Philip, Catiline, and Anthony. I chuſe the example of the firſt, rather than

than that of Pericles whom he imitated, or of Phocion whom he oppoſed, or of any other conſiderable perſonage in Greece; and the example of Cicero rather than that of Craſſus, or of Hortenſius, or of any other of the great men of Rome; becauſe the eloquence of theſe two has been ſo celebrated, that we are accuſtomed to look upon them almoſt as *meer orators*. They were orators indeed, and no man who has a ſoul can read their orations, after the revolution of ſo many ages, after the extinction of the governments, and of the people for whom they were compoſed, without feeling at this hour the paſſions they were deſigned to move, and the ſpirit they were deſigned to raiſe. But if we look into the hiſtory of theſe two men, and conſider the parts they acted, we ſhall ſee them in another light, and admire them in an higher ſphere of action. Demoſthenes had been neglected in his education, by the ſame tutors who cheated him of his inheritance. Cicero was bred with greater advantage: and Plutarch, I think, ſays, that when he firſt appeared, the people uſed to call him, by way of deriſion, the Greek, and the ſcholar. But whatever advantage of this kind the latter might have over the former, and to which of them ſoever you aſcribe the ſuperior genius, the progreſs which both of them made in every part of *political knowledge*, by their induſtry and application, was marvellous. Cicero might be a better philoſopher, but Demoſthenes was no leſs a ſtateſman: and both of them performed actions and acquired fame, above the reach of eloquence alone. Demoſthenes uſed to compare eloquence to a weapon, aptly enough; for eloquence like every other weapon, is of little

uſe

uſe to the owner, unleſs he have the force and the ſkill to uſe it. This force and this ſkill, Demoſthenes had in an eminent degree. Obſerve them in one inſtance among many. It was of mighty importance to Philip to prevent the acceſſion of Thebes to the grand alliance that Demoſthenes, at the head of the Athenian commonwealth, formed againſt the growing power of the Macedonians. Philip had emiſſaries and his ambaſſadors on the ſpot, to oppoſe to thoſe of Athens, and we may be aſſured that he neglected none of thoſe arts, upon this occaſion, that he employed ſo ſucceſsfully on others. The ſtruggle was great, but Demoſthenes prevailed, and the Thebans engaged in the war againſt Philip. Was it by his eloquence alone that he prevailed in a divided ſtate, over all the ſubtility of intrigue, all the dexterity of negotiation, all the ſeduction, all the corruption, and all the terror, that the ableſt and moſt powerful prince could employ? Was Demoſthenes wholly taken up with compoſing orations, and haranguing the people in this remarkable criſis? He harangued them no doubt at Thebes, as well as at Athens, and in the reſt of Greece, where all the great reſolutions of making alliances, waging war, or concluding peace, were determined in democratical aſſemblies. But yet haranguing was, no doubt, the leaſt part of his buſineſs, and eloquence was neither the ſole, nor the principal talent, as the ſtyle of writers would induce us to believe, on which his ſucceſs depended. He muſt have been maſter of other arts, ſubſerviently to which his eloquence was employed, and muſt have had a thorough knowledge of his own ſtate, and of the other ſtates of Greece, of

their diſpoſitions, and of their intereſts relatively to one another, and relatively to their neighbours, to the Perſians particularly, with whom he held a correſpondence not much to his honour: I ſay, he muſt have been maſter of many other arts and have poſſeſſed an immenſe fund of knowledge, to make his eloquence in every caſe ſucceſsful, and even pertinent or ſeaſonable in ſome, as well as to direct it, and to furniſh it with matter whenever he thought proper to employ this weapon.

Let us conſider Tully on the greateſt theatre of the known world, and in the moſt difficult circumſtances. We are better acquainted with him than we are with Demoſthenes; for we ſee him nearer, as it were, and in more different lights. How perfect a knowledge had he acquired of the Roman conſtitution of government, eccleſiaſtical and civil; of the original and progreſs, of the general reaſons and particular occaſions of the laws and cuſtoms of his country; of the great rules of equity, and the low practice of courts; of the duty of every magiſtracy and office in the ſtate, from the dictator down to the lictor; and of all the ſteps by which Rome had riſen from her infancy, to liberty, to power, and grandeur, and dominion, as well as of all thoſe by which ſhe began to decline, a little before his age, to that ſervitude which he died for oppoſing, but lived to ſee eſtabliſhed, and in which not her liberty alone, but her power, and grandeur, and dominion, were loſt? How well was he acquainted with the Roman colonies and provinces, with the allies and enemies of the empire, with the rights and privileges of the former, the diſpoſitions and conditions of the latter, with the intereſts of them

them all relatively to Rome, and with the intereſts of Rome relatively to them? How preſent to his mind were the anecdotes of former times, concerning the Roman and other ſtates, and how curious was he to obſerve the minuteſt circumſtances that paſſed in his own? His works will anſwer ſufficiently the queſtions I aſk, and eſtabliſh in the mind of every man who reads them, the idea I would give of his capacity and knowledge, as well as that which is ſo univerſally taken of his eloquence. To a man fraught with all this ſtock of knowledge, and induſtrious to improve it daily, nothing could happen that was entirely new, nothing for which he was quite unprepared, ſcarce any effect whereof he had not conſidered the cauſe, ſcarce any cauſe wherein his ſagacity could not diſcern the latent effect. His eloquence in private cauſes gave him firſt credit at Rome, but it was this knowledge, this experience, and the continued habits of buſineſs that ſupported his reputation, enabled him to do ſo much ſervice to his country, and gave force and authority to his eloquence. To little purpoſe would he have attacked Cataline with all the vehemence that indignation, and even fear, added to eloquence, if he had truſted to this weapon alone. This weapon alone would have ſecured neither him nor the ſenate from the poniard of that aſſaſſin. He would have had no occaſion to boaſt, that he had driven this infamous citizen out of the walls of Rome, *abiit*, *exceſſit*, *evaſit*, *erupit*, if he had not made it before hand impoſſible for him to continue any longer in them. As little occaſion would he have had to aſſume the honour of defeating without any tumult or any diſorder, the deſigns of

thoſe who conſpired to murder the Roman people, to deſtroy the Roman empire, and to extinguiſh the Roman name; if he had not united by ſkill and management, in the common cauſe of their country, orders of men the moſt averſe to each other; if he had not watched all the machinations of the conſpirators in ſilence, and prepared a ſtrength ſufficient to reſiſt them at Rome, and in the provinces, before he opened this ſcene of villany to the ſenate and the people: in a word, if he had not made much more uſe of political prudence, that is, of the knowledge of mankind, and of the arts of government, which ſtudy and experience give, than of all the powers of his eloquence.

Such was Demoſthenes, ſuch was Cicero, ſuch were all the great men whoſe memories are preſerved in hiſtory, and ſuch muſt every man be, or endeavour to be, if he has either ſenſe or ſentiment, who preſumes to meddle in affairs of government, of a free government I mean, and hopes to maintain a diſtinguiſhed character in popular aſſemblies, whatever part he takes, whether that of ſupporting or that of oppoſing. I put the two caſes purpoſely, my Lord, becauſe I have obſerved, and your Lordſhip will have frequent occaſions of obſerving, many perſons who ſeem to think, that oppoſition to an adminiſtration requires fewer preparatives, and leſs conſtant application than the conduct of it. Now, my Lord, I take this to be a groſs error, and I am ſure it has been a fatal one. It is one of thoſe errors, and there are many ſuch, which men impute to judgment, and which proceed from the defect of judgment, as this does from lightneſs, irreſolution,

ſolution, lazineſs, and a falſe notion of oppoſition; unleſs the perſons, who ſeem to think, do not really think in this manner, but ſerving the public purely for intereſt, and not for fame, nor for duty, decline taking the ſame pains, when they oppoſe without perſonal and immediate reward, as they are willing to take when they are paid for ſerving. Look about you, and you will ſee men eager to ſpeak, and keen to act, when particular occaſions preſs them, or particular motives excite them, but quite unprepared for either: and hence all that ſuperficiality in ſpeaking, for want of information, hence all that confuſion or inactivity, for want of concert, and all that diſappointment for want of preliminary meaſures. They who affect to head an oppoſition, or to make any conſiderable figure in it, muſt be equal at leaſt to thoſe whom they oppoſe; I do not ſay in parts only, but in application and induſtry, and the fruits of both, information, knowledge, and a certain conſtant preparedneſs for all the events that may ariſe. Every adminiſtration is a ſyſtem of conduct: oppoſition therefore ſhould be a ſyſtem of conduct likewiſe; an oppoſite, but not a dependent ſyſtem. I ſhall explain myſelf better by an example, When two armies take the field, the generals on both ſides have their different plans for the campaign, either of defence or offence; and as the former does not ſuſpend his meaſures till he is attacked, but takes them beforehand on every probable contingency, ſo the latter does not ſuſpend his, till the opportunity of attacking preſents itſelf, but is alert, and conſtantly ready to ſeize it, whenever it happens; and in the meantime is buſy to improve all the advantages of ſkill,

of force, or of any other kind that he has, or that he can acquire, independently of the plan, and of the motions, of his enemy.

In a word, my Lord, this is my notion, and I ſubmit it to you. According to the preſent form of our conſtitution, every member of either houſe of parliament is a member of a national ſtanding council, born, or appointed by the people, to promote good, and to oppoſe bad government; and if not veſted with the power of a miniſter of ſtate, yet veſted with the ſuperior power of controlling thoſe who are appointed ſuch by the crown. It follows from hence, that they who engage in oppoſition, are under as great obligations to prepare themſelves to controul, as they who ſerve the crown are under, to prepare themſelves to carry on the adminiſtration: and that a party formed for this purpoſe, do not act like good citizens nor honeſt men, unleſs they *propoſe true*, as well as *oppoſe falſe* meaſures of government. Sure I am they do not act like wiſe men, unleſs they act ſyſtematically, and unleſs they contract, on every occaſion, that ſcheme of policy which the public intereſt requires to be followed, with that which is ſuited to no intereſt but the private intereſt of the prince or his miniſters. Cunning men (ſeveral ſuch there are among you) will diſlike this conſequence, and object, that ſuch a conduct would ſupport, under the appearance of oppoſing, a weak and even a wicked adminiſtration; and that, to proceed in this manner, would be to give good counſel to a bad miniſter, and to extricate him out of diſtreſſes that ought to be improved to his ruin. But cunning pays no regard to virtue, and is but the low mimic of wiſdom.

dom. It were eaſy to demonſtrate what I have aſſerted concerning the duty of an oppoſing party: and, I preſume, there is no need of labouring to prove, that a party who oppoſed ſyſtematically, a wiſe to a ſilly, an honeſt to an iniquitous, ſcheme of government, would acquire greater reputation and ſtrength, and arrive more ſurely at their end, than a party who oppoſed occaſionally as it were, without any common ſyſtem, without any general concert, with little uniformity, little preparation, little perſeverance, and as little knowledge, or political capacity. But it is time to leave this invidious ſubject, and to haſten to the concluſion of my letter before it grows into a book.

I am, my Lord, &c.

LETTER II.

THE

IDEA

OF A

PATRIOT KING.

INTRODUCTION.

Dec. 1, 1738.

REviſing ſome letters I writ to my Lord ***, I found in one of them a great deal ſaid concerning the *duties* which men owe to their *country*, thoſe men particularly who live under a *free conſtitution* of government; with a ſtrong application of theſe general doctrines to the *preſent ſtate* of Great Britain, and to the characters of the preſent actors on this ſtage.

I ſaw no reaſon to alter, none even to ſoften, any thing that is there advanced. On the contrary, it came into my mind to carry theſe conſiderations further, and to delineate, for I pretend not to make a perfect draught, the *duties of a king to his country*; of thoſe kings particularly who are appointed by the people, for I know of none who are anointed by God, to rule in *limited monarchies*. After which, I propoſed to apply the general doctrines in this caſe, as ſtrongly, and as directly, as in the other, to the *preſent ſtate* of Great Britain.

I am not one of thoſe oriental ſlaves, who deem it unlawful preſumption to look their kings in the face; neither am I ſwayed by my Lord Bacon's authority to think this cuſtom good and reaſonable in its meaning, though it ſavours of barbariſm in its inſtitution: *Ritu quidem barbarus, ſed ſignificatione*

tione bonus. Much otherwiſe: It ſeems to me that no ſecrets are ſo important to be known, no hearts deſerve to be pryed into with more curioſity and attention, than thoſe of princes. But many things have concurred, beſides age and temper, to ſet me at a great diſtance from the preſent court. Far from prying into the hearts, I ſcarce know the faces of our royal family. I ſhall therefore decline all application to their characters, and all mention of any influence which their characters may have on their own fortune, or on that of this nation.

The principles I have reaſoned upon in my letter to my Lord ***, and thoſe I ſhall reaſon upon here, are the ſame. They are laid in the ſame ſyſtem of human nature. They are drawn from that ſource from whence all the duties of public and private morality muſt be derived, or they will be often falſely, and always precarioufly eſtabliſhed. Up to this ſource there are few men who take the pains to go: and, open as it lies, there are not many who can find their way to it. By ſuch as you, I ſhall be underſtood, and approved; and far from fearing the cenſure or the ridicule, I ſhould reproach myſelf with the applauſe, of men who meaſure their intereſts by the paſſions, and their duty by the examples of a corrupt age; that is, by the examples they afford to one another. Such I think are the greateſt part of the preſent generation; not of the vulgar alone, but of thoſe who ſtand foremoſt, and are raiſed higheſt in our nation. Such we may juſtly apprehend too that the next will be, ſince they who are to compoſe it will ſet out into the world under a direction that muſt incline them ſtrongly to the

the ſame courſe of ſelf-intereſt, profligacy, and corruption.

The iniquity of all the principal men in any community, of kings and miniſters eſpecially, does not conſiſt alone in the crimes they commit, and in the immediate conſequences of theſe crimes: and therefore their guilt is not to be meaſured by theſe alone. Such men ſin againſt poſterity, as well as againſt their own age; and when the conſequences of their crimes are over, the conſequences of their example remain. I think, and every wiſe and honeſt man in generations yet unborn will think, if the hiſtory of ——'s adminiſtration deſcends to blacken our annals, that the greateſt iniquity of the miniſter, on whom the whole iniquity ought to be charged, ſince he has been ſo long in poſſeſſion of the whole power, is the conſtant endeavour he has employed to corrupt the *morals* of *men*. I ſay thus generally the *morals*, becauſe he who abandons or betrays his country, will abandon or betray his friend; and becauſe he who is prevailed on to act in parliament, without any regard to truth or juſtice, will eaſily prevail on himſelf to act in the ſame manner every where elſe. A wiſer and honeſter adminiſtration may relieve our trade from that oppreſſion, and the public from that load of debt under which it muſt be ſuppoſed that he has induſtriouſly kept it; becauſe we are able to prove, by fair calculations, that he might have provided effectually for the payment of it, ſince he came to the head of the treaſury. A wiſer and honeſter adminiſtration may draw us back to our former credit and influence abroad, from that ſtate of contempt into which we are ſunk among all our neighbours. But will the

minds of *men*, which this miniſter has narrowed to perſonal regards alone, will their *views*, which he has confined to the preſent moment, as if nations were mortal like the men who compoſe them, and Britain was to periſh with her degenerate children; will theſe, I ſay, be ſo *eaſily* or ſo *ſoon* enlarged? Will their *ſentiments*, which are debaſed from the love of liberty, from zeal for the honour and proſperity of their country, and from a deſire of honeſt fame, to an abſolute unconcernedneſs for all theſe, to an abject ſubmiſſion, and to a rapacious eagerneſs after wealth that may ſate their avarice, and exceed the profuſion of their luxury; will theſe, I ſay again, be ſo *eaſily*, or ſo *ſoon elevated?* In a word, will the Britiſh ſpirit, that *ſpirit* which has preſerved liberty hitherto in one corner of the world at leaſt, be ſo *eaſily*, or ſo *ſoon reinfuſed* into the Britiſh nation? I think not. We have been long coming to this point of depravation: and the progreſs from confirmed habits of evil is much more ſlow than the progreſs to them. Virtue is not placed on a rugged mountain of difficult and dangerous acceſs, as they who would excuſe the indolence of their temper, or the perverſeneſs of their will, deſire to have it believed; but ſhe is ſeated however on an eminence. We may go up to her with eaſe, but we muſt go up gradually, according to the natural progreſſion of reaſon, which is to lead the way, and to guide our ſteps. On the other hand, if we fall from thence, we are ſure to be hurried down the hill with a blind impetuoſity, according to the natural violence of thoſe appetites and paſſions that cauſed our fall at firſt, and urge it on the faſter, the further

further they are removed from the controul that before reſtrained them.

To perform, therefore, ſo great a work, as to reinfuſe the *ſpirit* of *liberty*, to reform the *morals*, and to raiſe the *ſentiments* of a people, much time is required: and a work which requires ſo much time may too probably be never compleated; conſidering how unſteadily and unſyſtematically even the beſt of men are apt often to proceed; and how this reformation is to be carried forward in oppoſition to public faſhion, and private inclination, to the authority of the men in power, and to the ſecret bent of many of thoſe who are out of power. Let us not flatter ourſelves; I did ſo too long. It is more to be wiſhed than to be hoped, that the contagion ſhould ſpread no farther than that leprous race, who carry on their ſkins, expoſed to public ſight, the ſcabs and blotches of their diſtemper. The miniſter preaches corruption aloud and conſtantly, like an impudent miſſionary of vice: and ſome there are who not only inſinuate, but teach the ſame occaſionally. I ſay ſome; becauſe I am as far from thinking, that all thoſe who join with him, as that any of thoſe people who oppoſe him, wait only to be more authorized, that they may propagate it with greater ſucceſs, and apply it to their own uſe, in their turn.

It ſeems to me, upon the whole matter, that to ſave or redeem a nation under ſuch circumſtances from perdition, nothing leſs is neceſſary than ſome great, ſome extraordinary conjuncture of ill fortune, or of good, which may *purge*, yet *ſo as by fire*. Diſtreſs from abroad, bankruptcy at home, and other circumſtances of like nature and tendency, may be-

get univerſal confuſion. Out of confuſion order may ariſe: but it may be the order of a wicked tyranny, inſtead of the order of a juſt monarchy. Either may happen: and ſuch an alternative, at the diſpoſition of fortune, is ſufficient to make a ſtoic tremble! We may be ſaved indeed by means of a very different kind; but theſe means will not offer themſelves, this way of ſalvation will not be opened to us, without the concurrence, and the influence of a Patriot King, the moſt uncommon of all phænomena in the phyſical or moral world.

Nothing can ſo ſurely and ſo effectually reſtore the virtue and public ſpirit, eſſential to the preſervation of liberty, and the national proſperity, as the reign of ſuch a prince.

We are willing to indulge this pleaſing expectation, and there is nothing we deſire more ardently than to be able to hold of a Britiſh prince, without flattery, the ſame language that was held of a Roman emperor, with a great deal,

Nil eriturum alias, nil ortum tale fatentes.

But let us not neglect, on our part, ſuch means as are in our power, to keep the cauſe of truth, of reaſon, of virtue, and of liberty, alive. If the bleſſing be withheld from us, let us deſerve at leaſt that it ſhould be granted to us. If heaven in mercy beſtows it on us, let us prepare to receive it, to improve it, and to co-operate with it.

I ſpeak as if I could take my ſhare in theſe glorious efforts. Neither ſhall I recal my words. Stripped of the rights of a Britiſh ſubject, of all except the meaneſt of them, that of inheriting, I remember

that

that I am a Britain ſtill. I apply to myſelf what I have read in Seneca, *Officia ſi civis amiſerit, hominis exerceat.* I have renounced the world, not in ſhew, but in reality, and more by my way of thinking than by my way of living, as retired as that may ſeem. But I have not renounced my country, nor my friends; and by my friends I mean all thoſe, and thoſe alone, who are ſuch to their country, by whatever name they have been, or may be ſtill diſtinguiſhed: and though in that number there ſhould be men, of whoſe paſt ingratitude, injuſtice, or malice, I might complain on my own account with the greateſt reaſon. Theſe I will never renounce. In their proſperity, they ſhall never hear of me; in their diſtreſs, always. In that retreat, wherein the remainder of my days ſhall be ſpent I may be of ſome uſe to them; ſince even from thence I may adviſe, exhort, and warn them. *Nec enim is ſolus reipub: prodeſt, qui candidatos extrahit, et tuetor reos, et de pace belloq; cenſet; ſed qui juventutem exhortatur: qui, in tanta bonorum præceptorum inopia, virtute inſtruit animos; qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque curſu ruentes prenſat ac retrahit, et ſi nihil aliud, certe moratur; in privato publicum negotium agit.*

LETTER II.

The IDEA of a PATRIOT KING.

MY intention is not to introduce what I have to ſay concerning the *duties of kings*, by any nice inquiry into the original of their inſtitution. What is to be known of it will appear plainly enough, to ſuch as are able and can ſpare time to trace it, in the broken traditions which are come down to us of a few nations. But thoſe, who are not able to trace it there, may trace ſomething better and more worthy to be known, in their own thoughts: I mean what this inſtitution ought to have been, whenever it began, according to the rule of reaſon, founded in the common rights, and intereſts of mankind. On this head it is quite neceſſary to make ſome reflections, that will, like angular ſtones laid on a rock, ſupport the little fabrick, the model however of a great building, that I propoſe to raiſe.

So plain a matter could never have been rendered intricate and voluminous, had it not been for lawleſs ambition, extravagant vanity, and the deteſtable ſpirit of tyranny; abetted by the private intereſts of artful men, by adulation and ſuperſtition, two vices to which that ſtaring and timid creature man is exceſſively prone; if authority had not impoſed on ſuch as did not pretend to reaſon; and if ſuch

ſuch as did attempt to reaſon had not been caught in the common ſnares of ſophiſm, and bewildered in the labyrinths of diſputation. In this caſe, therefore, as in all thoſe of great concernment, the ſhorteſt and the ſureſt method of arriving at real knowledge is to unlearn the leſſons we have been taught, to remount to firſt principles, and take no body's word about them; for it is about them that almoſt all the juggling and legerdemain, employed by men whoſe trade it is to deceive, are ſet to work.

Now he who does ſo, in this caſe, will diſcover ſoon, that the notions concerning the divine inſtitution and right of kings, as well as the abſolute power belonging to their office, have no foundation in fact or reaſon, but have riſen from an old alliance between eccleſiaſtical and civil policy. The characters of king and prieſt have been ſometimes blended together; and when they have been divided, as kings have found the great effects wrought in government by the empire which prieſts obtain over the conſciences of mankind, ſo prieſts have been taught by experience, that the beſt method to preſerve their own rank, dignity, wealth, and power, all raiſed upon a ſuppoſed *divine right*, is to communicate the ſame pretenſion to kings, and by a fallacy common to both, impoſe their uſurpations on a ſilly world. This they have done: and in the ſtate, as in the church, theſe pretenſions to a divine right have been generally carried higheſt by thoſe, who have had the leaſt pretenſion to the divine favour.

It is worth while to obſerve, on what principle ſome men were advanced to a great pre-eminence over others, in the early ages of thoſe nations that are

are a little known to us: I ſpeak not of ſuch as raiſed themſelves by conqueſt, but of ſuch as were raiſed by common conſent. Now you will find in all theſe proceedings an entire uniformity of principle. The authors of ſuch inventions as were of general uſe to the well-being of mankind, were not only reverenced and obeyed during their lives, but worſhipped after their deaths: they became principal gods, *Dii majorum gentium.* The founders of commonwealths, the law-givers, and the heroes of particular ſtates, became gods of a ſecond claſs, *Dii minorum gentium.* All pre-eminence was given in heaven as well as on earth, in proportion to the benefits that men received. *Majeſty* was the firſt, and *divinity* the ſecond reward. Both were earned by ſervices done to mankind, whom it was eaſy to lead in thoſe days of ſimplicity and ſuperſtition, from admiration and gratitude, to adoration and expectation.

When advantage had been taken by ſome particular men of theſe diſpoſitions in the generality, and religion and government were become two trades or myſteries, new means of attaining to this pre-eminence were ſoon deviſed, and new and even contrary motives worked the ſame effect. Merit had given rank; but rank was ſoon kept, and, which is more prepoſterous, obtained too, without merit. Men were then made kings for reaſons as little relative to good government, as the neighing of the horſe of the ſon of Hyſtaſpes.

But the moſt prevalent, and the general motive was proximity of blood, to the laſt, not to the beſt king. Nobility in China mounts upwards, and he who has it conferred upon him, ennobles his anceſtors,

tors, not his posterity. A wise institution! and especially among a people in whose minds a great veneration for their forefathers has been always carefully maintained. But in China, as well as in most other countries, royalty has descended, and kingdoms have been reckoned the patrimonies of particular families

I have read in one of the historians of the latter Roman empire, historians, by the way, that I will not advise others to mispend their time in reading, that Sapores the famous king of Persia, against whom Julian made the expedition wherein he lost his life, was crowned in his mother's womb. His father left her with child, the magi declared that the child would be a male; whereupon the royal ensigns were brought forth, they were placed on her majesty's belly, and the princes and the satrapes prostrate recognized the embryo monarch. But to take a more known example out of multitudes that present themselves, Domitian the worst, and Trajan the best of princes, were promoted to the empire by the same title. Domitian was the son of Flavius, and the brother, though possibly the prisoner too, of Titus Vespasian: Trajan was the adopted son of Nerva. Hereditary right served the purpose of one, as well as of the other: and if Trajan was translated to a place among the gods, this was no greater a distinction than some of the worst of his predecessors and his successors obtained, for reasons generally as good as that which Seneca puts into the mouth of Diespiter in the apokolokyntosis of Claudius, *Cum sit e republica esse aliquem qui cum Romulo possit ferventia rapa vorare.* To say the truth, it would have been a wiser measure to have made these royal

royal perſons gods at once: as gods they would have done neither good nor hurt; but as emperors, in their way to divinity, they acted like devils.

If my readers are ready by this time to think me antimonarchial, and in particular an enemy to the ſucceſſion of kings by hereditary right, I hope to be ſoon reſtored to their good opinion. I eſteem monarchy above any other form of government, and hereditary monarchy above elective. I reverence kings, their office, their rights, their perſons; and it will never be owing to the principles I am going to eſtabliſh, becauſe the character and government of a *patriot king* can be eſtabliſhed on no other, if their office and their right are not always held divine, and their perſons always ſacred.

Now we are ſubject, by the conſtitution of human nature, and therefore by the will of the Author of this and every other nature, by two laws. One given immediately to all men by God, the ſame to all, and obligatory alike on all. The other given to man by man; and therefore not the ſame to all, nor obligatory alike on all: founded indeed on the ſame principles, but varied by different applications of them to times, to characters, and to a number which may be reckoned infinite, of other circumſtances. By the firſt you ſee, that I mean the univerſal law of reaſon; and by the ſecond the particular law, or conſtitution of laws, by which every diſtinct community has choſen to be governed.

The obligation of ſubmiſſion to both, is diſcoverable by ſo clear and ſo ſimple an uſe, of our intellectual faculties, that it may be ſaid properly enough to be "revealed to us by God;" and though both theſe laws cannot be ſaid properly to be given

by

by him, yet our obligation to submit to the civil law is a principal paragragh in the natural law, which he has most manifestly given us. In truth we can no more doubt of the obligations of both these laws, than of the existence of the lawgiver. As supreme Lord over all his works, his general providence regards immediately the great commonwealth of mankind; but then, as supreme Lord likewise, his authority gives a sanction to the particular bodies of law which are made under it. The law of nature is the law of all his subjects: the constitutions of particular governments are like the by-laws of cities, or the appropriated customs of provinces. It follows, therefore, that he who breaks the laws of his country resists the ordinance of God, that is, the law of his nature. God has instituted neither monarchy, nor aristocracy, nor democracy, nor mixed government: but though God has instituted no particular form of government among men, yet by the general laws of his kingdom, he exacts our obedience to the laws of those communities to which each of us is attached by birth, or to which we may be attached by a subsequent and lawful engagement.

From such plain, unrefined, and therefore I suppose true reasoning the just authority of kings, and the due obedience of subjects, may be deduced with the utmost certainty. And surely it is far better for kings themselves to have their authority thus founded on principles incontestible, and on fair deductions from them, than on the chimeras of madmen, or, what has been more common, the sophisms of knaves. A human right that cannot be controverted, is preferable surely to a pretended divine

vine right, which every man muſt believe implicitly, as few will do, or not believe at all.

But the principles we have laid down do not ſtop here. A divine right in kings is to be deduced evidently from them. A divine right to govern well, and conformably to the conſtitution at the head of which they are placed. A divine right to govern ill, is an abſurdity: to aſſert it is blaſphemy. A people may chuſe, or hereditary ſucceſſion may raiſe, a bad prince to the throne; but a good king alone can derive his right to govern from God. The reaſon is plain: good government alone can be in the divine intention. God has made us to deſire happineſs; he has made our happineſs dependent on ſociety; and the happineſs of ſociety dependent on good or bad government. His intention therefore was, that government ſhould be good.

This is eſſential to his wiſdom; for wiſdom conſiſts ſurely in proportioning means to ends: therefore it cannot be ſaid without abſurd impiety, that he confers a right to oppoſe his intention.

The office of kings is then of right divine, and their perſons are to be reputed ſacred. As men, they have no ſuch right, no ſuch ſacredneſs belonging to them: as kings they have both, unleſs they forfeit them. Reverence for government obliges to reverence governors, who, for the ſake of it, are raiſed above the level of other men: but reverence for governors, independently of government, any further than reverence would be due to their virtues if they were private men, is prepoſterous, and repugnant to common ſenſe. The ſpring from which this legal reverence, for ſo I may call it, ariſes, is national, not perſonal. As well might we ſay that a ſhip is built, and loaded, and manned, for

the ſake of any particular pilot, inſtead of acknowledging that the pilot is made for the ſake of the ſhip, her lading, and her crew, who are always the owners in the political veſſel, as to ſay that kingdoms were inſtituted for kings, not kings for kingdoms. In ſhort, and to carry our alluſion higher, majeſty is not an inherent, but a reflected light.

All this is as true of elective, as it is of hereditary monarchs; though the ſcriblers for tyranny, under the name of monarchy, would have us believe that there is ſomething more auguſt and more ſacred in one than the other. They are ſacred alike, and this attribute is to be aſcribed, or not aſcribed to them, as they anſwer, or do not anſwer, the *ends* of their inſtitution. But there is another compariſon to be made, in which a great and moſt important diſſimilitude will be found between hereditary and elective monarchy. Nothing can be more abſurd in pure ſpeculation, than an hereditary right in any mortal to govern other men: and yet, in practice, nothing can be more abſurd than to have a king to chuſe at every vacancy of a throne. We draw at a lottery indeed in one caſe, where there are many chances to loſe, and few to gain. But have we much more advantage of this kind in the other? I think not. Upon theſe, and upon moſt occaſions, the multitude would do at leaſt as well to truſt to chance as choice, and to their fortune as to their judgment. But in another reſpect the advantage is entirely on the ſide of hereditary ſucceſſion; for in elective monarchies, theſe elections, whether well or ill made, are often attended with ſuch national calamities, that even the

the beſt reigns cannot make amends for them; whereas in hereditary monarchy, whether a good or a bad prince ſucceeds, theſe calamities are avoided. There is one ſource of evil the leſs open; and one ſource of evil the leſs in human affairs, where there are ſo many, is ſufficient to decide. We may lament the imperfections of our human ſtate, which is ſuch, that in caſes of the utmoſt importance to the order and good government of ſociety, and by conſequence to the happineſs of our kind, we are reduced, by the very conſtitution of our nature, to have no part to take that our reaſon can approve abſolutely. But though we lament it, we muſt ſubmit to it. We muſt tell ourſelves once for all, that perfect ſchemes are not adapted to our imperfect ſtate; that Stoical morals and Platonic politics are nothing better than amuſements for thoſe who have had little experience in the affairs of the world, and who have much leiſure, *verbo otioſorum ſenum, ad imperitos juvenes*; which was the cenſure, and a juſt one too, that Dionyſius paſt on ſome of the doctrines of the father of the academy. In truth, all that human prudence can do, is to furniſh expedients, and to compound as it were with general vice and folly; employing reaſon to act even againſt her own principles, and teaching us, if I may ſay ſo, *inſanire cum ratione*. which appears on many occaſions not to be the paradox it has been thought.

To conclude this head therefore, as I think a limited monarchy the beſt of governments, ſo I think an hereditary monarchy the beſt of monarchies. I ſaid a *limited monarchy*; for an unlimited monarchy, wherein arbitrary will, which is in truth no rule, is however the ſole rule, or ſtands inſtead of all rule

of government, is so great an absurdity both in reason informed or uninformed by experience, that it seems a government fitter for savages than for civilized people.

But I think it proper to explain a little more what I mean, when I say a limited monarchy, that I may leave nothing untouched which ought to be taken into consideration by us, when we attempt to fix our ideas of a *patriot king*.

Among many reasons which determine me to prefer monarchy to every form of government, this is a principal one. When monarchy is the essential form, it may be more easily and more usefully tempered with aristocracy or democracy, or both, than either of them, when they are the essential forms, can be tempered with monarchy. It seems to me, that the introduction of a real permanent monarchical power, or any thing more than the pageantry of it, into either of these, must destroy them and extinguish them, as a great light extinguishes a less. Whereas it may easily be shewn, and the true form of our government will demonstrate, without seeking any other example, that very considerable aristocratical and democratical powers may be grafted on a monarchical stock, without diminishing the lustre, or restraining the power and authority of the prince, enough to alter in any degree the essential form.

A great difference is made in nature, and therefore the distinction should be always preserved in our notions, between two things that we are apt to confound in speculation, as they have been confounded in practice, legislative and monarchical power. There must be an absolute, unlimited, and uncon-

uncontroulable power lodged ſomewhere in every government; but to conſtitute monarchy, or the government of a ſingle perſon, it is not neceſſary that this power ſhould be lodged in the monarch alone. It is no more neceſſary that he ſhould excluſively and independently eſtabliſh the rule of his government, than it is, that he ſhould govern without any rule at all: and this ſurely will be thought reaſonable by no man.

I would not ſay God governs by a rule that we know, or may know as well as he, and upon our knowledge of which he appeals to men for the juſtice of his proceedings towards them: which a famous divine has impiouſly advanced, in a pretended demonſtration of his being and attributes. God forbid! But this I may ſay, that God does always that which is fitteſt to be done, and that this fitneſs, whereof neither that preſumptuous dogmatiſt was, nor any created being is, a competent judge, reſults from the various natures, and more various relations of things; ſo that as creator of all ſyſtems by which theſe natures and relations are conſtituted, he preſcribed to himſelf the rule, which he follows as governor of every ſyſtem of being. In ſhort, with reverence be it ſpoken, God is a monarch, yet not an arbitrary but a limited monarch, limited by the rule which infinite wiſdom preſcribes to infinite power. I know well enough the impropriety of theſe expreſſions; but when our ideas are inadequate, our expreſſions muſt needs be improper. Such conceptions however as we are able to form of theſe attributes, and of the exerciſe of them in the government of the univerſe may ſerve to ſhew what I have produced them to ſhew. If governing with-

out any rule, and by arbitrary will, be not eſſential to our idea of the monarchy of the ſupreme Being, it is plainly ridiculous to ſuppoſe them neceſſarily included in the idea of a human monarchy: and though God in his eternal ideas, for we are able to conceive no other manner of knowing, has preſcribed to himſelf that rule by which he governs the univerſe he created; it will be juſt as ridiculous to affirm, that the idea of human monarchy cannot be preſerved, if kings are obliged to govern according to a rule eſtabliſhed by the wiſdom of a ſtate, that was a ſtate before they were kings, and by the conſent of a people that they did not moſt certainly create; eſpecially when the whole executive power is excluſively in their hands, and the legiſlative power cannot be exerciſed without their concurrence.

There are limitations indeed that would deſtroy the eſſential form of monarchy: or, in other words, a monarchical conſtitution may be changed, under pretence of limiting the monarch. This happened among us in the laſt century, when the vileſt uſurpation, and the moſt infamous tyranny, were eſtabliſhed over our nation by ſome of the worſt and ſome of the meaneſt men in it. I will not ſay, that the eſſential form of monarchy ſhould be preſerved, though the preſervation of it were to cauſe the loſs of liberty. *Salus reip. ſuprema lex eſto*, is a fundamental law: and ſure I am, the ſafety of a commonwealth is ill provided for, if the liberty be given up. But this I preſume to ſay, and can demonſtrate, that all the limitations neceſſary to preſerve liberty, as long as the ſpirit of it ſubſiſts, and longer than that no limitations of monarchy, nor any other form of government can preſerve it, are compatible with

with monarchy. I think on theſe ſubjects, neither as the Tories nor as the Whigs have thought: at leaſt I endeavour to avoid the exceſſes of both. I neither dreſs up kings like ſo many burleſque Jupiters, weighing the fortunes of mankind in the ſcales of fate, and darting thunderbolts at the heads of rebellious giants: nor do I ſtrip them naked, as it were, and leave them at moſt a few tattered rags to clothe their majeſty, but ſuch as can ſerve really as little for uſe as for ornament. My aim is to fix this principle, that limitations on a crown ought to be carried as far as it is neceſſary to ſecure the liberties of a people; and that all ſuch limitations may ſubſiſt without weakening or endangering monarchy

I ſhall be told perhaps, for I have heard it ſaid by many, that this point is imaginary, and that limitations ſufficient to procure good government, and to ſecure liberty under a bad prince, cannot be made, unleſs they are ſuch as will deprive the ſubjects of many benefits in the reign of a good prince, clog his adminiſtration, maintain an unjuſt jealouſy between him and his people, and occaſion a defect of power, neceſſary to preſerve the public tranquillity, and to promote the national proſperity. If this was true, here would be a much more melancholy inſtance of the imperfections of our nature, and of the inefficacy of our reaſon to ſupply this imperfection, than the former. In the former, reaſon prompted by experience avoids a certain evil effectually, and is able to provide, in ſome meaſure, againſt the contingent evils that may ariſe from the expedient itſelf. But in the latter, if what is there advanced was true, theſe proviſions againſt contingent evils would in ſome caſes, be the occaſions of much

much certain evil, and of positive good in none: under a good prince they would render the administration defective; and under a bad one there would be no government at all. But the truth is widely different from this representation. The limitations necessary to preserve liberty under monarchy will restrain effectually a bad prince, without being ever felt as shackles by a good one. Our constitution is brought, or almost brought, to such a point, a point of perfection I think it, that no king who is not, in the true meaning of the word, a *patriot*, can govern Britain with ease, security, honour, dignity, or indeed with sufficient power and strength. But yet a king, who is a patriot, may govern with all the former; and besides them, with power as extended as the most absolute monarch can boast, and a power too, far more agreeable in the enjoyment, as well as more effectual in the operation.

To attain these great and noble ends, the patriotism must be real, and not in shew alone. It is something to desire to appear a patriot: and the desire of having fame is a step towards deserving it, because it is a motive the more to deserve it. If it be true, as Tacitus says, *Contemptu famæ contemni virtutem*, that a contempt of a good name, or an indifference about it, begets or accompanies always a contempt of virtue, the contrary will be true; and they are certainly both true. But this motive alone is not sufficient. To constitute a patriot, whether king or subject, there must be something more substantial than a desire of fame, in the composition: and if there be not, this desire of fame will never rise above that sentiment which may be compared to the coquetry of women; a fondness

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of tranſient applauſe, which is courted by vanity, given by flattery, and ſpends itſelf in ſhew, like the qualities which acquire it. Patriotiſm muſt be founded in great principles, and ſupported by great virtues. The chief of theſe principles I have endeavoured to trace; and I will not ſcruple to aſſert, that a man can be a good king upon no other. He may, without them and by complexion, be unambitious, generous, good-natured; but without them the exerciſe even of theſe virtues will be often ill directed: and with principles of another ſort, he will be drawn eaſily, notwithſtanding theſe virtues, from all the purpoſes of his inſtitution.

I mention theſe oppoſite principles the rather, becauſe, inſtead of wondering that ſo many kings, unfit and unworthy to be truſted with the government of mankind, appear in the world, I have been tempted to wonder that there are any tolerable: when I have conſidered the flattery that environs them moſt commonly from the cradle, and the tendency of all thoſe falſe notions that are inſtilled into them by precept, and by example, by the habits of courts, and by the intereſted ſelfiſh views of courtiers. They are bred to eſteem themſelves of a *diſtinct* and *ſuperior ſpecies* among *men*, as men are among *animals*.

Lewis the fourteenth was a ſtrong inſtance of the effect of this *education*, which trains up kings to be tyrants, without knowing that they are ſo. That oppreſſion under which he kept his people, during the whole courſe of a long reign, might proceed, in ſome degree from the natural haughtineſs of his temper; but it proceed in a greater degree from the principles and habits of his education. By this he had been brought to look on his kingdom as a

patrimony

patrimony that descended to him from his ancestors, and that was to be considered in no other light: so that when a very considerable man had discoursed to him at large of the miserable condition to which his people were reduced, and had frequently used the word *l'etat*; though the king approved the substance of all he had said, yet he was shocked at the frequent repetition of this word, and complained of it as a kind of indecency to himself. This will not appear so strange to our second, as it may very justly to our first reflections; for what wonder is it, that princes are easily betrayed into an error that takes its rise in the general imperfection of our nature, in our pride, our vanity, and our presumption? the bastard children, but the children still, of self-love; a spurious brood, but often a favourite brood, that governs the whole family. As men are apt to make themselves the measure of all being, so they make themselves the final cause of all creation. Thus the reputed orthodox philosophers in all ages have taught, that the world was made for man, the earth for him to inhabit, and all the luminous bodies in the immense expanse around us, for him to gaze at. Kings do no more, no not so much, when they imagine themselves the final cause for which societies were formed, and governments instituted.

This capital error, in which almost every prince is confirmed by his education, has so great extent, and so general influence, that a right to do every iniquitous thing in government may be derived from it. But as if this was not enough, the characters of princes are spoiled many more ways by their education. I shall not descend into a detail of such parti-

particulars, nor presume so much as to hint what regulations might be made about the education of princes, nor what part our parliaments might take occasionally in this momentous affair, lest I should appear too refining, or too presumptuous in my speculations. But I may assert in general, that the indifference of mankind upon this head, especially in a government constituted like ours, is monstrous.

I may also take notice of another cause of the mistakes of princes, I mean the general conduct of those who are brought near to their persons. Such men, let me say, have a particular duty arising from this very situation; a duty common to them all, because it arises not from their stations, which are different, but from their situation, which is the same. To enumerate the various applications of this duty, would be too minute and tedious; but this may suffice, that all such men should bear constantly in mind, that the master they serve is to be the king of their country; that their attachment to him, therefore, is not to be like that of other servants to other masters, for his sake alone, or for his sake and their own, but for the sake of their country likewise.

"Craterus loves the king, but Hephestion loves "Alexander," was a saying of the latter that has been often quoted, but not censured as it ought to be. Alexander gave the preference to the attachment of Hephestion; but this preference was due undoubtedly to that of Craterus. Attachment to a private person must comprehend a great concern for his character and his interests: but attachment to one who is, or may be a king, much more; because the character of the latter is more important to himself

ſelf and others; and becauſe his intereſts are vaſtly more complicated with thoſe of his country, and in ſome ſort with thoſe of mankind. Alexander himſelf ſeemed, upon one occaſion, to make the diſtinction that ſhould be always made between our attachments to a prince, and to any private perſon. It was when Parmenio adviſed him to accept the terms of peace which Darius offered: they were great, he thought them ſo; but he thought, no matter for my purpoſe whether juſtly or not, that it would be unbecoming him to accept them; therefore he rejected them, but acknowledged, that "he would have done as he was adviſed to do, if "he had been Parmenio."

As to perſons who are not about a prince in the ſituation here ſpoken of, they can do little more than proportion their applauſe, and the demonſtrations of their confidence and affection, to the benefits they actually receive from the prince on the throne, or to the juſt expectations that a ſucceſſor gives them. It is of the latter I propoſe to ſpeak here particularly. If he gives them thoſe of a good reign, we may aſſure ourſelves that they will carry, and in this caſe they ought to carry, that applauſe, and thoſe demonſtrations of their confidence and affection, as high as ſuch a prince himſelf can deſire. Thus the prince and the people take, in effect, a ſort of engagement with one another; the prince to govern well, and the people to honour and obey him. If he gives them expectations of a bad reign, they have this obligation to him at leaſt, that he puts them early on their guard. And an obligation and an advantage it will be, if they prepare for his acceſſion as for a great and inevitable evil;

and

and if they guard on every occaſion againſt the ill uſe they foreſee that he will make of money and power. Above all, they ſhould not ſuffer themſelves to be caught in the common ſnare, which is laid under ſpecious pretences of "gaining ſuch a "prince, and of keeping him by public compliances out of bad hands." That argument has been preſſed more than once, has prevailed, and has been fruitful of moſt pernicious conſequences. None indeed can be more abſurd: it is not unlike the reaſoning of thoſe ſavages who worſhip the devil, not becauſe they love him or honour him, or expect any good from him, but that he may do them no hurt. Nay, it is more abſurd; for the ſavages ſuppoſe, that the devil has, independently of them, the power to hurt them: whereas the others put more power into the hands of a prince, becauſe he has already ſome power to hurt them; and truſt to the juſtice and gratitude of one who wants ſenſe, virtue, or both, rather than increaſe and fortify the barriers againſt his folly and his vices.

But the truth is, that men who reaſon and act in this manner, either mean, or elſe are led by ſuch as mean, nothing more than to make a private court at the public expence; who chuſe to be the inſtruments of a bad king, rather than to be out of power; and who are often ſo wicked, that they would prefer ſuch a ſervice to that of the beſt of kings. In fine, theſe reaſons, and every other reaſon for providing againſt a bad reign in proſpect, acquire a new force when one weak or wicked prince is, in the order of ſucceſſion, to follow another of the ſame character. Such proviſions indeed are hardeſt to be obtained, when they are the moſt neceſſary;

that is, when the ſpirit of liberty begins to flag in a free people, and when they become diſpoſed by habits that have grown inſenſibly upon them, to a baſe ſubmiſſion. But they are neceſſary too, even when they are eaſieſt to be obtained: that is, when the ſpirit of liberty is in full ſtrength, and a diſpoſition to oppoſe all inſtances of male-adminiſtration, and to reſiſt all attempts on liberty, is univerſal. In both caſes, the endeavours of every man who loves his country, will be employed with inceſſant care and conſtancy to obtain them: that good government and liberty may be the better preſerved and ſecured: but in the latter caſe, for this further reaſon alſo, that the preſervation and ſecurity of theſe may be provided for, not only better, but more conſiſtently with public tranquillity, by conſtitutional methods, and a legal courſe of oppoſition, to the exceſſes of regal or miniſterial power. What I touch upon here might be made extremely plain; and I think the obſervation would appear to be of no ſmall importance: but I ſhould be carried too far from my ſubject, and my ſubject will afford me matter of more agreeable ſpeculation.

It is true, that a prince who gives juſt reaſons to expect that his reign will be that of a Patriot King, may not always meet, and from all perſons, ſuch returns as ſuch expectations deſerve: but they muſt not hinder either the prince from continuing to give them, or the people from continuing to acknowledge them. United, none can hurt them: and if no artifice interrupts, no power can defeat the effects of their perſeverance. It will blaſt many a wicked project, keep virtue in countenance, and vice to ſome degree at leaſt in awe. Nay, if it

ſhould

ſhould fail to have theſe effects, if we ſhould even ſuppoſe a good prince to ſuffer with the people, and in ſome meaſure for them, yet many advantages would accrue to him: for inſtance, the cauſe of the people he is to govern, and his own cauſe, would be made the ſame by their common enemies. He would feel grievances himſelf as a ſubject, before he had the power of impoſing them as a king. He would be formed in that ſchool out of which the greateſt and the beſt of monarchs have come, the ſchool of affliction: and all the vices which had prevailed before his reign, would ſerve as ſo many foils to the glories of it. But I haſten to ſpeak of the greateſt of all theſe advantages, and of that which a Patriot King will eſteem to be ſuch: whoſe ways of thinking and acting to ſo glorious a purpoſe as the re-eſtabliſhment of a free conſtitution, when it has been ſhook by the iniquity of former adminiſtrations, I ſhall endeavour to explain.

What I have here ſaid will paſs among ſome for the reveries of a diſtempered brain, at beſt for the vain ſpeculations of an idle man, who has loſt ſight of the world, or who had never ſagacity enough to diſcern in government the practicable from the impracticable. Will it not be ſaid, that this is adviſing a king to rouſe a ſpirit which may turn againſt himſelf; to reject the ſole expedient of governing a limited monarchy with ſucceſs, to labour to confine, inſtead of labouring to extend his power; to patch up an old conſtitution which his people are diſpoſed to lay aſide, inſtead of forming a new one more agreeable to them, and more advantageous to him; to refuſe, in ſhort, to be an abſolute monarch, when every circumſtance invites him to it?

All theſe particulars, in every one of which the queſtion is begged, will be thus repreſented, and will be then ridiculed as paradoxes fit to be ranked among the *mirabilia et inopinata* of the Stoics, and ſuch as no man in his ſenſes can maintain in earneſt. Theſe judgments, and theſe reaſonings, may be expected in an age as futile and as corrupt as ours: in an age wherein ſo many betray the cauſe of liberty, and act not only without regard, but in direct oppoſition to the moſt important intereſts of their country; not only occaſionally, by ſurpriſe, by weakneſs, by ſtrong temptation, or ſly ſeduction, but conſtantly, ſteadily, by deliberate choice, and in purſuance of principles they avow and propagate: in an age when ſo many others ſhrink from the ſervice of their country, or promote it coolly and uncertainly, in ſubordination to their own intereſt and humour, or to thoſe of a party: in age, when to aſſert the truth, is called ſpreading of deluſion, and to aſſert the cauſe of liberty and good government, is termed ſowing of ſedition. But I have declared already my unconcernedneſs at the cenſure or ridicule of ſuch men as theſe; for whoſe ſuppoſed abilities I have much well-grounded contempt, and againſt whoſe real immorality I have as juſt indignation.

Let us come therefore to the bar of reaſon and experience, where we ſhall find theſe paradoxes admitted as plain, and almoſt ſelf-evident propoſitions, and theſe reveries and vain ſpeculations as important truths, confirmed by experience in all ages and all countries.

Machiavel is an author who ſhould have great authority with the perſons likely to oppoſe me. He propoſes

propoſes to princes the amplification of their power, the extent of their dominion, and the ſubjection of their people, as the ſole objects of their policy. He deviſes and recommends all means that tend to theſe purpoſes, without the conſideration of any duty owing to God or man, or any regard to the morality or immorality of actions. Yet even he declares the affectation of virtue to be uſeful to princes: he is ſo far on my ſide in the preſent queſtion. The only difference between us is, I would have the virtue real: he requires no more than the appearance of it.

In the tenth chapter of the firſt book of Diſcourſes, he appears convinced, ſuch is the force of truth, but how conſiſtently with himſelf let others determine, that the ſupreme glory of a prince accrues to him who eſtabliſhes good government and a free conſtitution; and that a prince, ambitious of fame, muſt wiſh to come into poſſeſſion of a diſordered and corrupted ſtate, not to finiſh the wicked work that others have begun, and to compleat the ruin; but to ſtop the progreſs of the firſt, and to prevent the laſt. He thinks this not only the true way to fame, but to ſecurity and quiet; as the contrary leads, for here is no third way, and a prince muſt make his option between theſe two, not only to infamy, but to danger and to perpetual diſquietude. He repreſents thoſe who might eſtabliſh a commonwealth or a legal monarchy, and who chuſe to improve the opportunity of eſtabliſhing tyranny, that is, monarchy without any rule of law, as men who are deceived by falſe notions of good, and falſe appearances of glory, and who are in effect blind to their true intereſt in every reſpect:

Ne ſi auvegono per queſto partito quanta fama, quanta gloria, quanto honore, ſicurtà, quiete, con ſatisfatione d'animo e'fuggono, et in quanta infamia, vituperio, biaſſimo, periculo et inquietudine incorrono. He touches another advantage which patriot princes reap: and in that he contradicts flatly the main point, on which his half-taught ſcholars inſiſt. He denies, that ſuch princes diminiſh their power by circumſcribing it; and affirms, with truth on his ſide, that Timoleon, and others of the ſame character whom he had cited, poſſeſſed as great authority in their country, with every other advantage beſides, as Dionyſius or Phalaris had acquired, with the loſs of all thoſe advantages. Thus far Machiavel reaſons juſtly; but he takes in only a part of his ſubject, and confines himſelf to thoſe motives that ſhould determine a wiſe prince to maintain liberty, becauſe it is his intereſt to do ſo. He riſes no higher than the conſideration of mere intereſt, of fame, of ſecurity, of quiet, and of power, all perſonal to the prince: and by ſuch motives alone even his favourite Borgia might have been determined, to affect the virtues of a patriot prince; more than which this great doctor in political knowledge would not have required of him. But he is far from going up to that motive which ſhould above all determine a good prince to hold this conduct, becauſe it is his duty to do ſo; a duty that he owes to God by one law, and to his people by another. Now it is with this that I ſhall begin what I intend to offer concerning the ſyſtem of principles and conduct by which a patriot king will govern himſelf and his people. I ſhall not only begin higher, but deſcend into more detail, and keep ſtill

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in my eye the application of the whole to the conſtitution of Great Britain, even to the preſent ſtate of our nation, and temper of our people.

I think enough has been already ſaid, to eſtabliſh the firſt and true principles of monarchical, and indeed of every other kind of government: and I will ſay with confidence, that no principles but theſe, and ſuch as theſe, can be advanced, which deſerve to be treated ſeriouſly, though Mr. Locke condeſcended to examine thoſe of Filmer, more out of regard to the prejudices of the time, than to the importance of the work. Upon ſuch foundations we muſt conclude, that ſince men were directed by nature to form ſocieties, becauſe they cannot by their nature ſubſiſt without them, nor in a ſtate of individuality: and ſince they were directed in like manner to eſtabliſh governments, becauſe ſocieties cannot be maintained without them, nor ſubſiſt in a ſtate of anarchy; the ultimate end of all government is the good of the people, for whoſe ſake they were made, and without whoſe conſent they could not have been made. In forming ſocieties, and ſubmitting to government, men give up part of that liberty to which they are all born, and all alike. But why? is government incompatible with a full enjoyment of liberty? By no means. But becauſe popular liberty, without government, will degenerate into licence, as government, without ſufficient liberty, will degenerate into tyranny, they are mutually neceſſary to each other, good government to ſupport legal liberty, and legal liberty to preſerve good government.

I ſpeak not here of people, if any ſuch there are, who have been ſavage or ſtupid enough to ſubmit

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to tyranny by original contract; nor of those nations on whom tyranny has stolen as it were imperceptibly, or been imposed by violence, and settled by prescription. I shall exercise no political casuistry about the rights of such kings, and the obligations of such people. Men are to take their lots, perhaps, in governments as in climates, to fence against the inconveniencies of both, and to bear what they cannot alter. But I speak of people who have been wise and happy enough to establish, and to preserve free constitutions of government, as the people of this island have done. To these therefore I say, that their kings are under the most sacred obligations that human law can create, and divine law authorize, to defend and maintain in the first place, and preferably to every other consideration, the freedom of such constitutions.

The good of the people is the ultimate and true end of government. Governors are therefore appointed for this end, and the civil constitution which appoints them, and invests them with their power, is determined to do so by that law of nature and reason, which has determined the end of government, and which admits this form of government as the proper mean of arriving at it. Now the greatest good of a people is their liberty: and in the case here referred to, the people have judged it so, and provided for it accordingly. Liberty is to the collective body, what health is to every individual body. Without health no pleasure can be tasted by man: without liberty no happiness can be enjoyed by society. The obligation, therefore, to defend and maintain the freedom of such constitutions, will appear most sacred to a patriot king.

Kings

Kings who have weak underſtandings, bad hearts and ſtrong prejudices, and all theſe, as it often happens, inflamed by their paſſions, and rendered incurable by their ſelf-conceit and preſumption; ſuch kings are apt to imagine, and they conduct themſelves ſo as to make many of their ſubjects imagine, that the king and the people in free governments are rival powers, who ſtand in competition with one another, who have different intereſts and muſt of courſe have different views: that the rights and privileges of the people are ſo many ſpoils taken from the right and prerogative of the crown; and that the rules and laws made for the exerciſe and ſecurity of the former, are ſo many diminutions of their dignity, and reſtraints on their power.

A patriot King will ſee all this in a far different and much truer light. The conſtitution will be conſidered by him as one law, conſiſting of two tables, containing the rule of his government, and the meaſure of his ſubjects obedience; or as one ſyſtem compoſed of different parts and powers, but all duly proportioned to one another, and conſpiring by their harmony to the perfection of the whole. He will make one, and but one diſtinction between his rights and thoſe of his people: he will look on his to be a truſt, and theirs a property. He will diſcern, that he can have a right to no more than is truſted to him by the conſtitution: and that his people, who had an original right to the whole by the law of nature, can have the ſole indefeaſible right to any part; and really have ſuch a right to that part which they have reſerved to themſelves. In fine, the conſtitution will be reve-

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renced by him as the law of God and of man; the force of which binds the king as much as the meaneſt ſubject, and the reaſon of which binds him much more.

Thus he will think, and on theſe principles he will act, whether he come to the throne by immediate or remote election. I ſay remote; for in hereditary monarchies, where men are not elected, families are: and therefore ſome authors would have it believed, that when a family has been once admitted, and an hereditary right to the crown recogniſed in it, that right cannot be forfeited, nor that throne become vacant, as long as any heir of the family remains. How much more agreeably to truth and to common ſenſe would theſe authors have written, if they had maintained, that every prince who comes to a crown in the courſe of ſucceſſion, were he the laſt of five hundred, comes to it under the ſame conditions under which the firſt took it, whether expreſſed or implied; as well as under thoſe, if any ſuch there be, which have been ſince made by legal authority: and that royal blood can give no right, nor length of ſucceſſion any preſcription, againſt the conſtitution of a government? The firſt and the laſt hold by the ſame tenure.

I mention this the rather, becauſe I have an imperfect remembrance, that ſome ſcribler was employed, or emploved himſelf, to aſſert the hereditary right of the preſent royal family. A taſk ſo unneceſſary to any good purpoſe, that I believe a ſuſpicion aroſe of its having been deſigned for a bad one. A patriot king will never countenance ſuch impertinent fallacies, nor deign to lean on broken reeds. He knows that his right is founded on the laws of God

God and man, that none can ſhake it but himſelf, and that his own virtue is ſufficient to maintain it againſt all oppoſition.

I have dwelt the longer on the firſt and general principles of monarchical government, and have recurred the oftener to them; becauſe it ſeems to me that they are the ſeeds of patriotiſm, which muſt be ſowed as ſoon as poſſible in the mind of a prince, leſt their growth ſhould be checked by rank luxuriant weeds, which are apt to abound in ſuch ſoils, and under which no crop of kingly virtues can ever flouriſh. A prince, who does not know the true principles, cannot propoſe to himſelf the true ends of government: and he, who does not propoſe them, will never direct his conduct ſteadily to them. There is not a deeper, nor a finer obſervation, in all my Lord Bacon's works, than one which I ſhall apply and paraphraſe on this occaſion. The moſt compendious, the moſt noble, and the moſt effectual remedy which can be oppoſed to the uncertain and irregular motions of the human mind, agitated by various paſſions, allured by various temptations, inclining ſometimes towards a ſtate of moral perfection, and oftener even in the beſt towards a ſtate of moral depravation, is this. We muſt chuſe betimes ſuch virtuous objects as are proportioned to the means we have of purſuing them, and as belong particularly to the ſtations we are in, and to the duties of thoſe ſtations. We muſt determine and fix our minds in ſuch manner upon them, that the purſuit of them may become the buſineſs, and the attainment of them the end of our lives. Thus we ſhall imitate the great operations of nature, and not the feeble,

feeble, ſlow, and imperfect operations of art. We muſt not proceed, in forming the moral character, as a ſtatuary proceeds in forming a ſtatue, who works ſometimes on the face, ſometimes on one part, and ſometimes on another: but we muſt proceed, and it is in our power to proceed, as nature does in forming a flower, an animal, or any other of her productions; *rudimenta partium omnium ſimul parit et producit.* "She throws out altogether, "and at once, the whole ſyſtem of every being, "and the rudiments of all the parts." The vegetable or the animal grows in bulk and increaſes in ſtrength; but is the ſame from the firſt. Juſt ſo our patriot king muſt be a patriot from the firſt. He muſt be ſuch in reſolution, before he grows ſuch in practice. He muſt fix at once the general principles and ends of all his actions, and determine that his whole conduct ſhall be regulated by them, and directed to them. When he has done this, he will have turned, by one great effort, the bent of his mind ſo ſtrongly towards the perfection of a kingly character, that he will exerciſe with eaſe and as it were by a natural determination, all the virtues of it; which will be ſuggeſted to him on every occaſion by the principles wherewith his mind is imbued and by thoſe ends that are the conſtant objects of his attention.

Let us then ſee in what manner, and with what effect he will do this, upon the greateſt occaſion he can have of exerciſing theſe virtues, the maintainance of liberty, and the re-eſtabliſhment of a free conſtitution.

The freedom of a conſtitution reſts on two points. The orders of it are one: ſo Machiavel calls them,

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and I know not how to call them more ſignificantly. He means not only the forms and cuſtoms, but the different claſſes and aſſemblies of men, with different powers and privileges attributed to them, which are eſtabliſhed in the ſtate. The ſpirit and character of the people are the other. On the mutual conformity and harmony of theſe the preſervation of liberty depends. To take away, or eſſentially to alter the former, cannot be brought to paſs, whilſt the latter remains in original purity and vigour; nor can liberty be deſtroyed by this method, unleſs the attempt be made with a military force ſufficient to conquer the nation, which would not ſubmit in this caſe till it was conquered, nor with much ſecurity to the conqueror even then. But theſe orders of the ſtate may be eſſentially altered, and ſerve more effectually to the deſtruction of liberty, than the taking them away would ſerve, if the ſpirit and character of the people are loſt.

Now this method of deſtroying liberty is the moſt dangerous on many accounts, particularly on this; that even the reign of the weakeſt prince, and the policy of the weakeſt miniſtry, may effect the deſtruction, when circumſtances are favourable to this method. If a people is growing corrupt, there is no need of capacity to contrive, nor of inſinuation to gain, nor of plauſibility to ſeduce, nor of eloquence to perſuade, nor of authority to impoſe, nor of courage to attempt. The moſt implacable, aukward, ungracious, ſhocking, profligate and timorous wretches, inveſted with power, and maſters of the purſe, will be ſufficient for the work, when the people are complices in it. Luxury is rapacious; let them feed it: the more it is fed, the more pro-

fuſe it will grow. Want is the conſequence of profuſion, venality of want, and dependence of venality. By this progreſſion, the firſt men of a nation will become the penſioners of the leaſt; and he who has talents, the moſt implicit tool to him who has none. The diſtemper will ſoon deſcend not indeed to make a depoſite below, and to remain there, but to pervade the whole body.

It may ſeem a ſingular, but it is perhaps a true, propoſition, that ſuch a king, and ſuch a miniſtry, are more likely to begin and to purſue with ſucceſs, this method of deſtroying a free conſtitution of government, than a king and a miniſtry that were held in great eſteem would be. This very eſteem might put many on their guard againſt the latter; but the former may draw from contempt the advantage of not being feared; and an advantage this is in the beginning of corruption. Men are willing to excuſe, not only to others, but to themſelves, the firſt ſteps they take in vice, and eſpecially in vice that affects the public, and whereof the public has a right to complain. Thoſe therefore who might withſtand corruption in one caſe, from a perſuaſion that the conſequence was too certain to leave them any excuſe, may yield to it when they can flatter themſelves, and endeavour to flatter others, that liberty cannot be deſtroyed, nor the conſtitution be demoliſhed by ſuch hands as hold the ſcepter, and guide the reins of the adminiſtration: But alas! the flattery is groſs, and the excuſe without colour. Theſe men may ruin their country, but they cannot impoſe on any, unleſs it be on themſelves. Nor will even this impoſition on themſelves be long neceſſary. Their conſciences will be

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ſoon ſeared by habit and by example: and they who wanted an excuſe to begin, will want none to continue, and to complete the tragedy of their country. Old men will outlive the ſhame of loſing liberty, and young men will ariſe who know not that it ever exiſted. A ſpirit of ſlavery will oppoſe and oppreſs the ſpirit of liberty, and ſeem at leaſt to be the genius of the nation. Such too it will become in time, when corruption has once grown to this height, unleſs the progreſs of it can be interrupted.

How ineſtimable a bleſſing, therefore, muſt the ſucceſſion of a patriot king be eſteemed in ſuch circumſtances as theſe, which would be a bleſſing, and a great one two, in any other? He, and he alone, can ſave a country whoſe ruin is ſo far advanced. The utmoſt that private men can do, who remain untainted by the general contagion, is to keep the ſpirit of liberty alive in a few breaſts; to proteſt againſt what they cannot hinder, and to claim on every occaſion what they cannot by their own ſtrength recover.

Machiavel has treated in the diſcourſes before cited, this queſtion: "Whether when the people "are grown corrupt, a free government can be "maintained, if they enjoy it; or eſtabliſhed, if "they enjoy it not?" And upon the whole matter he concludes for the difficulty, or rather the impoſſibility, of ſucceeding in either caſe. It will be worth while to obſerve his way of reaſoning. He aſſerts very truly, and proves by the example of the Roman commonwealth, that thoſe orders which are proper to maintain liberty, whilſt a people remain uncorrupt, become improper and hurtful to

liberty when a people is grown corrupt. To remedy this abuſe, new laws alone will not be ſufficient. Theſe orders therefore muſt be changed, according to him, and the conſtitution muſt be adapted to the depraved manners of the people. He ſhews, that ſuch a change in the orders, and conſtituent parts of the government, is impracticable, whether the attempt be made by gentle and ſlow, or by violent and precipitate meaſures: and from thence he concludes that a free commonwealth can neither be maintained by a corrupt people, nor be eſtabliſhed among them. But he adds, that "if this can "poſſibly be done, it muſt be done by drawing "the conſtitution to the monarchical form of go-"vernment;" *acchioche quelli huomini i quali dalle leggi non poſſono eſſere corretti, fuſſero da una podeſta, in qualche modo, frenati.* "That a corrupt people, "whom law cannot correct, may be reſtrained and "corrected by a kingly power." Here is the hinge on which the whole turns.

Another advantage that a free monarchy has over all other forms of free government, beſides the advantage of being more eaſily and more uſefully tempered with ariſtocratical and democratical powers, which is mentioned above, is this: Thoſe governments are made up of different parts, and are apt to be disjointed by the ſhocks to which they are expoſed: but a free monarchical government is more compact, becauſe there is a part the more, that keeps like the key-ſtone of a vault the whole building together. They cannot be mended in a ſtate of corruption, they muſt be in effect conſtituted anew, and in that attempt they may be diſſolved for ever: but this is not the caſe of a free monarchy. To preſerve

liberty

liberty by new laws, and new ſchemes of government, whilſt the corruption of a people continues and grows, is abſolutely impoſſible every where: but to reſtore and preſerve it under old laws, and an old conſtitution, by reinfuſing into the minds of men the ſpirit of this conſtitution, is not only poſſible, but is in a particular manner, eaſy to a king. A corrupt commonwealth remains without remedy, though all the orders and forms of it ſubſiſt: a free monarchical government cannot remain abſolutely ſo as long as the orders and forms of the conſtitution ſubſiſt. Theſe alone are indeed nothing more than the dead letter of freedom, or maſks of liberty. In the firſt character they ſerve to no good purpoſe whatſoever: in the ſecond, they ſerve to a bad one, becauſe tyranny, or government by will, becomes more ſevere, and more ſecure under their diſguiſe, than it would if it was barefaced and avowed. But a king can, eaſily to himſelf, and without violence to his people, renew the ſpirit of liberty in their minds, quicken this dead letter, and pull off this maſk.

As ſoon as corruption ceaſes to be an expedient of government, and it will ceaſe to be ſuch, as ſoon as a patriot king is raiſed to the throne, the panacea is applied; the ſpirit of the conſtitution revives of courſe; and, as faſt as it revives, the orders and forms of the conſtitution are reſtored to their primitive integrity, and become what they were intended to be; real barriers againſt arbitrary power, not blinds nor maſks under which tyranny may lie concealed. Depravation of manners expoſed the conſtitution to ruin; reformation will ſecure it. Men decline eaſily from virtue; for there is a devil too in the political ſyſtem, a conſtant tempter at hand:

a patriot king will want neither power nor inclination to caſt out this devil, to make the temptation ceaſe, and to deliver his ſubjects if not from the guilt, yet from the conſequence of their fall. Under him, they will not only ceaſe to do evil, but learn to do well; for by rendering public virtue and real capacity the ſole means of acquiring any degree of power or profit in the ſtate, he will ſet the paſſions of their hearts on the ſide of liberty and good government. A patriot king is the moſt powerful of all reformers; for he is himſelf a ſort of ſtanding miracle, ſo rarely ſeen and ſo little underſtood, that the ſure effects of his appearance will be admiration and love in every honeſt breaſt, confuſion and terror to every guilty conſcience, but ſubmiſſion and reſignation in all. A new people will ſeem to ariſe with a new king. Innumerable metamorphoſes, like thoſe which poets feign will happen in every deed; and while men are conſcious that they are the ſame individuals, the difference of their ſentiments will almoſt perſuade them that they are changed into different beings.

But that we may not expect more from ſuch a king than even he can perform, it is neceſſary to premiſe another general obſervation, after which I ſhall deſcend into ſome that will be more particular.

Abſolute ſtability is not to be expected in any thing human; for that which exiſts immutably exiſts alone neceſſarily, and this attribute of the ſupreme Being can neither belong to man, nor to the works of man. The beſt inſtituted governments, like the beſt inſtituted animal bodies, carry in them the ſeeds of their deſtruction: and though they grow and improve for a time, they will ſoon tend viſibly

viſibly to their diſſolution. Every hour they live is an hour the leſs that they have to live. All that can be done therefore to prolong the duration of a good government, is to draw it back on every favourable occaſion, to the firſt good principles on which it was founded. When theſe occaſions happens often, and are well improved, ſuch governments are proſperous and durable. When they happen ſeldom, or are ill improved, theſe political bodies live in pain or in languor, and die ſoon.

A patriot king affords one of the occaſions I mention in a free monarchical ſtate, and the very beſt that can happen. It ſhould be improved like ſnatches of fair weather at ſea, to repair the damages ſuſtained in the laſt ſtorm, and to prepare to reſiſt the next. For ſuch a king cannot ſecure to his people a ſucceſſion of princes like himſelf. He will do all he can towards it, by his example and by his inſtruction. But after all, the royal mantle will not convey the ſpirit of patriotiſm into another king, as the mantle of Elijah did the gift of prophecy into another prophet. The utmoſt he can do, and that which deſerves the utmoſt gratitude from his ſubjects is to reſtore good government, to revive the ſpirit of it, and to maintain and confirm both during the whole courſe of his reign. The reſt his people muſt do for themſelves. If they do not, they will have none but themſelves to blame: if they do, they will have the principal obligation to him. In all events, they will have been free men one reign the longer by his means and perhaps more; ſince he will leave them much better prepared and diſpoſed to defend their liberties than he found them.

This general obſervation being made, let us now deſcend, in ſome detail, to the particular ſteps and meaſures

meaſures that ſuch a king muſt purſue, to merit a much nobler title than all thoſe which many princes of the weſt, as well as the eaſt are ſo proud to accumulate.

Firſt then, he muſt begin to govern as ſoon as he begins to reign. For the very firſt ſtep he makes in government will give the firſt impreſſion, and as it were the preſage of his reign; and may be of great importance in many other reſpects beſides that of opinion and reputation. His firſt care will be, no doubt, to purge his court, and to call into the adminiſtration ſuch men, as he can aſſure himſelf will ſerve on the ſame principles on which he intends to govern.

As to the firſt point; if the precedent reign has been bad, we know how he will find the court compoſed. The men in power will be ſome of thoſe adventurers, buſy and bold, who thruſt and crowd themſelves early into the intrigue of party and the management of affairs of ſtate, often without true ability, always without true ambition, or even the appearances of virtue: who mean nothing more than what is called making a fortune, the acquiſition of wealth to ſatisfy avarice, and of titles and ribbands to ſatisfy vanity. Such as theſe are to be employed by a weak or a wicked king: they impoſe on the firſt, and are choſen by the laſt. Nor is it marvellous that they are ſo, ſince every other want is ſupplied in them by the want of good principles and a good conſcience; and ſince theſe defects become miniſterial perfections, in a reign when meaſures are purſued and deſigns carried on that every honeſt man will diſapprove. All the proſtitutes who ſet themſelves to ſale, all the locuſts who devour

vour the land, with crowds of ſpies, paraſites and ſycophants, will ſurround the throne under the patronage of ſuch miniſters; and whole ſwarms of little noiſome nameleſs inſects will hum and buz in every corner of the court. Such miniſters will be caſt off, and ſuch abettors of a miniſtry will be chaſed away together, and at once, by a patriot king.

Some of them perhaps will be abandoned by him; not to party-fury, but to national juſtice; not to ſate private reſentments, and to ſerve particular intereſts, but to make ſatisfaction for wrongs done to their country, and to ſtand as examples of terror to future adminiſtrations. Clemency makes, no doubt, an amiable part of the character I attempt to draw; but clemency to be a virtue, muſt have its bounds like other virtues, and ſurely theſe bounds are extended enough by a maxim I have read ſomewhere, that frailties and even vices may be paſſed over, but not enormous crimes: *multa donanda ingeniis puto: ſed donanda vitia, non portenta.*

Among the bad company with which ſuch a court will abound, may be reckoned a ſort of men too low to be much regarded, and too high to be quite neglected; the lumber of every adminiſtration, the furniture of every court. Theſe gilt carved things are ſeldom anſwerable for more than the men on a cheſs board, who are moved about at will, and on whom the conduct of the game is not to be charged. Some of theſe every prince muſt have about him.

The pageantry of a court requires that he ſhould, and this pageantry, like many other deſpicable things, ought not to be laid aſide. But as much fameneſs as there may appear in the characters of this ſort of men,

men, there is one distinction that will be made, whenever a good prince succeeds to the throne after an iniquitous administration: the distinction I mean is, between those who have affected to dip themselves deeply in precedent iniquities, and those who have had the virtue to keep aloof from them, or the good luck not to be called to any share in them. And thus much for the first point, that of purging his court.

As to the second, that of calling to his administration such men as he can assure himself will serve on the same principles on which he intends to govern, there is no need to enlarge much upon it. A good prince will no more chuse ill men than a wise prince will chuse fools. Deception in one case is indeed more easy than in the other; because a knave may be an artful hypocrite, whereas a silly fellow can never impose himself for a man of sense. And least of all, in a country like ours, can either of these deceptions happen, if any degree of the discernment of spirits be employed to chuse. The reason is, because every man here, who stands forward enough in rank and reputation to be called to the councils of his king, must have given proofs before-hand of his patriotism as well as of his capacity, if he has either sufficient to determine his general character.

There is, however, one distinction to be made as to the capacity of ministers, on which I will insist a little: because I think it very important at all times, particularly so at this time; and because it escapes observation most commonly. The distinction I mean is that between a cunning man and wise man: and this distinction is built on a manifest difference

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nature, how imperceptible ſoever it may become to weak eyes, or to eyes that look at their object through the falſe medium of cuſtom and habit. My Lord Bacon ſays, that cunning is left handed or crooked wiſdom. I would rather ſay that it is a part, but the loweſt part of wiſdom; employed alone by ſome, becauſe they have not the other parts to employ: and by ſome, becauſe it is as much as they want, within thoſe bounds of action which they preſcribe to themſelves, and ſufficient to the ends that they propoſe. The difference ſeems to conſiſt in degree and application, rather than in kind. Wiſdom is neither left-handed nor crooked: but the heads of ſome men contain little, and the hearts of others employ it wrong. To uſe my Lord Bacon's own compariſon, the cunning man knows how to pack the cards, the wiſe man how to play the game better: but it would be of no uſe to the firſt to pack the cards, if his knowledge ſtopped here, and he had no ſkill in the game; nor to the ſecond, to play the game better if he did not know how to pack the cards, that he might unpack them by new ſhuffling. Inferior wiſdom or cunning may get the better of folly; but ſuperior wiſdom will get the better of cunning. Wiſdom and cunning have often the ſame objects; but a wiſe man will have more and greater in his view The leaſt will not fill his ſoul, nor ever become the principal there: but will be purſued in ſubſerviency, in ſubordination at leaſt to the other. Wiſdom and cunning may employ ſometimes the ſame means too: but the wiſe man ſtoops to theſe means, and the other cannot riſe above them. Simulation and diſſimulation for inſtance are the chief arts of cunning: the firſt will

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be eſteemed always by a wiſe man unworthy of him, and will be therefore avoided by him in every poſſible caſe; for, to reſume my Lord Bacon's compariſon, ſimulation is put on that we may look into the cards of another, whereas diſſimulation intends nothing more than to hide our own. Simulation is a ſtiletto, not only an offenſive, but an unlawful weapon; and the uſe of it may be rarely, very rarely excuſed, but never juſtified. Diſſimulation is a ſhield, as ſecrecy is armour: and it is no more poſſible to preſerve ſecrecy in the adminiſtration of public affairs without ſome degree of diſſimulation, than it is to ſucceed in it without ſecrecy. Thoſe two arts of cunning are like the alloy mingled with pure ore. A little is neceſſary and will not debaſe the coin below its proper ſtandard; but if more than that little be employed, the coin loſes its currency, and the coiner his credit.

We may obſerve much the ſame difference between wiſdom and cunning, both as to the objects they propoſe, and to the means they employ, as we obſerve between the viſual powers of different men. One ſees diſtinctly the objects that are near to him, their immediate relations, and their direct tendencies; and a ſight like this ſerves well enough the purpoſe of thoſe who concern themſelves no further. The cunning miniſter is one of thoſe: he neither ſees nor is concerned to ſee any further than his perſonal intereſts and the ſupport of his adminiſtration require. If ſuch a man overcomes any actual difficulty, avoids any immediate diſtreſs, or, without doing either of theſe effectually, gains a little time, by all the low artifice which cunning is ready to ſuggeſt and baſeneſs of mind to employ;

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he triumphs, and is flattered by his mercenary train on the great event, which amounts often to no more than this, that he got into diſtreſs by one ſeries of faults, and out of it by another. The wiſe miniſter ſees, and is concerned to ſee further, becauſe government has a farther concern: he ſees the objects that are diſtant as well as thoſe that are near, and all their remote relations, and even their indirect tendencies. He thinks of fame as well as of applauſe, and prefers that, which to be enjoyed muſt be given, to that which may be bought. He conſiders his adminiſtration as a ſingle day in the great year of government; but as a day that is affected by thoſe which went before, and that muſt affect thoſe which are to follow. He combines therefore and compares all theſe objects, relations, and tendencies, and the judgment he makes on an entire, not a partial ſurvey of them, is the rule of his conduct. That ſcheme of the reaſon of ſtate which lies open before a wiſe miniſter contains all the great principles of government, and all the great intereſt of his country: ſo that as he prepares ſome events, he prepares againſt others, whether they be likely to happen during his adminiſtration, or in ſome future time.

Many reflections might be added to theſe, and many examples be brought to illuſtrate them. Some I could draw from the men I have ſeen at the head of buſineſs, and make very ſtrong contraſts of men of great wiſdom with thoſe of meer cunning. But I conclude this head, that I may proceed to another of no leſs importance.

To eſpouſe no party, but to govern like the common father of his people, is ſo eſſential to the character of a patriot king, that he who does other-

wife, forfeits the title. It is the peculiar privilege and glory of this character, that princes who maintain it, and they alone, are ſo far from the neceſſity, that they are not expoſed to the temptation, of governing by a party: which muſt always end in the government of a faction; the faction of the prince if he has ability, the faction of his miniſters if he has not, and either one way or other in the oppreſſion of the people. For faction is to party what the ſuperlative is to the poſitive: party is a political evil, and faction is the worſt of all parties. The true image of a free people, governed by a patriot king, is that of a patriarchal family, where the head and all the members are united by one common intereſt, and animated by one common ſpirit; and where, if any are perverſe enough to have another, they will be ſoon borne down by the ſuperiority of thoſe who have the ſame; and far from making a diviſion, they will but confirm the union of the little ſtate. That to approach as near as poſſible to theſe ideas of perfect government, and ſocial happineſs under it, is deſirable in every ſtate, no man will be abſurd enough to deny. The ſole queſtion is therefore, how near to them it is poſſible to attain? For, if this attempt be not abſolutely impracticable, all the views of a patriot king will be directed to make it ſucceed. Inſtead of abetting the diviſions of his people, he will endeavour to unite them, and to be himſelf the centre of their union: inſtead of putting himſelf at the head of one party in order to govern his people, he will put himſelf at the head of his people in order to govern, or more properly to ſubdue all parties. Now, to arrive at this deſirable union, and to maintain it,

will

will be found more difficult in ſome caſes than in others, but abſolutely impoſſible in none, to a wiſe and good prince.

If his people are united in their ſubmiſſion to him, and in their attachment to the eſtabliſhed government, he muſt not only eſpouſe but create a party, in order to govern by one: and what ſhould tempt him to purſue ſo wild a meaſure? A prince who aims at more power than the conſtitution gives him, may be ſo tempted; becauſe he may hope to obtain in the diſorders of the ſtate what cannot be obtained in quiet times; and becauſe contending parties will give what a nation will not. Parties, even before they degenerate into abſolute factions, are ſtill numbers of men aſſociated together for certain purpoſes, and certain intereſts, which are not, or which are not allowed to be thoſe of the community by others. A more private or perſonal intereſt comes but too ſoon, and too often, to be ſuperadded, and to grow predominant in them: and when it does ſo, whatever occaſions or principles began to form them, the ſame logic prevails in them that prevails in every church. The intereſt of the ſtate is ſuppoſed to be that of the party, as the intereſt of religion is ſuppoſed to be that of the church: and, with this pretence or prepoſſeſſion, the intereſt of the ſtate becomes, like that of religion, a remote conſideration, is never purſued for its own ſake, and is often ſacrificed to the other. A king, therefore, who has ill deſigns to carry on, muſt endeavour to divide an united people; and, by blending or ſeeming to blend his intereſts with that of a party, he may ſucceed perhaps; and his party and he may ſhare the ſpoils of a ruined nation: but ſuch a

party is then become a faction, such a king is a tyrant, and such a government is a conspiracy. A patriot king must renounce his character to have such designs, or act against his own designs to pursue such methods. Both are too absurd to be supposed. It remains therefore, that all the good ends of government are most attainable in an united state, and as the divisions of a people can serve to bad purposes alone, the king we suppose here will deem the union of his subjects his greatest advantage, and will think himself happy to find that established, which he would have employed the whole labour of his life to bring about. This seems so plain, that I am ready to make excuses for having insisted at all upon it.

Let us turn ourselves to another supposition, to that of a *divided state*. This will fall in oftener with the ordinary course of things in free governments, and especially after iniquitous and weak administrations. Such a state may be better or worse, and the great and good purposes of a patriot king more or less attainable in it, according to the different nature of those divisions, and therefore we will consider this state in different lights.

A people may be united in submission to the prince, and to the establishment, and yet be divided about general principles, or particular measures of government. In the first case, they will do by their constitution what has been frequently done by the Scripture, strain it to their own notions and prejudices; and if they cannot strain it, alter it as much as is necessary to render it conformable to them. In the second, they will support or oppose particular acts of administrations, and defend, or attack

attack the perſons employed in them: and both theſe ways a conflict of parties may ariſe, but no great difficulty to a prince who determines to purſue the union of his ſubjects, and the proſperity of his kingdoms, independently of all parties.

When parties are divided by different notions and principles concerning ſome particular eccleſiaſtical or civil inſtitutions, the conſtitution, which ſhould be their rule, muſt be that of the prince. He may and he ought to ſhew his diſlike or his favour, as he judges the conſtitution may be hurt or improved, by one ſide or the other. The hurt he is never to ſuffer, not for his own ſake; and therefore ſurely not for the ſake of any whimſical, factious, or ambitious ſet of men. The improvement he muſt always deſire, but as every new modification, in a ſcheme of government and of national policy, is of great importance, and requires more and deeper conſideration than the warmth and hurry and raſhneſs of party-conduct admit; the duty of a prince ſeems to require, that he ſhould render by his influence the proceedings more orderly and more deliberate, even when he approves the end to which they are directed. All this may be done by him without fomenting diviſion; and far from forming, or eſpouſing a party, he will defeat party in defence of the conſtitution, on ſome occaſions; and lead men from acting with a party-ſpirit, to act with a national ſpirit on others.

When the diviſion is about particular meaſures of government, and the conduct of the adminiſtration is alone concerned, a patriot king will ſtand in want of party as little as in any other caſe. Under his reign, the opportunities of forming an oppoſi-

tion of this ſort will be rare, and the pretences generally weak. Nay the motives to it will loſe much of their force, when a government is ſtrong in reputation, and men are kept in good humour by feeling the rod of a party on no occaſion, though they feel the weight of the ſceptre on ſome. Such opportunities however may happen, and there may be reaſon as well as pretences ſometimes for oppoſition even in ſuch a reign: at leaſt we will ſuppoſe ſo, that we may include in this argument every contingent caſe. Grievances then are complained of, miſtakes and abuſes in government are pointed out, and miniſters are proſecuted by their enemies. Shall the prince on the throne form a party by intrigue, and by ſecret and corrupt influence, to oppoſe the proſecution? When the prince and the miniſters are *participes criminis*, when every thing is to be defended, leſt ſomething ſhould come out, that may unravel the ſilly wicked ſcheme, and diſcloſe to public ſight the whole turpitude of the adminiſtration; there is no help, this muſt be done, and ſuch a party muſt be formed, becauſe ſuch a party alone will ſubmit to a drudgery of this kind. But a prince, who is not in theſe circumſtances, will not have recourſe to theſe means. He has others more open, more noble, and more effectual in his power: he knows that the views of his government are right, and that the tenor of his adminiſtration is good; but he knows that neither he nor his miniſters are infallible, nor impeccable. There may be abuſes in his government, miſtakes in his adminiſtration, and guilt in his miniſters, which he has not obſerved: and he will be far from imputing the complaints, that give him occaſion

caſion to obſerve them, to a ſpirit of party; much leſs will he treat thoſe who carry on ſuch proſecutions in a legal manner as incendiaries, and as enemies to his government. On the contrary, he will diſtinguiſh the voice of his people from the clamour of a faction, and will hearken to it. He will redreſs grievances, correct errors, and reform or puniſh miniſters. This he will do as a good prince: and as a wiſe one, he will do it in ſuch a manner that his dignity ſhall be maintained, and that his authority ſhall encreaſe with his reputation by it.

Should the efforts of a mere faction be bent to calumniate his government, and to diſtreſs the adminiſtration on groundleſs pretences, and for inſufficient reaſons; he will not neglect, but he will not apprehend neither, the ſhort-lived and contemptible ſcheme. He will indeed have no reaſon to do ſo; for let the fautors of male-adminiſtration, whenever an oppoſition is made to it, affect to inſinuate as much as they pleaſe, that their maſters are in no other circumſtances than thoſe to which the very beſt miniſters ſtand expoſed, objects of general envy and of particular malice, it will remain eternally true, that groundleſs oppoſition, in a well-regulated monarchy, can never be ſtrong and durable. To be convinced of the truth of this propoſition, one needs only to reflect how many well-grounded attacks have been defeated, and how few have ſucceeded, againſt the moſt wicked and the weakeſt adminiſtrations. Every king of Britain has means enough in his power to defeat and to calm oppoſition. But a patriot king above all others, may ſafely reſt his cauſe on the innocency of his

his adminiſtration, on the conſtitutional ſtrength of the crown, and on the concurrence of his people, to whom he dares appeal, and by whom he will be ſupported.

To conclude all I will ſay on the diviſions of this kind, let me add, that the caſe of a groundleſs oppoſition can hardly happen in a bad reign, becauſe in ſuch a reign juſt occaſions of oppoſition muſt of courſe be frequently given (as we have allowed that they may be given ſometimes, though very rarely, in a good reign) but that whether it be well or ill grounded, whether it be that of the nation or that of a faction, the conduct of the prince with reſpect to it will be the ſame; and one way or other this conduct muſt have a very fatal event. Such a prince will not mend the adminiſtration, as long as he can reſiſt the juſteſt and moſt popular oppoſition: and therefore this oppoſition will laſt and grow as long as a free conſtitution is in force, and the ſpirit of liberty is preſerved; for ſo long even a change of his miniſters, without a change of his meaſures, will not be ſufficient. The former without the latter is a mere banter, and would be deemed and taken for ſuch by every man who did not oppoſe on a factious principle; that I mean of getting into power at any rate, and uſing it as ill, perhaps worſe than the men he helped to turn out of it. Now if ſuch men as theſe abound, and they will abound in the decline of a free government, a bad prince, whether he changes, or does not change his miniſters, may hope to govern by the ſpirit and art of a faction, againſt the ſpirit and ſtrength of the nation. His character may be too low, and that of his miniſters too odious, to form originally

originally even a faction that ſhall be able to defend them. But they may apply to their purpoſes a party that was formed on far different occaſions, and bring numbers to fight for a cauſe in which many of them would not have liſted. The names, and with the names the animoſity of parties, may be kept up, when the cauſes that formed them ſubſiſt no longer.

When a party is thus revived or continued in the ſpirit of a faction, the corrupt and the infatuated members of it will act without any regard to right or wrong: and they who have aſſerted liberty in one reign, or oppoſed invaſions of one kind, will give it up in another reign, and abet invaſions of another kind; though they ſtill diſtinguiſh themſelves by the ſame appellation, ſtill ſpread the ſame banner, and ſtill deafen their adverſaries and one another with the ſame cry. If the national cauſe prevails againſt all the wicked arts of corruption and diviſion, that an obſtinate prince and flagitious miniſtry can employ; yet will the ſtruggle be long, and the difficulties, the diſtreſſes, and the danger great, both to the king and to the people. The beſt he can hope for, in ſuch a caſe, will be to eſcape with a diminution of his reputation, authority, and power. He may be expoſed to ſomething worſe; and his obſtinacy may force things to ſuch extremities, as they who oppoſe him will lament, and as the preſervation of liberty and good government can alone juſtify. If the wicked arts I ſpeak of prevail, faction will be propagated through the whole nation, an ill or well grounded oppoſition will be the queſtion no longer, and the conteſt among parties will be who ſhall govern, not how they

they ſhall be governed. In ſhort, univerſal confuſion will follow, and a complete victory on any ſide will enſlave all ſides.

I have not overchaged the draught. Such conſequences muſt follow ſuch a conduct; and therefore let me aſk how much more ſafe, more eaſy, more pleaſant, more honourable is it, for a prince to correct, if he has not prevented male-adminiſtration? that he may be able to reſt his cauſe, as I ſaid before, on the ſtrength of the crown, and the concurrence of his people, whenever any faction preſumes to riſe in oppoſition to him.

This a patriot king will do. He may favour one party and diſcourage another, upon occaſions wherein the ſtate of his kingdom makes ſuch a temporary meaſure neceſſary. But he will eſpouſe none, much leſs will he proſcribe any. He will liſt no party, much leſs will he do the meaneſt and moſt imprudent thing a king can do, liſt himſelf in any. It will be his aim to purſue true principles of government independently of all: and by a ſteady adherence to this meaſure, his reign will become an undeniable and glorious proof, that a wiſe and good prince may unite his ſubjects, and be himſelf the centre of their union, notwithſtanding any of theſe diviſions that have been hitherto mentioned

Let us now view the divided ſtate of a nation in another light. In this, the diviſions will appear more odious, more dangerous; leſs dependent on the influence, and leſs ſubject to the authority of the crown. Such will be the ſtate, whenever a people is divided about ſubmiſſion to their prince, and a party is formed of ſpirit and ſtrength ſufficient to oppoſe, even in arms, the eſtabliſhed government.

ment. But in this caſe, deſperate as it may ſeem, a patriot king will not deſpair of reconciling, and re-uniting his ſubjects to himſelf, and to one another. He may be obliged perhaps, as Henry the fourth of France was, to conquer his own; but then like that great prince, if he is the conqueror, he will be the father too of his people. He muſt purſue in arms thoſe who preſume to take arms againſt him; but he will purſue them like rebellious children whom he ſeeks to reclaim, and not like irreconcileable enemies whom he endeavours to exterminate. Another prince may blow up the flame of civil war by unprovoked ſeverity, render thoſe zealous againſt him who were at worſt indifferent, and determine the diſaffection of others to open rebellion. When he has prevailed againſt the faction he helped to form, as he could not have prevailed if the bent of the nation had been againſt him, he may be willing to aſcribe his ſucceſs to a party, that he may have that pretence to govern by a party: and, far from reconciling the minds that have been alienated from him, and re-uniting his ſubjects in a willing unforced ſubmiſſion to him, he may be content to maintain himſelf on that throne, where the laws of God and man have placed him, by the melancholy expedient that uſurpers and tyrants, who have no other in their power, employ, the expedient of force. But a patriot king will act with another ſpirit, and entertain nobler and wiſer views from firſt to laſt, and through the whole courſe of ſuch a conjuncture. Nothing leſs than the hearts of his people will content ſuch a prince, nor will he think his throne eſtabliſhed till it is eſtabliſhed there. That he may

have

have time and opportunity to gain them, therefore, he will prevent the flame from breaking out, if by art and management he can do it. If he cannot, he will endeavour to keep it from ſpreading: and if the frenzy of rebellion diſappoints him in both theſe attempts, he will remember peace, like the heroic king I juſt now quoted, in the midſt of war. Like him he will forego advantages of puſhing the latter, rather than loſe an opportunity of promoting the former: like him, in the heat of battle he will ſpare, and in the triumph of victory he will condeſcend: like him, he will beat down the violence of this flame by his valour, and extinguiſh even the embers of it by his lenity.

It may happen, that a prince, capable of holding ſuch a conduct as this, may not have the opportunity. He may ſucceed to the throne after a contrary conduct has been held; and when among other diviſions which male-adminiſtration and the tyranny of faction have increaſed and confirmed, there is one againſt the eſtabliſhed government ſtill in being, though not ſtill in arms. The uſe is obvious, which a faction in power might make of ſuch a circumſtance under a weak prince, by ranking in that diviſion all thoſe who oppoſed the adminiſtration, or at leaſt by holding out equal danger to him from two quarters, from their enemies who meant him no harm, and from his enemies who could do him none. But ſo groſs an artifice will not impoſe on a prince of another character; he will ſoon diſcern the diſtinctions it becomes him to make. He will ſee in this inſtance how faction breeds, nouriſhes, and perpetuates faction: he will obſerve how far that of the court contributed to

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form the other, and contributes ſtill to keep it in countenance and credit, among thoſe who conſider more what ſuch men are againſt, than what they are for. He will obſerve, how much that of the diſaffected gives pretence to the other who keeps a monopoly of power and wealth, one of which oppreſſes, and the other beggars, the reſt of the nation: his penetration will ſoon diſcover, that theſe factions break in but little on the body of his people, and that it depends on him alone to take from them even the ſtrength they have; becauſe that of the former is acquired entirely by his authority and purſe and that of the latter principally by the abuſe which the former makes of both. Upon the whole, the meaſures he has to purſue towards the great object of a patriot king, the union of his people will appear to him extremely eaſy. How ſhould they be otherwiſe? One of the factions muſt be diſſolved the moment that the favour of the prince is withdrawn, and the other is diſarmed as ſoon as it is marked out. It will have no ſhelter, and it muſt therefore be ſo marked out, under a good and wiſe adminiſtration; for whether the members of it avow their principles by refuſing thoſe teſts of fidelity which the law requires, or perjure themſelves by taking them, they will be known alike. One difference, and but one will be made between them in the general ſenſe of mankind, a difference ariſing from the greater degree of infamy that will belong juſtly to the latter. The firſt may paſs for fools; the latter muſt paſs without excuſe for knaves.

The terms I uſe ſound harſhly, but the cenſure is juſt, and it will appear to be ſo in the higheſt de-

gree, and upon the higheſt reaſon, if we ſtop to make a reflection or two that deſerve very well to be made, on the conduct of our Jacobites; for I deſire no ſtronger inſtance on which to eſtabliſh the cenſure, and to juſtify the terms I have uſed. Now all theſe, whether they ſwear, or whether they do not, are liable to one particular objection, that did not lie againſt thoſe who were in former days enemies to the king on the throne. In the days of York and Lancaſter, for inſtance, a man might be againſt the prince on the throne without being againſt the conſtitution of his country. The conſtitution conveyed the crown by hereditary right in the ſame family: and he who was a Yorkiſt, and he who was a Lancaſtrian, might, and I doubt not did, pretend in every conteſt to have this right on his ſide. The ſame conſtitution was acknowledged by both, and therefore ſo much indulgence was ſhewn by law to both, at leaſt in the time of Henry the ſeventh, that ſubmiſſion to a king *de facto* could not be imputed as a crime to either. Thus again, to deſcend lower in hiſtory; when the excluſion of the Duke of York was preſſed in the reign of Charles the ſecond, the right of that prince to the crown was not diſputed. His divine right indeed, ſuch a divine right as his grandfather and father had aſſerted before him, was not much regarded; but his right by the conſtitution, his legal right, was ſufficiently owned by thoſe who inſiſted on a law as neceſſary to barr it. But every Jacobite at this time goes beyond all theſe examples, and is a rebel to the conſtitution under which he is born, as well as to the prince on the throne. The law of his country has ſettled the right of ſucceſſion in a new family.

family. He resists this law, and asserts on his own private authority, not only a right in contradiction to it, but a right extinguished by it. This absurdity is so great, that it cannot be defended except by advancing a greater; and therefore it is urged, that no power on earth could alter the constitution in this respect, nor extinguish a right to the crown inherent in the Stuart family, and derived from a superior, that is from a divine authority. This kind of plea, for refusing submission to the laws of the land, if it was admitted, would serve any purpose as well as that for which it is brought. Our fanatics urged it formerly, and I do not see why a conscientious fifth-monarchy man had not as much right to urge it formerly, as a Jacobite has now. But if conscience, that is private opinion, may excuse the fifth-monarchy man and the Jacobite, who act conformably to it, from all imputations except those of madness and folly; how shall the latter be excused when he forswears the principles he retains, acknowledges the right he renounces, takes oaths with an intent to violate them, and calls God to witness to a premeditated lie? Some casuistry has been employed to excuse these men to themselves and to others. But such casuistry, and in truth every other, destroys, by distinctions and exceptions, all morality, and effaces the essential difference between right and wrong, good and evil. This the schoolmen in general have done on many occasions; the sons of Loyola in particular: and I wish with all my heart that nothing of the same kind could be objected to any other divines. Some political reasoning has been employed, as well as the casuistry here spoken of, and to the same purpose. It

has been ſaid, that the conduct of thoſe who are enemies to the eſtabliſhment, to which they ſubmit and ſwear, is juſtified by the principles of the Revolution. But nothing can be more falſe and frivolous. By the principles of the Revolution, a ſubject may reſiſt, no doubt, the prince who endeavours to ruin and enſlave his people, and may puſh this reſiſtance to the dethronement and excluſion of him and his race: but will it follow, that becauſe we may juſtly take arms againſt a prince whoſe right to govern we once aknowledged, and who by ſubſequent acts has forfeited that right, we may ſwear to a right we do not acknowledge, and reſiſt a prince whoſe conduct has not forfeited the right we ſwore to, nor given any juſt diſpenſation from our oaths?

But I ſhall lengthen this digreſſion no further: it is on a ſubject I have treated in public writings, the refutation of which never came to my hands, and I think, never will. I return to the ſubject of my preſent diſcourſe. And I ſay, that ſuch factions as theſe can never create any obſtruction to a prince, who purſues the union of his ſubjects, nor diſturb the peace of his government. The men who compoſe them muſt be deſperate, and impotent; the moſt deſpicable of all characters when they go together. Every honeſt and ſenſible man will diſtinguiſh himſelf out of their number: and they will remain, as they deſerve to be, hewers of wood and drawers of water, to the reſt of their fellow ſubjects.

They will remain ſuch, if they are abandoned to themſelves, and to that habitual infatuation which they have not ſenſe and ſpirit enough to break. But

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if a prince, out of goodneſs or policy, ſhould think it worth his while to take them from under this influence, and to break theſe habits; even this diviſion, the moſt abſurd of all others, will not be found incurable. A man who has not ſeen the inſide of parties, nor had opportunities to examine nearly their ſecret motives, can hardly conceive how little a ſhare principle of any ſort, though principle of ſome ſort or other be always pretended, has in the determination of their conduct. Reaſon has ſmall effect on numbers: a turn of imagination often as violent and as ſudden as a guſt of wind, determines their conduct; and paſſion is taken by others, and by themſelves too, when it grows into habit eſpecially, for principle. What gave ſtrength and ſpirit to a Jacobite party, after the late king's acceſſion? The true anſwer is, a ſudden turn of the imaginations of a whole party, to reſentment and rage, that were turned a little before to quiet ſubmiſſion, and patient expectation. Principle had as little ſhare in making the turn, as reaſon had in conducting it. Men who had ſenſe, and temper too, before that moment, thought of nothing after it but of ſetting up a Tory king againſt a Whig king; and when ſome of them were aſked, if they were ſure a popiſh king would make a good Tory king? or whether they were determined to ſacrifice their religion and liberty to him? The anſwer was, No: that they would take arms againſt him, if he made attempts on either; that this might be the caſe perhaps in ſix months after his reſtoration, but that in the mean time they would endeavour his reſtoration. This is no exaggerated fact: and I leave you to judge to what ſuch ſentiments and

conduct must be ascribed, to principle or passion, to reason or madness? What gives obstinacy without strength, and sullenness without spirit, to the Jacobite-tories at this time? Another turn of imagination, or rather the same shewing itself in another form. A factious habit, and a factious notion, converted into a notion of policy and honour. They are taught to believe, that by clinging together they are a considerable weight, which may be thrown in to turn the scale in any great event; and that, in the mean time, to be a steady suffering party, is an honour they may flatter themselves with very justly. Thus they continue steddy to engagements which most of them wish in their hearts they had never taken; and suffer for principles, in support of which not one of them would venture further than talking the treason that claret inspires.

It results therefore from all that has been said, and from the reflections which these hints may suggest, that in whatever light we view the divided state of a people, there is none in which these divisions will appear incurable, nor an union of the members of a great community with one another, and with their head, unattainable. It may happen in this case, as it does in many others, that things uncommon may pass for improbable or impossible: and as nothing can be more uncommon than a patriot king, there will be room to wonder if the natural and certain effects of his conduct should appear improbable or impossible to many. But there is still something more in this case. Though the union we speak of be so much for the interest of every king and every people, that their glory and their prosperity must increase, or diminish, in pro-

portion

portion as they approach nearer to it, or are further removed from it; yet is there another intereſt by which princes and people both are often impoſed upon, ſo far as to miſtake it for their own. The intereſt I mean is that of private ambition. It would be eaſy to ſhew, in many inſtances, and particularly in this, of uniting inſtead of dividing, and of governing by a national concurrence, inſtead of governing by the management of parties and factions in the ſtate, how widely different, nay how repugnant, the intereſts of private ambition and thoſe of real patriotiſm are. Men therefore who are warmed by the firſt, and have no ſenſe of the laſt, will declare for diviſion, as they do for corruption, in oppoſition to union and to integrity of government. They will not indeed declare directly that the two former are in the abſtract preferable, but they will affirm with great airs of ſufficiency, that both are incurable; and conclude from hence, that in practice it is neceſſary to comply with both This ſubterfuge once open, there is no falſe and immoral meaſure in political management, which may not be avowed and recommended. But the very men who hope to eſcape by opening it, ſhut it up again, and ſecure their own condemnation. when they labour to confirm diviſions, and to propagate corruption, and thereby to create the very neceſſity that they plead in their excuſe. Neceſſity of this kind there is in reality none; for it ſeems full as abſurd to ſay, that popular diviſion muſt be cultivated, becauſe popular union cannot be procured, as it would be to ſay, that poiſon muſt be poured into a wound, becauſe it cannot be healed. The

practice

practice of morality in private life will never arrive at ideal perfection: muſt we give up ourſelves therefore to all manner of immorality? And muſt thoſe who are charged with our inſtruction endeavour to make us the moſt profligate of men, becauſe they cannot make us ſaints?

Experience of the depravity of human nature, made men deſirous to unite in ſociety and under government, that they might defend themſelves the better againſt injuries: but the ſame depravity ſoon inſpired in ſome the deſign of employing ſocieties to invade and ſpoil ſocieties; and to diſturb the peace of the great commonwealth of mankind, with more force and effect in ſuch collective bodies, than they could do individually. Juſt ſo it happens in the domeſtic œconomy of particular ſtates: and their peace is diſturbed by the ſame paſſions. Some of their members content themſelves with the common benefits of ſociety, and employ all their induſtry to promote the public good: but ſome propoſe to themſelves a ſeparate intereſt, and, that they may purſue it the more effectually, they aſſociate with others. Thus factions are in them, what nations are in the world. They invade and rob one another: and while each purſues a ſeparate intereſt, the common intereſt is ſacrificed by them all; that of mankind in one caſe, that of ſome particular community in the other. This has been, and muſt always be in ſome meaſure, the courſe of human affairs, eſpecially in free countries, where the paſſions of men are leſs reſtrained by authority: and I am not wild enough to ſuppoſe, that a patriot king can change human nature. But I am reaſonable enough to ſuppoſe, that without altering the human nature he may

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give a check to this courſe of human affairs, in his own kingdom at leaſt; that he may defeat the deſigns, and break the ſpirit of faction, inſtead of partaking in one, and aſſuming the other; and that if he cannot render the union of his ſubjects univerſal, he may render it ſo general, as to anſwer all the ends of good government, private ſecurity, public tranquillity, wealth, power, and fame.

If theſe ends were ever anſwered, they were ſo, ſurely, in this country, in the days of our Elizabeth. She found her kingdom full of factions, and factions of another conſequence and danger than theſe of our days, whom ſhe would have diſperſed with a puff of her breath. She could not re-unite them it is true: the Papiſt continued a papiſt, the Puritan a Puritan; one furious, the other ſullen. But ſhe united the great body of the people in her and their common intereſt, ſhe inflamed them with one national ſpirit, and thus armed, ſhe maintained tranquillity at home, and carried ſuccour to her friends and terror to her enemies abroad. There were cabals at court and intrigues among her miniſters. It is ſaid too that ſhe did not diſlike there ſhould be ſuch. But theſe were kept within her court. They could not creep abroad to ſow diviſion among her people: and her greateſt favourite the Earl of Eſſex paid the price of attempting it with his head. Let our great doctors in politics, who preach ſo learnedly on the trite text *divide et impera*, compare the conduct of Elizabeth in this reſpect with that of her ſucceſſor, who endeavoured to govern his kingdom by the notions of a faction that he raiſed, and to manage his parliament by undertakers: and they

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muſt be very obſtinate indeed, if they refuſe to acknowledge, that a wiſe and good prince can unite a divided people, though a weak and wicked prince cannot; and that the conſequences of national union, are glory and happineſs to the prince and to the people, whilſt thoſe of diſunion bring ſhame and miſery on both, and entail them too on poſterity.

I have dwelt long on the laſt head, not only becauſe it is of great importance in itſelf, and at all times, but becauſe it is rendered more ſo than ever at this time by the unexampled avowal of contrary principles. Hitherto it has been thought the higheſt pitch of profligacy to own, inſtead of concealing crimes, and to take pride in them inſtead of being aſhamed of them. But in our age men have ſoared to a pitch ſtill higher. The firſt is common, it is the practice of numbers, and by their numbers they keep one another in countenance. But the choice ſpirits of theſe days, the men of mode in politics, are far from ſtopping where criminals of all kinds have ſtopt when they have gone even to this point; for generally the moſt of the hardened inhabitants of Newgate do not go ſo far. The men I ſpeak of contend that it is not enough to be vicious by practice and habit, but that it is neceſſary to be ſo by principle. They make themſelves miſſionaries of faction as well as of corrution: they recommend both, they deride all ſuch as imagine it poſſible or fit to retain truth, integrity, and a diſintereſted regard to the public in public life, and pronounce every man a fool who is not ready to act like a knave. I hope that enough has been ſaid, though much more might

might have been said, to expose the wickedness of these men, and the absurdity of their schemes; and to shew that a patriot king may walk more easily and successfully in other paths of government, *per tutum plenumque iter religionis, justitiæ, honestatis, virtutumque moralium*. Let me proceed, therefore, to mention two other heads of the conduct that such a king will hold, and it shall be my endeavour not to fall into the same prolixity.

A king who esteems it his duty to support, or to restore, if that be needful, the free constitution of a limited monarchy; who forms and maintains a wise and good administration; who subdues faction and promotes the union of his people; and who makes their greatest good the constant object of his government, may be said, no doubt, to be in the true interest of his kingdom. All the particular cases that can arise are included in these general characteristics of a wise and good reign. And yet it seems proper to mention, under a distinct head, some particular instances that have not been touched, wherein this wisdom and goodness will exert themselves.

Now though the true interest of several states may be the same in many respects, yet is there always some difference to be perceived by a discerning eye, both in these interests, and in the manner of pursuing them; a difference that arises from the situation of countries, from the character of people, from the nature of government, and even from that of climate and soil; from circumstances that are like these permanent, and from others that may be deemed more accidental. To illustrate all this by examples, would be easy but long. I shall content myself therefore to mention, in some instances only, the

the difference that ariſes from the cauſes referred to, between the true intereſt of our country, and that of ſome or all our neighbours on the continent, and leave you to extend and apply in your thoughts the compariſon I ſhall hint at, rather than enlarge upon.

The ſituation of Great Britain, the character of her people, and the nature of her government fit her for trade and commerce. Her climate and her ſoil make them neceſſary to her well-being. By trade and commerce we grew a rich and powerful nation, and by their decay we are growing poor and impotent. As trade and commerce enrich, ſo they fortify our country. The ſea is our barrier, ſhips are our fortreſſes, and the mariners, that trade and commerce alone can furniſh, are the garriſons to defend them. France lies under great diſadvantages in trade and commerce, by the nature of her government. Her advantages in ſituation are as great at leaſt as ours. Thoſe that ariſe from the temper and character of her people are a little different, perhaps, and yet upon the whole equivalent. Thoſe of her climate and her ſoil are ſuperior to ours, and indeed to thoſe of any European nation. The United Provinces have the ſame advantages that we have in the nature of their government, more perhaps in the temper and character of their people, leſs to be ſure in their ſituation, climate, and ſoil. But without deſcending into a longer detail of the advantages and diſadvantages attending each of theſe nations in trade and commerce, it is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe to obſerve, that Great Britain ſtands in a certain middle between the other two, with regard to wealth and power ariſing from theſe

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ſprings. A leſs, and leſs conſtant application to the improvement of theſe may ſerve the ends of France; a greater is neceſſary in this country; and a greater ſtill in Holland. The French may improve their natural wealth and power by the improvement of trade and commerce. We can have no wealth nor power by conſequence, as Europe is now conſtituted, without the improvement of them, nor in any degree but proportionably to this improvement. The Dutch cannot ſubſiſt without them. They bring wealth to other nations, and are neceſſary to the well-being of them; but they ſupply the Dutch with food and rayment, and are neceſſary even to their being.

The reſult of what has been ſaid is, in general, that the wealth and power of all nations depending ſo much on their trade and commerce, and every nation being, like the three I have mentioned, in ſuch different circumſtances of advantage or diſadvantage in the purſuit of this common intereſt; a good government, and therefore the government of a patriot king will be directed conſtantly to make the moſt of every advantage that nature has given, or art can procure, towards the improvement of trade and commerce. And this is one of the principal criterions by which we are to judge whether governors are in the true intereſt of the people or not.

It reſults, in particular, that Great Britain might improve her wealth and power in a proportion ſuperior to that of any nation who can be deemed her rival, if the advantages ſhe has were as wiſely cultivated, as they will be in the reign of a patriot king. To be convinced more thoroughly of this truth, a

very ſhort proceſs of reaſoning will ſuffice. Let any man, who has knowledge enough for it, firſt compare the natural ſtate of Great Britain, and of the United Provinces, and then their artificial ſtate together; that is, let him conſider minutely the advantages we have by the ſituation, extent, and nature of our iſland, over the inhabitants of a few ſalt marſhes gained on the ſea, and hardly defended from it: and after that, let him conſider how nearly theſe provinces have raiſed themſelves to an equality of wealth and power with the kingdom of Great Britain. From whence ariſes this difference of improvement? It ariſes plainly from hence: the Dutch have been, from the foundation of their commonwealth, a nation of patriots and merchants. The ſpirit of that people has not been diverted from theſe two objects, the defence of their liberty, and the improvement of their trade and commerce; which have been carried on by them with uninterrupted and unſlackened application, induſtry, order and œconomy. In Great Britain the caſe has not been the ſame, in either reſpect; but here we confine ourſelves to ſpeak of the laſt alone.

Trade and commerce, ſuch as they were in thoſe days, had been ſometimes, and in ſome inſtances, before the reign of Queen Elizabeth, encouraged and improved: but the great encouragements were given, the great extenſions and improvements were made, by that glorious princeſs. To her we owe that ſpirit of domeſtic and foreign trade, which is not quite extinguiſhed. It was ſhe who gave that rapid motion to our whole mercantile ſyſtem, which is not entirely ceaſed. They both flagged under her ſucceſſor; were not revived under his ſon; were

were checked, diverted, clogged, and interrupted, during our civil wars: and began to exert new vigour after the reſtoration, in a long courſe of peace; but met with new difficulties too from the confirmed rivalry of the Dutch, and the growing rivalry of the French. To one of theſe the puſillanimous character of James the firſt gave many ſcandalous occaſions: and the other was favoured by the conduct of Charles the ſecond, who never was in the true intereſt of the people he governed. From the revolution to the death of Queen Anne, however trade and commerce might be aided and encouraged in other reſpects, they were neceſſarily ſubjected to depredations abroad, and overloaded by taxes at home, during the courſe of two great wars. From the acceſſion of the late king to this hour, in the midſt of a full peace, the debts of the nation continue much the ſame, the taxes have been increaſed, and, for eighteen years of this time, we have tamely ſuffered continual depredations from the moſt contemptible maritime power in Europe, that of Spain.

A patriot king will neither neglect nor ſacrifice his country's intereſt. No other intereſt, neither a foreign nor a domeſtic, neither a public nor a private will influence his conduct in government. He will not multiply taxes wantonly, nor keep up thoſe unneceſſarily which neceſſity has laid, that he may keep up legions of tax gatherers. He will not continue national debts, by all ſorts of political, and other profuſion; nor, more wickedly ſtill, by a ſettled purpoſe of oppreſſing and impoveriſhing the people, that he may with greater eaſe corrupt ſome, and govern the whole according to the dictates of his paſſions

ſions and arbitrary will To give eaſe and encouragement to manufactory at home, to aſſiſt and protect trade abroad, to improve and keep in heart the national colonies, like ſo many farms of the mother country, will be principal and conſtant parts of the attention of ſuch a prince. The wealth of the nation he will moſt juſtly eſteem to be his wealth, the power his power, the ſecurity and honour his ſecurity and honour; and by the very means by which he promotes the two firſt, he will wiſely preſerve the two laſt; for by theſe means, and by theſe alone, can the great advantage of the ſituation of this kingdom be taken and improved.

Great Britain is an iſland: and whilſt nations on the continent are at immenſe charge in maintaining their barriers, and perpetually on their guard, and frequently embroiled to extend or ſtrengthen them, Great Britain may, if her governors pleaſe, accumulate wealth in maintaining hers; make herſelf ſecure from invaſions, and be ready to invade others, when her own immediate intereſt, or the general intereſt of Europe, require it. Of all which Queen Elizabeth's reign is a memorable example, and undeniable proof. I ſaid the general intereſt of Europe, becauſe it ſeems to me that this alone ſhould call our councils off from an almoſt entire application to their domeſtic and proper buſineſs. Other nations muſt watch over every motion of their neighbours: penetrate, if they can, every deſign; foreſee every minute event, and take part, by ſome engagement or other, in almoſt every conjuncture that ariſes. But as we cannot be eaſily nor ſuddenly attacked, and as we ought not to aim at any acquiſition of territory on the continent, it

may

may be our intereſt to watch the ſecret workings of the ſeveral councils abroad; to adviſe and warn; to abet and oppoſe; but it never can be our true intereſt eaſily and officiouſly to enter into action, much leſs into engagements that imply action and expence. Other nations, like the Velites or light-armed troops, ſtand foremoſt in the field, and ſkirmiſh perpetually. When a great war begins, we ought to look on the powers of the continent, to whom we incline, like the two firſt lines, the *Principes* and *Haſtati* of a Roman army; and on ourſelves, like the *Triarii*, that are not to charge with theſe legions on every occaſion, but to be ready for the conflict whenever the fortune of the day, be it ſooner or latter, calls us to it, and the ſum of things, or the general intereſt, makes it neceſſary.

This is that poſt of advantage and honour, which our ſingular ſituation among the powers of Europe determines us, or ſhould determine us, to take, in all diſputes that happen on the continent. If we neglect it, and diſſipate our ſtrength on occaſions that touch us remotely or indirectly; we are governed by men who do not know the true intereſt of this iſland, or who have ſome other intereſt more at heart. If we adhere to it, ſo at leaſt as to deviate little and ſeldom from it, as we ſhall do whenever we are wiſely and honeſtly governed, then will this nation make her proper figure, and a great one it will be. By a continual attention to improve her natural, that is, her maritime ſtrength, by collecting all her forces within herſelf, and reſerving them to be laid out on great occaſions, ſuch as regard her immediate intereſts and her honour, or ſuch as are truly important to the general ſyſ-

tem of power in Europe; ſhe may be the arbitrator of differences, the guardian of liberty, and the preſerver of that balance, which has been ſo much talked of, and is ſo little underſtood.

Are we never to be ſoldiers? you will ſay. Yes, conſtantly, in ſuch proportion as is neceſſary for the defence of good government. To eſtabliſh ſuch a military force as none but bad governors can want, is to eſtabliſh tyrannical power in the king or in the miniſters; and may be wanted by the latter, when the former would be ſecure without his army, if he broke his miniſter. Occaſionally too we muſt be ſoldiers, and for offence as well as defence; but in proportion to the nature of the conjuncture, conſidered always relatively to the difference here inſiſted upon, between our ſituation, our intereſt, and the nature of our ſtrength, compared with thoſe of the other powers of Europe; and not in proportion to the deſires, or even to the wants, of the nations with whom we are confederated. Like other amphibious animals, we muſt come occaſionally on ſhore: but the water is more properly our element, and in it, like them, as we find our greateſt ſecurity, ſo we exert our greateſt force.

What I touch upon here, very ſhortly, deſerves to be conſidered, and re-conſidered, by every man who has, or may have any ſhare in the government of Great Britain. For we have not only departed too much from our true national intereſt in this reſpect; but we have done ſo with the general applauſe even of well-meaning men, who did not diſcern that we waſted ourſelves by an improper application of our ſtrength in conjunctures, when we might have

have ſerved the common cauſe far more uſefully, nay with entire effect, by a proper application of our natural ſtrength. There was ſomething more than this. Armies grew ſo much into faſhion in time of war, among men who meant well to their country, that they who mean ill to it have kept, and keep them ſtill up in the profoundeſt peace: and the number of our ſoldiers, in this iſland alone, is almoſt double to that of our ſeamen. That they are kept up againſt foreign enemies, cannot be ſaid with any colour. If they are kept for ſhew, they are ridiculous. If they are kept for any other purpoſe whatever, they are too dangerous to be ſuffered. A patriot king, ſeconded by miniſters attached to the true intereſt of their country, would ſoon reform this abuſe, and ſave a great part of this expence; or apply it in a manner preferable even to the ſaving it, to the maintainance of a body of marine foot, and to the charge of a regiſter of thirty or forty thouſand ſeamen. But no thoughts like theſe, no great deſigns for the honour and intereſt of the kingdom, will be entertained, till men who have this honour and intereſt at heart ariſe to power.

I come now to the laſt head, under which I ſhall conſider the character and conduct of a patriot king: and let it not be thought to be of the leaſt importance, though it may ſeem at the firſt mention to concern appearances rather than realities, and to be nothing more than a circumſtance contained in or implied by the great parts of the character and conduct of ſuch a king. It is of his perſonal behaviour, of his manner of living with other men, and in a word, of his private as well as public life that I mean to ſpeak. It is of that decency and grace,

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that *bienſence* of the French, that *decorum* of the Latins, that πρεπον of the Greeks, which can never be reflected on any character that is not laid in virtue: but for want of which, a character that is ſo laid will loſe at all times part of the luſtre belonging to it, and may be ſometimes not a little miſunderſtood and undervalued. Beauty is not ſeparable from health, nor this luſtre ſaid the ſtoics, from virtue; but as a man may be healthful without being handſome, ſo he may be virtuous without being amiable.

There are certain finiſhing ſtrokes, a laſt hand as we commonly ſay, to be given to all the works of art. When that is not given, we may ſee the excellency of a general deſign, and the beauty of ſome particular parts. A judge of the art may ſee further; he may allow for what is wanting, and diſcern the full merit of a compleat work in one that is imperfect. But vulgar eyes will not be ſo ſtruck. The work will appear to them defective, becauſe unfiniſhed: ſo that without knowing preciſely what they diſlike, they may admire, but they will not be pleaſed. Thus in moral characters, though every part be virtuous and great, or though the few and ſmall defects in it be concealed under the blaze of thoſe ſhining qualities that compenſate for them; yet is not this enough even in private life: it is leſs ſo in public life, and ſtill leſs ſo in that of a prince.

There is a certain *ſpecies liberalis*, more eaſily underſtood than explained, and felt than defined, that muſt be acquired and rendered habitual to him. A certain propriety of words and actions, that reſults from their conformity to nature and charac-

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ter, muſt always accompany him, and create an air and manner, that run uniformly through the whole tenour of his conduct and behaviour: which air and manner are ſo far from any kind or degree of affectation, that they cannot be attained except by him who is void of all affectation. We may illuſtrate this to ourſelves, and make it more ſenſible, by reflecting on the conduct of good dramatic or epic writers. They draw the characters which they bring on the ſcene from nature, they ſuſtain them through the whole piece, and make their actors neither ſay nor do any thing that is not exactly proper to the character each of them repreſents. *Oderint dum metuant*, came properly out of the mouth of a tyrant; but Euripides would never have put that execrable ſentence into the mouth of Minos or Eacus.

A man of ſenſe and virtue both will not fall into any great impropriety of character, or indecency of conduct. But he may ſlide or be ſurprized into ſmall ones, from a thouſand reaſons, and in a thouſand manners, which I ſhall not ſtay to enumerate. Againſt theſe, therefore, even men, who are incapable of falling into the others, muſt be ſtill on their guard, and no men ſo much as princes. When their minds are filled and their hearts warmed with true notions of government, when they know their duty, and love their people, they will not fail in the great parts they are to act, in the council, in the field, and in all the arduous affairs that belong to their kingly office: at leaſt they will not begin to fail, by failing in them. But as they are men, ſuſceptible of the ſame impreſſions, liable to the ſame errors, and expoſed to the ſame paſſi-

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ons, ſo they are likewiſe expoſed to more and ſtronger temptations, than others. Beſides, the elevation in which they are placed, as it gives them great advantages, gives them great diſadvantages too, that often countervail the former. Thus for inſtance, a little merit in a prince is ſeen and felt by numbers: it is multiplied, as it were, and in proportion to this effect his reputation is raiſed by it. But then, a little failing is ſeen and felt by numbers too: it is multiplied in the ſame manner, and his reputation ſinks in the ſame proportion.

I ſpoke above of defects that may be concealed under the blaze of great and ſhining qualities. This may be the caſe: it has been that of ſome princes. There goes a tradition, that Henry the fourth of France aſked a Spaniſh ambaſſador, what miſtreſſes the King of Spain had? The ambaſſador replied, like a formal pedant, that his maſter was a prince who feared God, and had no miſtreſs but the Queen. Henry the fourth felt the reflection, and aſked him in return with ſome contempt, "Whether his maſter had not virtues enough to cover "one vice?"

The faults or defects, that may be thus covered or compenſated, are, I think, thoſe of the man rather than thoſe of the king; ſuch as ariſe from conſtitution, and the natural rather than the moral character; ſuch as may be deemed accidental ſtarts of paſſion, or accidental remiſſneſs in ſome unguarded hours; ſurpriſes, if I may ſay ſo, of the man on the king. When theſe happen ſeldom and paſs ſoon, they may be hid, like ſpots in the ſun, but they are ſpots ſtill. He who has the means of ſeeing them, will ſee them; and he who has not, may feel

feel the effects of them without knowing precisely the cause. When they continue (for here is the danger, because, if they continue, they will increase) they are spots no longer: they spread a general shade, and obscure the light in which they were drowned before. The virtues of the king are lost in the vices of the man.

Alexander had violent passions, and those for wine and women were predominant after his ambition. They were spots in his character before they prevailed by the force of habit: as soon as they began to do so, the king and the hero appeared less, the rake and bully more. Persepolis was burnt at the instigation of Thais, and Clytus was killed in a drunken brawl. He repented indeed of these two horrible actions, and was again the king and hero upon many occasions; but he had not been enough on his guard, when the strongest incitements to vanity and sensual pleasures offered themselves at every moment to him: and when he stood in all his easy hours surrounded by women and eunuchs, by the pandars, parasites, and buffoons of a voluptuous court, they who could not approach the king, approached the man, and by seducing the man, they betrayed the king. His faults became habits. The Macedonians, who did not or would not see the one, saw the other; and he fell a sacrifice to their resentments, to their fears, and to those factions that will arise under an odious government, as well as under one that grows into contempt.

Other characters might be brought to contrast with this. The first Scipio Africanus, for example, or the eldest Cato: and there will be no objection to a comparison of such citizens of Rome as these

were

were with kings of the firſt magnitude. Now the reputation of the firſt Scipio was not ſo clear and uncontroverted in private as in public life; nor was he allowed by all, to be a man of ſuch ſevere virtue, as he affected, and as that age required. Nævius was thought to mean him in ſome verſes Gellius has preſerved: and Valerius Antias made no ſcruple to aſſert, that, far from reſtoring the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauched and kept her. Notwithſtanding this, what authority did he not maintain? In what eſteem and veneration did he not live and die? With what panegyrics has not the whole torrent of writers rolled down his reputation even to theſe days? This could not have happened, if the vice imputed to him had ſhewn itſelf in any ſcandalous appearances, to eclipſe the luſtre of the general, the conſul, or the citizen. The ſame reflection might be extended to Cato, who loved wine as well as Scipio loved women. Men did not judge in the days of the elder Cato perhaps, as Seneca was ready to do in thoſe of the younger, that drunkenneſs could be no crime if Cato drank: but Cato's paſſion, as well as that of Scipio, was ſubdued and kept under by his public character. His virtue warmed, inſtead of cooling, by this indulgence to his genius or natural temper: and one may gather from what Tully puts into his mouth in the treatiſe concerning old age, that even his love of wine was rendered ſubſervient, inſtead of doing hurt, to the meaſures he purſued in his public character.

Give me leave to inſiſt a little on the two firſt Cæſars, and on Mark Anthony. I quote none of them

them as good men, but I may quote them all as great men, and therefore properly in this place; ſince a patriot king muſt avoid the defects that diminiſh a great character, as well as thoſe that corrupt a good one. Old Curio called Julius Cæſar the huſband of every wife, and the wife of every huſband, referring to his known adulteries, and to the compliances that he was ſuſpected of in his youth for Nicomedes. Even his own ſoldiers in the licence of a triumph ſung lampoons on him for his profuſion as well as lewdneſs. The youth of Auguſtus was defamed as much as that of Julius Cæſar, and both as much as that of Anthony. When Rome was ranſacked by the pandars of Auguſtus, and matrons and virgins were ſtripped and ſearched like ſlaves in a market, to chuſe the fitteſt to ſatisfy his luſt, did Anthony do more? When Julius ſet no bounds to his debauches in Egypt, except thoſe that ſatiety impoſed, *poſtquam epulis bacchoque modum laſſata voluptas impoſuit*, when he trifled away his time with Cleopatra in the very criſis of the civil war, and till his troops refuſed to follow him any further in his effeminate progreſs up the Nile—did Anthony do more? No, all three had vices which would have been ſo little borne in any former age of Rome, that no man could have raiſed himſelf under the weight of them to popularity and to power. But we muſt not wonder that the people, who bore the tyrants, bore the libertines; nor that indulgence was ſhewn to the vices of the great, in a city where univerſal corruption and profligacy of manners were eſtabliſhed: and yet even in this city, and among theſe degenerate Romans, certain it is that different appearances with the ſame vices, help-

ed to maintain the Cæsars, and ruined Anthony. I might produce many anecdotes to shew how the two former saved appearances whilst their vices were the most flagrant, and made so much amends for the appearances they had not saved, by those of a contrary kind, that a great part at least of all which was said to defame them, might pass, and did pass, for the calumny of party.

But Anthony threw off all decorum from the first, and continued to do so to the last. Not only vice, but indecency became habitual to him. He ceased to be a general, a consul, a triumvir, a citizen of Rome. He became an Egyptian king, sunk into luxurious effeminacy, and proved he was unfit to govern men, by suffering himself to be governed by a woman. His vices hurt him, but his habits ruined him. If a political modesty at least had made him disguise the first, they would have hurt him less, and he might have escaped the last: but he was so little sensible of this, that in a fragment of one of his letters to Augustus, which Suetonius has preserved, he endeavours to justify himself by pleading this very habit. "What matter is it "whom we lie with?" says he: this letter may find "you perhaps with Tertulla, or Terentilla, or o- "thers that he names. I lie with Cleopatra, and "have I not done so these nine years?"

These great examples, which I have produced, not to encourage vice, but to shew more strongly the advantages of decency in private behaviour, may appear in some sort figures bigger than the life. Few virtues and few vices grow up, in these parts of the world, and in these latter ages, to the size of those I have mentioned; and none have such scenes

wherein

wherein to exert themſelves. But the truths I am deſirous to inculcate will be as juſtly delivered in this manner, and perhaps more ſtrongly felt. Failings or vices that flow from the ſame ſource of human nature, that run the ſame courſe through the conduct of princes, and have the ſame effects on their characters, and conſequently on their government and their fortune, have all the proportion neceſſary to my application of them. It matters little, whether a prince who abandons that common decorum which reſults from nature, and which reaſon preſcribes, abandons the particular decorums of this country or that, of this age or that, which reſults from mode, and which cuſtom exacts. It matters little, for inſtance, whether a prince gives himſelf up to the more groſs luxury of the Weſt, or to the more refined luxury of the Eaſt; whether he become the ſlave of a domeſtic harlot, or of a foreign queen; in ſhort, whether he forget himſelf in the arms of one whore, or of twenty; and whether he imitate Anthony, or a king of Achin, who is reported to have paſſed his whole time in a ſeraglio, eating, and drinking, chewing betel, playing with women, and talking of cock-fighting.

To ſum up the whole and draw to a concluſion: this decency, this grace, this propriety of manners to character, is ſo eſſential to princes in particular, that whenever it is neglected, their virtues loſe a great degree of luſtre, and their defects acquire much aggravation. Nay more, by neglecting this decency and this grace, and for want of a ſufficient regard to appearances, even their virtues may betray them into failings, their failings into vices, and

their vices into habits unworthy of princes and unworthy of men.

The conſtitutions of governments, and the different tempers and characters of people, may be thought juſtly to deſerve ſome conſideration, in determining the behaviour of princes in private life as well as in public; and to put a difference, for inſtance, between the decorum of a king of France, and that of a king of Great Britain.

Lewis the fourteenth was king in an abſolute monarchy, and reigned over a people whoſe genius makes it as fit perhaps to impoſe on them by admiration and awe, as to gain and hold them by affection. Accordingly he kept great ſtate; was haughty, was reſerved; and all he ſaid or did appeared to be forethought and planned. His regard to appearances was ſuch, that when his miſtreſs was the wife of another man, and he had children by her every year, he endeavoured to cover her conſtant reſidence at court by a place ſhe filled about the queen: and he dined and ſupped and cohabited with the latter in every apparent reſpect as if he had had no miſtreſs at all. Thus he raiſed a great reputation; and he was revered by his ſubjects, and admired by his neighbours: and this was due principally to the art with which he managed appearances, ſo as to ſet off his virtues, to diſguiſe his failings and his vices, and by his example and authority to keep a veil drawn over the futility and debauch of his court.

His ſucceſſor, not to the throne, but to the ſovereign power, was a mere rake, with ſome wit, and no morals; nay, with ſo little regard to them, that

that he made them a ſubject of ridicule in diſcourſe, and appeared in his whole conduct more profligate, if that could be, than he was in principle. The difference between theſe characters ſoon appeared in abominable effects; ſuch as, cruelty apart, might recal the memory of Nero, or in the other ſex, that of Meſſalina, and ſuch as I leave the chroniclers of ſcandal to relate.

Our Elizabeth was queen in a limited monarchy, and reigned over a people at all times more eaſily led than driven; and at that time capable of being attached to their prince and their country, by a more generous principle than any of thoſe which prevail in our days, by affection. There was a ſtrong prerogative then in being, and the crown was in poſſeſſion of greater legal power. Popularity was however then, as it is now, and as it muſt be always in mixed government, the ſole true foundation of that ſufficient authority and influence, which other conſtitutions give the prince gratis, and independently of the people, but which a king of this nation muſt acquire. The wiſe queen ſaw it, and ſhe ſaw too how much popularity depends on thoſe appearances, that depend on the decorum, the decency, the grace, and the propriety of behaviour of which we are ſpeaking. A warm concern for the intereſt and honour of the nation, and a tenderneſs for her people, and a confidence in their affections, were appearances that run through her whole public conduct, and gave life and colour to it. She did great things, and ſhe knew how to ſet them off according to their full value, by her manner of doing them. In her private behaviour ſhe

ſhewed great affability, ſhe deſcended even to familiarity; but her familiarity was ſuch as could not be imputed to her weakneſs, and was therefore moſt juſtly aſcribed to her goodneſs. Though a woman, ſhe hid all that was womaniſh about her: and if a few equivocal marks of coquetry appeared on ſome occaſions, they paſſed like flaſhes of lightning, vaniſhed as ſoon as they were diſcerned, and imprinted no blot on her character. She had private friendſhips, ſhe had favourites: but ſhe never ſuffered her friends to forget ſhe was their queen; and when her favourites did, ſhe made them feel that ſhe was ſo.

Her ſucceſſor had no virtues to ſet off, but he had failings and vices to conceal. He could not conceal the latter; and, void of the former, he could not compenſate for them. His failings and his vices therefore ſtanding in full view, he paſſed for a weak prince and an ill man; and fell into all the contempt wherein his memory remains to this day. The methods he took, to preſerve himſelf from it, ſerved but to confirm him in it. No man can keep the decorum of manners in life, who is not free from every kind of affectation, as it has been ſaid already: but he who affects what he has no pretenſions to, or what is improper to his character and rank in the world, is guilty of moſt conſummate folly: he becomes doubly ungracious, doubly indecent, and quite ridiculous. James the firſt, not having one quality to conciliate the eſteem or affection of his people to him, endeavoured to impoſe on their underſtandings; and to create a reſpect for himſelf by ſpreading the moſt extravagant notions about kings in general, as if they were mid-

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dle beings between God and other men; and by comparing the extent and unsearchable mysteries of their power and prerogative to those of the divine providence. His language and behaviour were commonly suited to such foolish pretensions; and thus by assuming a claim to such respect and submission as were not due to him, he lost a great part of what was due to him. In short, he begun at the wrong end; for though the shining qualities of the king may cover some failings and some vices that do not grow up into strong habits in the man, yet must the character of a great and good king be founded in that of a great and good man. A king who lives out of the sight of his subjects, or is never seen by them except on his throne, can scarce be despised as a man, though he may be hated as a king. But the king who lives more in their sight, and more under their observation, may be despised before he is hated, and even without being hated. This happened to King James: a thousand circumstances brought it to pass, and none more than the indecent weaknesses he had for his minions. He did not endeavour to cure this contempt and raise his character, only by affecting what he had no pretensions to, as in the former case; but he endeavoured likewise most vainly to do it by affecting what was improper to his character and rank. He did not endeavour indeed to disguise his natural pusillanimity and timidity under the mask of a bully, whilst he was imposed upon and insulted by all his neighbours, and above all by the Spaniards; but he retailed the scraps of Buchanan, affected to talk much, figured in church controversies, and put on all the pedantic appearances of a scholar,

whilst

whilſt he neglected all thoſe of a great and good man, as well as king.

Let not princes flatter themſelves. They will be examined cloſely in private as well as in public life: and thoſe who cannot pierce further will judge of them by the appearances they give in both. To obtain true popularity, that which is founded in eſteem and affection, they muſt therefore maintain their characters in both; and to that end neglect appearances in neither, but obſerve the decorum neceſſary to preſerve the eſteem, whilſt they win the affections of mankind. Kings, they muſt never forget that they are men; men, they muſt never forget that they are kings. The ſentiments which one of theſe reflections of courſe inſpires will give an humane and affable air to their whole behaviour, and make them taſte in that high elevation all the joys of ſocial life. The ſentiments that the other reflection ſuggeſts will be found very compatible with the former; and they may never forget that they are kings, though they do not always carry the crown on their heads, nor the ſceptre in their hands. Vanity and folly muſt entrench themſelves in a conſtant affectation of ſtate to preſerve regal dignity: a wiſe prince will know how to preſerve it when he lays his majeſty aſide. He will dare to appear a private man, and in that character he will draw to himſelf a reſpect leſs oſtentatious, but more real and more pleaſing to him, than any which is paid to the monarch. By never ſaying what is unfit for him to ſay, he will never hear what is unfit for him to hear. By never doing what is unfit for him to do, he will never ſee what is unfit for him to ſee. Decency and propriety of manners are ſo far

far from leſſening the pleaſures of life that they refine them, and give them an higher taſte: they are ſo far from reſtraining the free and eaſy commerce of ſocial life, that they baniſh the bane of it, licentiouſneſs of behaviour. Ceremony is the barrier againſt this abuſe of liberty in public; politeneſs and decency are ſo in private: and the prince who practiſes and exacts them, will amuſe himſelf much better, and oblige thoſe who have the honour to be in his intimacy, and to ſhare his pleaſures with him, much more, than he could poſſibly do by the moſt abſolute and unguarded familiarity.

That which is here recommended to princes, that conſtant guard on their own behaviour even in private life, and that conſtant decorum which their example ought to exact from others, will not be found ſo difficult in practice as may be imagined; if they uſe a proper diſcernment in the choice of the perſons whom they admit to the neareſt degrees of intimacy with them. A prince ſhould chuſe his companions with as great care as his miniſters. If he truſts the buſineſs of his ſtate to theſe, he truſts his character to thoſe: and his character will depend on theirs much more than is commonly thought. General experience will lead men to judge that a ſimilitude of character determined the choice; even when chance, indulgence to aſſiduity, good nature, or want of reflection, had their ſhare in the introduction of men unworthy of ſuch favour. But, in ſuch caſes, certain it is that they, who judged wrong at firſt concerning him, will judge right at laſt. He is not a trifler, for inſtance. Be it ſo: but if he takes trifling futile creatures, men of mean characters, or of no character, into his

his intimacy, he ſhews a diſpoſition to become ſuch, and will become ſuch, unleſs he breaks theſe habits early, and before puerile amſements are grown up to be the buſineſs of his life. I mean that the minds of princes, like the minds of other men, will be brought down inſenſibly to the tone of the company they keep.

A worſe conſequence even than this may follow a want of diſcernment in princes how to chuſe their companions, and how to conduct themſelves in private life. Silly kings have reſigned themſelves to their miniſters, have ſuffered theſe to ſtand between them and their people, and have formed no judgments, nor taken any meaſures on their own knowledge, but all implicitly on the repreſentations made to them by their miniſters. Kings of ſuperior capacity have reſigned themſelves in the ſame manner to their favourites, male and female, have ſuffered theſe to ſtand between them and their moſt able and faithful counſellors: their judgments have been influenced, and their meaſures directed by inſinuations of women, or of men as little fitted as women, by nature and education, to be hearkened to, in the great affairs of government. Hiſtory is full of ſuch examples; all melancholy, many tragical! ſufficient, one would imagine, to deter princes, if attended to, from permitting the companions of their idle hours, or the inſtruments of their pleaſures, to exceed the bounds of thoſe provinces. Should a miniſter of ſtate pretend to vie with any of theſe, about the forms of a drawing room, the regulation of a ruelle, the decoration of a ball, or the dreſs of a fine lady, he would be thought ridiculous, and he would be truly ſo. But then are not any of theſe

theſe impertinent, when they preſume to meddle in things at leaſt as much above them, as thoſe that have been mentioned are below the others? And are not princes who ſuffer them to do ſo, unaccountably weak?

What ſhall I ſay further on this head? Nothing more is neceſſary. Let me wind it up therefore by aſſerting this great truth, that reſults from what has been already ſaid: As he can never fill the character of a patriot king, though his perſonal great and good qualities be in every reſpect equal to it, who lies open to the flattery of courtiers, to the ſeduction of women, and to the partialities and affections which are eaſily contracted by too great indulgence in private life; ſo the prince who is deſirous to eſtabliſh this character, muſt obſerve ſuch a decorum, and keep ſuch a guard on himſelf, as may prevent even the ſuſpicion of being liable to ſuch influences. For as the reality would ruin, the very ſuſpicion will leſſen him in the opinion of mankind: and the opinion of mankind, which is fame after death, is ſuperior ſtrength and power in life

And now if the principles and meaſures of conduct, laid down in this diſcourſe, as neceſſary to conſtitute that greateſt and moſt glorious of human beings, a patriot king, be ſufficient to this purpoſe; let us conſider too how eaſy it is, or ought to be, to eſtabliſh them in the minds of princes. They are founded on true propoſitions, all of which are obvious, nay, many of them ſelf-evident. They are confirmed by univerſal experience. In a word, no underſtanding can reſiſt them, and none but the weakeſt can fail, or be miſled, in the application of them. To a prince whoſe heart is corrupt, it is

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in vain to ſpeak, and for ſuch a prince I would not be thought to write. But if the heart of a prince be not corrupt, theſe truths will find an eaſy ingreſſion through the underſtanding to it. Let us conſider again, what the ſure, the neceſſary effects of ſuch principles and meaſures of conduct muſt be, to the prince, and to the people. On this ſubject let the imagination range through the whole glorious ſcene of a patriot reign: the beauty of the idea will inſpire thoſe tranſports, which Plato imagined the viſion of virtue would inſpire, if virtue could be ſeen. What in truth can be ſo lovely, what ſo venerable, as to contemplate a king on whom the eyes of a whole people are fixed, filled with admiration, and glowing with affection? a king, in the temper of whoſe government, like that of Nerva, things ſo ſeldom allied as empire and liberty are intimately mixed, co-exiſt together inſeparably, and conſtitute one real eſſence? What ſpectacle can be preſented to the view of the mind ſo rare, ſo nearly divine, as a king poſſeſſed of abſolute power, neither uſurped by fraud, nor maintained by force, but the genuine effect of eſteem, of confidence and affection; the free gift of liberty, who finds her greateſt ſecurity in this power, and would deſire no other if the prince on the throne could be, what his people wiſh him to be, immortal. Of ſuch a prince, and of ſuch a prince alone, it may be ſaid with ſtrict propriety and truth,

Volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympi.

Civil fury will have no place in this draught: or, if

if the monſter is ſeen, he muſt be ſeen as Virgil deſcribes him,

Centum vinctus catenis
Poſt tergum nodis, fremit horridus ore cruento.

He muſt be ſeen ſubdued, bound, chained, and deprived entirely of power to do hurt. In his place, concord will appear, brooding peace and proſperity on the happy land; joy ſitting in every face, content in every heart; a people unoppreſſed, undiſturbed, unalarmed; buſy to improve their private property and the public ſtock; fleets covering the ocean, bringing home wealth by the returns of induſtry; carrying aſſiſtance or terror abroad by the direction of wiſdom; and aſſerting triumphantly the right and the honour of Great Britain, as far as waters roll and as winds can waft them.

Thoſe who live to ſee ſuch happy days, and to act in ſo glorious a ſcene, will perhaps call to mind with ſome tenderneſs of ſentiment, when he is no more, a man, who contributed his mite to carry on ſo good a work, and who deſired life for nothing ſo much, as to ſee a king of great Britain the moſt popular man in his country, and a patriot king at the head of an united people.

LETTER III.

OF THE

STATE OF PARTIES

AT THE

Accession of KING GEORGE I.

LETTER III.

Of the STATE of PARTIES, at the Acceſſion of King GEORGE I.

I Perceive by yours, that my diſcourſe of the character and conduct of a patriot king, in that article which relates to party, has not entirely ſatisfied your expectations. You expected, from ſome things that I remember to have ſaid to you in converſation, and others that have fallen on that occaſion from my pen, a more particular application to thoſe general reaſonings to the preſent time, and to the ſtate of parties, from the late king's acceſſion to the throne. The ſubject is delicate enough, and yet I ſhall ſpeak upon it what truth exacts from me with the utmoſt frankneſs: for I know all our parties too well to eſteem any; and I am too old, and too reſigned to my fate, to want or to fear any.

Whatever anecdotes you have been told, for you are too young to have ſeen the paſſages of the times I am going to mention, and whatever prepoſſeſſions you have had, take theſe facts for undoubted truths: that there was no deſign on foot during the four laſt years of Queen Anne's reign, to ſet aſide the

ſucceſſion of the houſe of Hanover, and to place the crown on the head of the pretender to it, nor any party formed for this purpoſe at the time of the death of that princeſs, whoſe memory I honour, and therefore feel a juſt indignation at the irreverence with which we have ſeen it treated. If ſuch a deſign had been on foot during that time, there were moments when the execution of it would not have been difficult, or dangerous enough to have ſtopped men of the moſt moderate reſolution. Neither could a deſign of that nature have been carried on ſo long, though it was not carried into execution, without leaving ſome traces, which would have appeared when ſuch ſtrict inquiſitions were made; when the papers of ſo many of the Queen's ſervants were ſeized, and even her own papers, even thoſe ſhe had ſealed up to be burnt after her death, were expoſed to ſo much indecent inſpection. But laying aſide all arguments of the probable kind, I deny the fact abſolutely: and I have the better title to expect credit, becauſe it could not be true without my knowledge, or at leaſt ſuſpicion of it; and becauſe even they who believed it, for all who aſſerted it did not believe it, had no proof to produce, nor have to this hour, but vain ſurmiſes; nor any authority to reſt upon but the clamour of party.

That there were particular men who correſponded indirectly, and directly too, with the pretender, and with others for his ſervice; that theſe men profeſſed themſelves to be zealous in it, and made large promiſes, and raiſed ſome faint hopes, I cannot doubt; though this was unknown to me at that time, or at leaſt I knew it not with the ſame certainty,

ty, and in the ſame detail, that I have known it ſince. But if this was done by ſome who were in the Queen's ſervice, it was done too by ſome who were out of it, and I think with little ſincerity by either.

It may well ſeem ſtrange to one who carries in his breaſt a heart like yours, that men of any rank, and eſpecially of the higheſt, ſhould hold a conduct ſo falſe, ſo dangerous, always of uncertain event, and often, as it was in the caſe here mentioned, upon remote contingencies, and ſuch as they themſelves think the leaſt probable. Even I think it ſtrange, who have been much longer mingled in a corrupt world, and who have ſeen many more examples of the folly, of the cunning, and the perfidy of mankind. A great regard to wealth, and a total contempt of virtue, are ſentiments very nearly allied: and they muſt poſſeſs the whole ſouls of men whom they can determine to ſuch infamous duplicity, to ſuch double treachery. In fact they do ſo. One is ſo afraid of loſing his fortune, that he lays in claims to ſecure it, perhaps to augment it on all ſides, and to prevent even imaginary dangers. Another values ſo little the inward teſtimony of a good conſcience, or the future reproaches of thoſe he has deceived, that he ſcruples not to take engagements for a time to come that he has no deſign to keep; if they may ſerve as expedients to facilitate, in any ſmall degree, the ſucceſs of an immediate project. As this was done at the time, on the occaſion, and by the perſons I intend. But the ſcheme of defeating the proteſtant ſucceſſion was ſo far from being laid by the Queen and her miniſters, and ſuch a reſolution was ſo far from being taken,

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that the very men I ſpeak of, when they were preſſed by the other ſide, that is, from Verſailles and St. Germains, to be more particular, and to come into a cloſer concert, declined both, and gave the moſt evaſive anſwers.

A little before, or about the time of the Queen's death, ſome other perſons, who figured afterwards in the rebellion, entered in good earneſt into thoſe engagements, as I believe; for I do not know exactly the date of them. But, whenever they took them, they took them as ſingle men. They could anſwer for no party to back them. They might flatter themſelves with hopes and dreams, like Pompey, if little men and little things may be compared with great, of legions ready to riſe at the ſtamp of their feet. But they had no aſſurance, no nor grounds to expect any troops except thoſe of the Highlands; whoſe diſpoſition in general was known to every man, but whoſe inſurrection, without the concurrence of other inſurrections and other troops, was deemed, even by thoſe that made them take arms afterwards, not a ſtrength but a weakneſs, ruin to the poor people, and ruin to the cauſe. In a word, theſe men were ſo truly ſingle in their engagements,, and their meaſures were ſo unripe for action when the reſolution of acting immediately was taken by them, that I am perſuaded they durſt not communicate their deſign to any one man of conſequence that ſerved at that time with them. What perſuades me of it is this: one man, whom they thought likely to incline to them on ſeveral accounts, they attempted indirectly, and at a great diſtance: they came no nearer to the point with him, neither then, that is, juſt before the Queen's death,

death, nor afterwards. They had indeed no encouragement to do it; for upon this hint, and another circumſtance which fell in, both he and others took ſeveral occaſions to declare, that though they would ſerve the Queen faithfully and excluſively of all other regards or engagements to her laſt breath, yet, after her deceaſe, they would acknowledge the prince on whom the ſucceſſion devolved by law, and to whom they had ſworn, and no other. This declaration would have been that of the far greateſt number of the ſame party, and would have been ſtuck to by them, if the paſſions and private intereſts of another party had not prevailed over the true intereſt of a new family that was going to mount the throne. You may aſk me now, and the queſtion will not be at all improper, how it came to paſs, if the Queen and her miniſters had no deſign to defeat this ſucceſſion, that ſo much ſuſpicion of it prevailed, that ſo great an alarm was taken, and ſo great a clamour raiſed? I might anſwer you very ſhortly and very truly, by the ſtrange conduct of a firſt miniſter, by the conteſts about the negotiations of the peace, and by the arts of a party.

The minds of ſome miniſters are like the *ſanctum ſanctorum* of a temple I have read of ſomewhere: before it a great curtain was ſolemnly drawn; within it nothing was to be ſeen but a confuſed group of miſ-ſhapen and imperfect forms, heads without bodies, bodies without heads, and the like. To develope the moſt complicated caſes, and to decide in the moſt doubtful, has been the talent of great miniſters: it is that of others to perplex the moſt ſimple and to be puzzled by the plaineſt. No man was more deſirous of power than the miniſter here intended:

tended: and he had a competent ſhare of cunning to wriggle himſelf into it; but then his part was over, and no man was more at a loſs how to employ it. The ends he propoſed to himſelf, he ſaw for the moſt part darkly and indiſtinctly; and if he ſaw them a little better, he ſtill made uſe of means diſproportionate to them. That private correſpondence with the Queen, which produced the change of the miniſtry in 1710, was begun with him whilſt he was ſecretary of ſtate, and was continued through him during the two years that intervened between his leaving the court and his return to it. This gave him the ſole confidence of the Queen, put him more abſolutely at the head of the party that came into power, and inveſted him with all the authority that a firſt miniſter could have in thoſe days, and before any man could preſume to rival in that rank, and in this kindom, the rank of the ancient mayors of the palace in France. The Tories, with whom, and by whom he had riſen, expected much from him. Their expectations were ill anſwered: and I think that ſuch management as he employed, would not have hindered them long from breaking from him, if new things had not fallen in, to engage their whole attention, and to divert their paſſions.

The fooliſh proſecution of Sacheverel had carried party rage to the height, and the late change of miniſtry had confirmed it there. Theſe circumſtances, and many others relative to them, which I omit, would have made it impoſſible, if there had been honeſty and wiſdom enough to deſire it, to bring about a coalition of the bulk of the Tories and Whigs at the latter end of this reign: as it had been brought about a few years before, under the admi-

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niſtration of my Lord Marlborough and my Lord Godolphin, who broke it ſoon, and before it had time to cement, by making ſuch an uſe of it as I am unable to account for, even at this hour. The two parties were in truth become factions, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word. I was of one, and I own the guilt; which no man of the other would have a good grace to deny. In this reſpect they were alike; but here was the difference: one was well united, well conducted, and determined to their future as well as their preſent objects. Not one of theſe advantages attended the other. The miniſter had evidently no bottom to reſt his adminiſtration upon, but that of the party at the head of which he came into power: If he had reſted it there, if he had gained their confidence, inſtead of creating, even wantonly, if I may ſo ſay, a diſtruſt of himſelf in them, it is certain he might have determined them to every national intereſt during the Queen's time, and after her death. But this was above his conception as well as his talents. He meant to keep power as long as he could, by the little arts by which he had got into it: he thought that he ſhould be able to compound for himſelf in all events, and cared little what became of his party, his miſtreſs or the nation. That this was the whole of his ſcheme, appeared ſufficiently in the courſe of his adminiſtration; was then ſeen by ſome, and has been ſince acknowledged by all people. For this purpoſe he coaxed and perſecuted Whigs, he flattered and diſappointed Tories; and ſupported by a thouſand little tricks his tottering adminiſtration. To the Tory party he held out the peace, as an æra when all they expected ſhould be done for them, and when they ſhould be placed

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in ſuch fulneſs of power, and ſuch ſtrength of party, "that it would be more the intereſt of the ſucceſſor "to be well with them, than theirs to be well with "him." Such expreſſions were often uſed, and others of like import: and I believe theſe oracular ſpeeches were interpreted, as oracles uſed to be, according as every man's inclinations led him.

The conteſts that ſoon followed, by the violent oppoſition to the negotiations of peace, did the good hinted at above to the miniſter, and enabled him to amuſe and banter his party a little longer. But they did great, and in ſome reſpects irreparable, miſchief to Great Britain, and to all Europe. One part of the miſchief they did at home, is proper to be mentioned here. They dipped the houſe of Hanover in our party quarrels unſeaſonably, I preſume to think, and impopularly: for though the conteſt was maintained by two parties, that pretended equally to have the national intereſt at heart, yet the national intereſt was ſo plainly on one ſide of the queſtion, and the other ſide was ſo plainly partial, at the expence of this intereſt to the Emperor, the princes of the empire, and the Dutch in particular, that a ſucceſſor to the crown, who was himſelf a prince of Germany, ſhould have preſerved in good policy, for this very reaſon, the appearance at leaſt of ſome neutrality. The means employed openly to break the Queen's meaſures were indecent and unjuſtifiable: thoſe employed ſecretly, and meditated to be employed, were worſe. The miniſters of Hanover, whoſe conduct I may cenſure the more freely becauſe the late king did not approve it all, took ſo remarkable a ſhare in the firſt, that they might be, and they were, ſuſpected of having ſome in the o-

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thers. This had a very bad effect, which was improved by men in the two extremes. The Whigs desired nothing more than to have it thought that the successor was theirs, if I may repeat an insolent expression which was used at that time: the notion did them honour, and though it could give no colour, it gave some strength to their opposition. The Jacobites insinuated industriously the same thing; and represented, that the establishment of the house of Hanover would be the establishment of the Whig party, and that the interests of Great Britain would be constantly sacrificed to foreign interests, and her wealth drained to support them under that family. I leave you to judge what ingression such exaggerations must find, on such occasion, and in such a ferment. I do not think they determined men to Jacobitism. I know they did not; but I know that they disinclined men from the succession, and made many, who resolved to submit to it, submit to it rather as a necessary evil than as an eligible good.

This was, to the best of my observation and knowledge, the state of one party. An absurd one it was, and the consequences of it were foreseen, foretold, and pressed upon the minister at the time, but always without effect, and sometimes without any answers. He had some private intrigue for himself at Hanover: so he had at Bar. He was the bubble of one in the end; the Pretender was so of the other. But his whole management in the mean time was contrived to keep up a kind of general indetermination in the party, about the succession; which made a man of great temper once say to him with passion, that "he believed no other minister at the "head of a powerful party would not be better at

" Hanover, if he did not mean to be worſe there."

The ſtate of the other party was this. The Whigs had appeared zealous for the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, from the time when King William propoſed it, after the death of the Duke of Glouceſter. The Tories voted for it then, and the acts that were judged neceſſary to ſecure it, ſome of them at leaſt, were promoted by them. Yet were they not thought nor did they affect as the others did, to be thought extremely fond of it. King William did not come into this meaſure, till he found upon trial, that there was no other ſafe and practicable: and the Tories had an air of coming into it for no other reaſon. Beſides which, it is certain that there was, at that time, a much greater leaven of Jacobitiſm in the Tory-lump, than at the time ſpoken of here.

Now thus far the Whigs acted like a national party, who thought that their religion and liberty could be ſecured by no other expedient, and therefore adhered to this ſettlement of the crown, with diſtinguiſhed zeal. But this national party degenerated ſoon into faction; that is, the national intereſt became ſoon a ſecondary and ſubſervient motive, and the cauſe of the ſucceſſion was ſupported more for the ſake of the party or faction, than for the ſake of the nation; and with views that went more directly to the eſtabliſhment of their own adminiſtration, than to a ſolid ſettlement of the preſent royal family. This appeared evidently enough to thoſe whom noiſe and ſhew could not impoſe upon, in the latter end of the Queen's reign, and plain beyond diſpute to all mankind after her deceaſe. The art of the Whigs was to blend, as undiſtinguiſhably

diſtinguiſhably as they could, all their party-intereſts with thoſe of the ſucceſſion: and they made juſt the ſame factious uſe of the ſuppoſed danger of it, as the Tories had endeavoured to make ſome time before of the ſuppoſed danger of the church. As no man is reputed a friend to Chriſtianity, beyond the Alps and Pyrenees, who does not acknowledge the papal ſupremacy, ſo here no man was to be reputed a friend to the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, who did not acknowledge their ſupremacy. The intereſt of the preſent royal family was to ſucceed without oppoſition and riſque, and to come to the throne in a calm. It was the intereſt of a faction that they ſhould come to it in a ſtorm. Accordingly the Whigs were very near putting in execution ſome of the wildeſt projects of inſurrections and rebellion, under pretence of ſecuring what there was not ſufficient diſpoſition, nor any preparation at all made to obſtruct. Happily for the public theſe deſigns proved abortive. They were too well known to have ſucceeded, but they might have had, and they would have had, moſt fatal conſequences. The ſtorm, that was not raiſed to diſturb and endanger the late king's acceſſion, was only deferred. To a party, who meant nothing leſs than engroſſing the whole power of the government, and the whole wealth of the nation under the ſucceſſor, a ſtorm in which every other man ſhould be driven from him, was too neceſſary not to be conjured up at any rate; and it was ſo immediately after the late king's acceſſion. He came to the throne eaſily and quietly, and took poſſeſſion of the kingdom with as little trouble as he could have expected, if he had been not only the queen's

ſucceſſor but her ſon. The whole nation ſubmitted chearfully to his government, and the queen's ſervants diſcharged the duty of their offices, whilſt he continued them in their offices, in ſuch a manner as to merit his approbation. This was ſignified to ſome of them, to the ſecretaries in particular, in the ſtrongeſt terms, and according to his majeſty's expreſs order, before the whole council of ſtate. He might I think, I thought then that he ought, and every man except the Earl of O----d who believed, or had a mind to make others believe, that his influence would be great in the new reign, expected that he would have given his principal confidence, and the principal power of the adminiſtration to the Whigs: but it was ſcarce poſſible to expect, that he would immediately let looſe the whole fury of party, ſuffer the Queen's ſervants, who had ſurely been guilty of no crime againſt him nor the ſtate, to be ſo bitterly perſecuted; and proſcribe in effect every man in the country who did not bear the name of Whig. Princes have often forgot, on their acceſſion to a throne, even perſonal injuries received in party quarrels: and the ſaying of Louis the twelfth of France, in anſwer to thoſe who would have perſuaded him to ſhew ſeverity to La Tremouille, is very deſervedly famous, "God forbid," ſaid he, "that Lewis the "twelfth ſhould revenge the quarrels of the Duke "of Orleans." Other princes who have fought their way to the throne, have not only exerciſed clemency, but ſhewn favour to thoſe who have ſtood in arms againſt them: and here again I might quote the example of another king of France, that of Henry the fourth. But to take an example in our own country,

country, look back to the reſtoration, conſider all that paſſed from the year 1641 to the year 1660, and then compare the meaſures that King Charles the ſecond was adviſed to purſue for the eſtabliſhment of his government in the circumſtances of that time, with thoſe which the late king was adviſed and prevailed on, againſt his opinion, inclination, and firſt reſolution, to purſue, in the circumſtances I have juſt mentioned. I leave the concluſion to the candour and good ſenſe of every impartial reader.

To theſe meaſures of unexpected violence alone, it muſt be aſcribed, that the Pretender had any party for him, of ſtrength ſufficient to appear and act. Theſe meaſures alone produced the troubles that followed, and dyed the royal ermines of a prince, no way ſanguinary, in blood. I am far from excuſing one party for ſuffering another to drive them into rebellion. I wiſh I could forget it myſelf. But there are two obſervations on that event, which I cannot refuſe my ſelf to make. One is, that the very manner in which this rebellion was begun, ſhews abundantly that it was a ſtart of paſſion, a ſudden phrenzy of men tranſported by their reſentment, and nothing leſs than the execution of a deſign long premeditated and prepared. The other is that few examples are to be found in hiſtory, perhaps none of what happened on this occaſion, when the ſame men, in the ſame country, and in the compaſs of the ſame year, were ready to riſe in arms againſt one prince without any national cauſe; and then provoked by the violence of their councils, the oppoſite faction to riſe in actual rebellion againſt the ſucceſſor.

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These are some of the effects of maintaining divisions in a nation, and of governing by faction. I might descend into a detail of many fatal consequences that have followed, from the first false step which was taken, when the present settlement was so avowedly made on the narrow bottom of party. But I consider that this discourse is growing into length; that I have had, and shall have occasion to mention some of these consequences elsewhere; and that your own reflections on what has been said, will more than supply what I omit to say in this place. Let me therefore conclude by repeating, that division has caused all the mischief we lament, that union can alone retrieve it, and that a great advance towards this union was the coalition of parties, so happily begun, so successfully carried on, and of late so unaccountably neglected, to say no worse. But let me add, that this union can never be compleat, till it become an union of the head with the members, as well as of the members with one another: and that such an union can never be expected till patriotism fills the throne, and faction be banished from the administration.

THE END of VOLUME IV.

APR 17 1952

Cleaned & Oiled

January 1989